learned intermediary doctrine in Connecticut

2019In Hurley , our Supreme Court noted: "If there exists an undisputed record demonstrating that [the defendant's product representative] did nothing inconsistent with the manual, then we would agree with the defendant that the trial court properly rendered judgment in its favor based on the learned intermediary doctrine." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 321 , 898 A.2d 777 .

2019In Hurley , our Supreme Court noted: "If there exists an undisputed record demonstrating that [the defendant's product representative] did nothing inconsistent with the manual, then we would agree with the defendant that the trial court properly rendered judgment in its favor based on the learned intermediary doctrine." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 321 , 898 A.2d 777 .

2019The doctrine is based on the principle that prescribing physicians act as learned intermediaries between a manufacturer and consumer and, therefore, stand in the best position to evaluate a patient's needs and assess [the] risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Synthes-Stratec, Inc ., 108 Conn. App. 105 , 110-12, 947 A.2d 383 (2008).

2019The doctrine is based on the principle that prescribing physicians act as learned intermediaries between a manufacturer and consumer and, therefore, stand in the best position to evaluate a patient's needs and assess [the] risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Breen v. Synthes-Stratec, Inc ., 108 Conn. App. 105 , 110-12, 947 A.2d 383 (2008).

2011Such training, experience or knowledge shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.” 16 “The learned intermediary doctrine is based on the principle that prescribing physicians act as learned intermediaries between a manufacturer and the consumer and, therefore, stand in the best position to evaluate a patient’s needs and assess the risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment. . . [and as a result] adequate warnings to prescribing physicians obviate the need for manufa

2011Such training, experience or knowledge shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.” 16 “The learned intermediary doctrine is based on the principle that prescribing physicians act as learned intermediaries between a manufacturer and the consumer and, therefore, stand in the best position to evaluate a patient’s needs and assess the risks and benefits of a particular course of treatment. . . [and as a result] adequate warnings to prescribing physicians obviate the need for manufa

2008Co. v. Namerow, 261 Conn. 784 , 786 n.2, 807 A.2d 467 (2002). 3 We note that the plaintiff has preserved this claim for our review by filing a request to charge, by filing an objection to the defendant’s proposed instructions and by taking exceptions to the charge as given, arguing that the instructions on comment (k) and the learned intermediary doctrine should not have been given because they were inapplicable. 4 Although the plaintiff contends, in his appellate brief, that the court should not have instructed the jury on comment (k) and on the learned *110 intermediary doctrine, he does not

2008Co. v. Namerow, 261 Conn. 784 , 786 n.2, 807 A.2d 467 (2002). 3 We note that the plaintiff has preserved this claim for our review by filing a request to charge, by filing an objection to the defendant’s proposed instructions and by taking exceptions to the charge as given, arguing that the instructions on comment (k) and the learned intermediary doctrine should not have been given because they were inapplicable. 4 Although the plaintiff contends, in his appellate brief, that the court should not have instructed the jury on comment (k) and on the learned *110 intermediary doctrine, he does not

2008We decline to consider this argument because “[i]t is well settled that claims on appeal must be adequately briefed . . . and cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument before the reviewing court.” Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 393 , 886 A.2d 391 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148 , 126 S. Ct. 2296 , 164 L.

2008We decline to consider this argument because “[i]t is well settled that claims on appeal must be adequately briefed . . . and cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument before the reviewing court.” Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 393 , 886 A.2d 391 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148 , 126 S. Ct. 2296 , 164 L.

2006Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly rejected the application of the exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine set forth in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 394 .

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2006App. 3d 869, 881 , 723 N.E.2d 302 (1999), aff'd, 198 Ill. 2d 420 , 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002); Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380, 384 , 763 N.E.2d 160 (2002); Rosci v. Acromed, Inc., 447 Pa. Super. 403, 423 , 669 A.2d 959 (1995). 11 Other than their misplaced reliance on certain language in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 377 ; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the plaintiffs cite no authority in support of any of their contentions as to why the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply in the present case. 12 We stated in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Co

2001Thus, courts have recognized exceptions regarding: (1) vaccine inoculations; Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., supra, 399 F.2d 131 ; (2) oral contraceptives; MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 135-36 , 475 N.E.2d 65 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 , 106 S. Ct. 250 , 88 L.

2001Thus, courts have recognized exceptions regarding: (1) vaccine inoculations; Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., supra, 399 F.2d 131 ; (2) oral contraceptives; MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 135-36 , 475 N.E.2d 65 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 , 106 S. Ct. 250 , 88 L.

2001Those jurisdictions in alphabetical order by state are as follows: Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 , 1303 n.2 (Ala. 1984); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 , 1195 n.6 (Alaska 1992); Dyer v. Best Pharmacol, 118 Ariz. 465, 468 , 577 P.2d 1084 (1978); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 39-41 , 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65 , 507 P.2d 653 , 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Caveny v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F. Sup. 1404, 1406 (D.

2001Those jurisdictions in alphabetical order by state are as follows: Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 , 1303 n.2 (Ala. 1984); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 , 1195 n.6 (Alaska 1992); Dyer v. Best Pharmacol, 118 Ariz. 465, 468 , 577 P.2d 1084 (1978); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 39-41 , 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65 , 507 P.2d 653 , 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Caveny v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F. Sup. 1404, 1406 (D.

2001Manufacturers in Connecticut are strictly liable for defective products under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 7 See Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 233 , 429 A.2d 486 (1980) (“[i]n Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284 , 216 A.2d 189 [1965], we accepted the principles adopted by the American Law Institute as contained in § 402A of the Restatement (Second), Torts, establishing strict liability in tort”).

2001Manufacturers in Connecticut are strictly liable for defective products under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 7 See Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 233 , 429 A.2d 486 (1980) (“[i]n Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284 , 216 A.2d 189 [1965], we accepted the principles adopted by the American Law Institute as contained in § 402A of the Restatement (Second), Torts, establishing strict liability in tort”).

2001Thus, courts have recognized exceptions regarding: (1) vaccine inoculations; Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., supra, 399 F.2d 131 ; (2) oral contraceptives; MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 135-36 , 475 N.E.2d 65 , cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 , 106 S. Ct. 250 , 88 L.

2001Those jurisdictions in alphabetical order by state are as follows: Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 , 1303 n.2 (Ala. 1984); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 , 1195 n.6 (Alaska 1992); Dyer v. Best Pharmacol, 118 Ariz. 465, 468 , 577 P.2d 1084 (1978); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 39-41 , 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65 , 507 P.2d 653 , 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Caveny v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F. Sup. 1404, 1406 (D.

2001Those jurisdictions in alphabetical order by state are as follows: Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 , 1303 n.2 (Ala. 1984); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 , 1195 n.6 (Alaska 1992); Dyer v. Best Pharmacol, 118 Ariz. 465, 468 , 577 P.2d 1084 (1978); West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33, 39-41 , 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65 , 507 P.2d 653 , 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973); Caveny v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 818 F. Sup. 1404, 1406 (D.