learned intermediary doctrine (Ohio) · Go Syfert
← Ohio issues

learned intermediary doctrine in Ohio

11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green
ohio · 1991 · cited in 7 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2000–2004
2 sentences

2002The trial court granted the motions in limine, concluding that there was “no compelling reason to limit the application of the learned intermediary doctrine only to prescription drugs.” The court relied on Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 147, 149 , 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 .

2002The trial court granted the motions in limine, concluding that there was “no compelling reason to limit the application of the learned intermediary doctrine only to prescription drugs.” The court relied on Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 147, 149 , 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 .

27
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc.green
ohio · 2002 · cited in 4 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2004–2020
2 sentences

2006In Vaccariello v. Smith Nephew Richards, Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 380 , the Ohio Supreme Court held: {¶ 28} "The learned intermediary doctrine does not relieve the manufacturer of liability to the ultimate user for an inadequate or misleading warning; it only provides that the warning reaches the ultimate user through the learned intermediary." {¶ 29} It is clear from the Court's holding in Vaccariello that a manufacturer's duty can only be discharged upon providing a learned intermediary with an adequate warning. {¶ 30} The total surface area of Basil's cranial wound was 48 centimeters.

2006The Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Vaccariello, supra, provides the standard to which a manufacturer is held pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine: {¶ 78} "The learned intermediary doctrine does not relieve the manufacturer of liability to the ultimate user for an inadequate or misleading warning; it only provides that the warning reaches the ultimate user through the learned intermediary." {¶ 79} The law in Ohio requires a manufacturer to provide an adequate warning.

14
Gaston v. Huntergreen
arizctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991Accord Gaston v. Hunter (App. 1978), 121 Ariz. 33, 46-47 , 588 P. 2d 326, 339-340 .

1991Accord Gaston v. Hunter (App. 1978), 121 Ariz. 33, 46-47 , 588 P. 2d 326, 339-340 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Seley v. G. D. Searle & Co. green
ohio · 1981
2 sentences

2003Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. {¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the learned intermediary doctrine and applied it in product liability actions involving prescription drugs.

2002Searle & Co. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 192 , 21 O.O.3d 121 , 423 N.E.2d 831 , paragraph one of the syllabus, this court stated: “A manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe ethical (prescription) drug is not strictly liable in tort to a consumer who has suffered injury as a result of ingesting that drug where the manufacturer has provided adequate warning to the medical profession of all potential adverse reactions inherent in the use of the drug of which the manufacturer, being held to the standards of an expert in the field, knew or should have known to exist at the time of marketing.” Smith & Nephe

51991–2003
Howell v. Dayton Power & Light Co. green
ohioctapp · 1995
1 sentence

2006Howell v. Dayton Power and Light Co. (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 6 , 13 ; Keeton v. Telemedia Co. of S. Ohio (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 1405 , 1409 . {¶ 40} Although the appellants argue that, pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine, the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict, we cannot agree.

12006–2006
Wethington v. Purdue Pharma LP green
ohsd · 2003
1 sentence

2004The court held that “doctors were adequately warned of the powerful dosage of OxyContin relative to morphine, and thus the Learned Intermediary Doctrine discharges the duty to warn from the manufacturer to the physician. {¶ 23} “Liability, in this case, therefore, turns on individual determinations.” Id. {¶ 24} The learned-intermediary doctrine has been adopted and applied by this court.

12004–2004
Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. green
ohio · 1997
2 sentences

2002We further stated that “ ‘[t]here is no repeal of the common law by mere implication.’ ” Id. at 287 , 677 N.E.2d at 798-799 , quoting Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 472 , 7 O.O.2d 209, 213 , 155 N.E.2d 471, 476 . {¶ 20} After reviewing the relevant statutes, we conclude that it is possible to believe that the General Assembly may have intended to exclude prescription medical devices from the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.

2002We further stated that “ ‘[t]here is no repeal of the common law by mere implication.’ ” Id. at 287 , 677 N.E.2d at 798-799 , quoting Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 472 , 7 O.O.2d 209, 213 , 155 N.E.2d 471, 476 . {¶ 20} After reviewing the relevant statutes, we conclude that it is possible to believe that the General Assembly may have intended to exclude prescription medical devices from the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.

12002–2002
Frantz v. Maher, Exr. green
ohioctapp · 1957
2 sentences

2002We further stated that “ ‘[t]here is no repeal of the common law by mere implication.’ ” Id. at 287 , 677 N.E.2d at 798-799 , quoting Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 472 , 7 O.O.2d 209, 213 , 155 N.E.2d 471, 476 . {¶ 20} After reviewing the relevant statutes, we conclude that it is possible to believe that the General Assembly may have intended to exclude prescription medical devices from the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.

2002We further stated that “ ‘[t]here is no repeal of the common law by mere implication.’ ” Id. at 287 , 677 N.E.2d at 798-799 , quoting Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 472 , 7 O.O.2d 209, 213 , 155 N.E.2d 471, 476 . {¶ 20} After reviewing the relevant statutes, we conclude that it is possible to believe that the General Assembly may have intended to exclude prescription medical devices from the application of the learned intermediary doctrine.

12002–2002
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation green
or · 1974
2 sentences

1991Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America (Tex. 1986), 717 S.W. 2d 588, 592 ; McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1974), 270 Ore. 375, 386-387 , 528 P. 2d 522, 529 .

1991Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America (Tex. 1986), 717 S.W. 2d 588, 592 ; McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1974), 270 Ore. 375, 386-387 , 528 P. 2d 522, 529 .

11991–1991
Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America green
tex · 1986
1 sentence

1991Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America (Tex. 1986), 717 S.W. 2d 588, 592 ; McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1974), 270 Ore. 375, 386-387 , 528 P. 2d 522, 529 .

11991–1991

Where else courts name it

IL 35 (1987–2026) PA 20 (1990–2020) NJ 14 (1992–2019) WA 13 (1989–2019) OH 11 (1991–2020) TX 11 (1986–2013) CA 10 (2008–2024) CT 9 (2001–2022) MS 8 (1993–2017) GA 7 (1995–2014) OK 6 (1994–2026) MA 6 (1999–2018) TN 6 (1994–2011) AL 5 (2003–2014) AZ 5 (2007–2018) MD 4 (2005–2008) UT 4 (2003–2025) DE 4 (1989–2021) NY 3 (1999–2018) KS 3 (1990–2020) WV 2 (2007–2018) FL 2 (2008–2015) AR 2 (1991–2011) OR 2 (2002–2022) MO 2 (1999–2016) VA 2 (2003–2004) KY 2 (2004–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check