minimum sentence violation in Ohio

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2005However, appellate review of felony sentencing decisions is a "meaningful review": "`Meaningful review' means that an appellate court hearing an appeal of a felony sentence may modify or vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing if the court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentence or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 466 , 793 N.E.2d 473 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , ¶ 10 ; R.C. § 2953.08 . {¶ 74} Appellant argues that the trial court should have stated its analysis supporting its d

2005However, appellate review of felony sentencing decisions is a "meaningful review": "`Meaningful review' means that an appellate court hearing an appeal of a felony sentence may modify or vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing if the court clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentence or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 , 466 , 793 N.E.2d 473 , 2003-Ohio-4165 , ¶ 10 ; R.C. § 2953.08 . {¶ 74} Appellant argues that the trial court should have stated its analysis supporting its d

2009State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 157 . {¶ 15} Prior to State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , unless certain findings were made by the trial court, a defendant was entitled to a presumption of the minimum sentence and a presumption of concurrent sentences.

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2005State v. Cox, Butler App. No. CA2003-05-113, 2004-Ohio-4977 , ¶ 56; Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d at 324 . {¶ 19} However, R.C. 2929.14 (B) expressly provides an exception to the minimum sentence presumption when a sentencing court finds, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 (C), that a maximum sentence is warranted.

2004Therefore, he argues that the trial court's failure to impose the minimum sentence was error. {¶ 24} R.C. 2929.14 (B) provides as follows: {¶ 25} "Except as provided in division (C), (D)(1), (D)(2), (D)(3), or (G) of this section, in section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, or in Chapter 2925 of the Revised Code, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of

2009State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 157 . {¶ 15} Prior to State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , unless certain findings were made by the trial court, a defendant was entitled to a presumption of the minimum sentence and a presumption of concurrent sentences.

2008No. CA2006-01-002, 2006-Ohio-5511 , ¶ 3 . *Page 6 {¶ 13} We must now determine whether the record demonstrates clear and convincing evidence that Chambers' consecutive sentences were contrary to law. {¶ 14} Prior to Foster , unless certain findings were made by the trial court, a defendant was entitled to a presumption of the minimum sentence and a presumption of concurrent sentences.

2007See, e.g., State v. Tobin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-150, 2007-Ohio-1345 , ¶ 107 ; State v. Davis , Clark App. No. 2006 CA 69, 2007-Ohio-1030 , ¶ 43 ; State v. Durbin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-134, 2006-Ohio-5125 , ¶ 42 ; State v. Eicholtz , Clark App. No. 06-CA-27, 2007-Ohio-1032 , ¶ 9 ; see also State v. Bruce , 170 Ohio App.3d 92 , 2007-Ohio-175 . {¶ 5} Because we cannot declare the operation of Foster to be an ex post facto or due process violation, we overrule Smith's assignment of error and affirm the *Page 3 judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.

2007Heddleston, 84 Ohio St.3d at 214 .

2007See, e.g., State v. Tobin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-150, 2007-Ohio-1345 , ¶ 107 ; State v. Davis , Clark App. No. 2006 CA 69, 2007-Ohio-1030 , ¶ 43 ; State v. Durbin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-134, 2006-Ohio-5125 , ¶ 42 ; State v. Eicholtz , Clark App. No. 06-CA-27, 2007-Ohio-1032 , ¶ 9 ; see also State v. Bruce , 170 Ohio App.3d 92 , 2007-Ohio-175 . {¶ 5} Because we cannot declare the operation of Foster to be an ex post facto or due process violation, we overrule Smith's assignment of error and affirm the *Page 3 judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.

2007See, e.g., State v. Tobin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-150, 2007-Ohio-1345 , ¶ 107 ; State v. Davis , Clark App. No. 2006 CA 69, 2007-Ohio-1030 , ¶ 43 ; State v. Durbin , Greene App. No. 2005-CA-134, 2006-Ohio-5125 , ¶ 42 ; State v. Eicholtz , Clark App. No. 06-CA-27, 2007-Ohio-1032 , ¶ 9 ; see also State v. Bruce , 170 Ohio App.3d 92 , 2007-Ohio-175 . {¶ 5} Because we cannot declare the operation of Foster to be an ex post facto or due process violation, we overrule Smith's assignment of error and affirm the *Page 3 judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2006In fact, she testified that she was "100 percent sure" that appellant was the individual who shot her. {¶ 30} Based upon the aforementioned, appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, his second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 31} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the minimum sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . {¶ 32} Until recently, R.C. 2929.14 (B) governed more than the minium sentences, and required that "if the co

2005This issue has recently been addressed in this court's en banc decision of State v. Atkins-Boozer, Cuyahoga App. No. 84151, 2005-Ohio-2666 .

2005State v. Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240 , 242 , 2004-Ohio-2659 .

2004Therefore, he argues that the trial court's failure to impose the minimum sentence was error. {¶ 24} R.C. 2929.14 (B) provides as follows: {¶ 25} "Except as provided in division (C), (D)(1), (D)(2), (D)(3), or (G) of this section, in section 2907.02 of the Revised Code, or in Chapter 2925 of the Revised Code, if the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of