6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1983–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Knight v. Jewettgreen2 sentences1993(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 321, cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) Because Knight commands a strong plurality, and because it speaks generally to the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, we will follow Knight here.” (Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1397 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ].) According to the Knight court, the term “assumption of risk” applies to two different situations: “(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk—the catego 1993(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 321, cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) Because Knight commands a strong plurality, and because it speaks generally to the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, we will follow Knight here.” (Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1397 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ].) According to the Knight court, the term “assumption of risk” applies to two different situations: “(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk—the catego | 2 | 2 |
Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Clubgreen2 sentences1994(Id. at pp. 321-322 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Since Justice George’s analysis garnered the support of a majority of the high court, “. . . we follow the lead opinion as though it were a majority opinion.” (Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 817, 821, fn. 1 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 270 ].) 2 We assume that Knight speaks in terms of “ordinary careless conduct” rather than “negligent conduct” because the latter phrase connotes conduct which breaches a duty of care, and the existence of such a duty is the very issue to be decided here. 3 As phrased, the rule is not entirely clea 1994(Id. at pp. 321-322 (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Since Justice George’s analysis garnered the support of a majority of the high court, “. . . we follow the lead opinion as though it were a majority opinion.” (Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 817, 821, fn. 1 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 270 ].) 2 We assume that Knight speaks in terms of “ordinary careless conduct” rather than “negligent conduct” because the latter phrase connotes conduct which breaches a duty of care, and the existence of such a duty is the very issue to be decided here. 3 As phrased, the rule is not entirely clea | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Gaschlergreen2 sentences1993(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 321, cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) Because Knight commands a strong plurality, and because it speaks generally to the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, we will follow Knight here.” (Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1397 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ].) According to the Knight court, the term “assumption of risk” applies to two different situations: “(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk—the catego 1993(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 321, cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) Because Knight commands a strong plurality, and because it speaks generally to the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, we will follow Knight here.” (Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1397 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ].) According to the Knight court, the term “assumption of risk” applies to two different situations: “(1) those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk—the catego | 1 | 1 |
Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co.green2 sentences1988(Prescott v. Ralph’s Grocery Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) On appeal plaintiff contends that the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk no longer has any legal viability or that the doctrine is inapplicable to the present case as a matter of law. 1988(Prescott v. Ralph’s Grocery Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 158, 162 [ 265 P.2d 904 ].) On appeal plaintiff contends that the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk no longer has any legal viability or that the doctrine is inapplicable to the present case as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation
green
2 sentences1988To the extent that anything in Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1485 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 55 ] (a case in which the release document contained an express assumption of all risks) suggests a different rule, we respectfully decline to follow it. 10 While the existence of such a reasonable relationship (which itself will demonstrate reasonable foreseeability) might in some cases be an issue of fact, that is not so here. 1988To the extent that anything in Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1485 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 55 ] (a case in which the release document contained an express assumption of all risks) suggests a different rule, we respectfully decline to follow it. 10 While the existence of such a reasonable relationship (which itself will demonstrate reasonable foreseeability) might in some cases be an issue of fact, that is not so here. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1983Co. (1962) 15 Wis.2d 374 [ 113 N.W.2d 14 ], Springrose v. Willmore (1971) 292 Minn. 23 [ 192 N.W.2d 826 ] and Wilson v. Gordon (Me. 1976) 354 A.2d 398 where the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine abolished implied assumption of the risk as a separate defense under the comparative negligence law. 1983Co. (1962) 15 Wis.2d 374 [ 113 N.W.2d 14 ], Springrose v. Willmore (1971) 292 Minn. 23 [ 192 N.W.2d 826 ] and Wilson v. Gordon (Me. 1976) 354 A.2d 398 where the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine abolished implied assumption of the risk as a separate defense under the comparative negligence law. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Springrose v. Willmore
green
2 sentences1983Co. (1962) 15 Wis.2d 374 [ 113 N.W.2d 14 ], Springrose v. Willmore (1971) 292 Minn. 23 [ 192 N.W.2d 826 ] and Wilson v. Gordon (Me. 1976) 354 A.2d 398 where the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine abolished implied assumption of the risk as a separate defense under the comparative negligence law. 1983Co. (1962) 15 Wis.2d 374 [ 113 N.W.2d 14 ], Springrose v. Willmore (1971) 292 Minn. 23 [ 192 N.W.2d 826 ] and Wilson v. Gordon (Me. 1976) 354 A.2d 398 where the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine abolished implied assumption of the risk as a separate defense under the comparative negligence law. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Wilson v. Gordon
green
1 sentence1983Co. (1962) 15 Wis.2d 374 [ 113 N.W.2d 14 ], Springrose v. Willmore (1971) 292 Minn. 23 [ 192 N.W.2d 826 ] and Wilson v. Gordon (Me. 1976) 354 A.2d 398 where the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Maine abolished implied assumption of the risk as a separate defense under the comparative negligence law. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.