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11 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2025Thomas is incorrect. {¶20} “In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement permitting a limited protective search of an automobile during a traffic stop.” State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-1201, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Grady v. Corbinred1 sentence1991The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohio, supra, found the constitutional exception to “exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 169, fn. 7 ; accord Grady v. Corbin, supra, at_, 109 L. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1991The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohio, supra, found the constitutional exception to “exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 169, fn. 7 ; accord Grady v. Corbin, supra, at_, 109 L. 1991The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohio, supra, found the constitutional exception to “exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 169, fn. 7 ; accord Grady v. Corbin, supra, at_, 109 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Long
green
2 sentences2025Thomas is incorrect. {¶20} “In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement permitting a limited protective search of an automobile during a traffic stop.” State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-1201, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). 2025Thomas is incorrect. {¶20} “In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , 103 S.Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement permitting a limited protective search of an automobile during a traffic stop.” State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-1201, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). | 2 | 2014–2025 |
State v. DeMarco
green
2 sentences1998In State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191 , the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative error. 1998In State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 191 , the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of cumulative error. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Beeman
green
2 sentences1998Pursuant to this doctrine, a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial, even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49 , 64 . 1998"Pursuant to this doctrine, a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49 , 64 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Diaz v. United States
green
2 sentences1991“Two, there being a less serious offense for which the defendant has been previously tried, is the state prohibited from relitigating the factual issues already resolved in the prior trial, or do the facts of this case present an exception to the general rule prohibiting multiple prosecutions?” The exception referred to in Thomas, supra, originated in Diaz v. United States (1912), 223 U.S. 442 , where the Supreme Court recognized an exception to a double jeopardy statute by holding that a defendant’s conviction of assault and battery did not prevent a subsequent prosecution for homicide after 1980In Diaz, supra, the Supreme Court recognized this exception in construing a double jeopardy statute in force in the Philippines. | 2 | 1980–1991 |
Free v. Bland
green
2 sentences2022The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 , 82 S.Ct. 1089 (1962). 2022The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 , 82 S.Ct. 1089 (1962). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Industrial Commission v. Heil
green
1 sentence2022In concluding that the employees were in the course of employment at the time of the accident, the Supreme Court noted that the rigging business required the employees to “set up on a customer’s premises, drill a well and, after completion, disassemble the derrick for transport to the next jobsite.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hodge
green
2 sentences2011Weimert then claims that since the Supreme Court recognized its error in State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2010-Ohio-6320 , 941 N.E.2d 768 , public policy requires the original statutory language be followed. 2011Weimert then claims that since the Supreme Court recognized its error in State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2010-Ohio-6320 , 941 N.E.2d 768 , public policy requires the original statutory language be followed. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Nottingdale Homeowners' Ass'n v. Darby
green
1 sentence2000In Nottingdale Homeowners' Assn. v. Darby (1987) 33 Ohio St.3d 32 , the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general rule, under which attorney fees are ordinarily not recoverable, and determined that if the parties' agreement in a noncommercial context provides for such an award, such an agreement could be enforced if the fees awarded are fair, just, and reasonable as determined by the trial court upon full consideration of all the circumstances of the case. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
First Capital Corp. v. G & J Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2000In First Capital Corp. v. G J Industries, Inc. (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 106 , this Court applied a more expansive view to Nottingdale and stated: We read Nottingdale and the cases cited above as holding that attorney fee provisions are unenforceable in those commercial situations where there is uneven bargaining position, where the provision promotes litigation and illegal acts such as evading the usury laws, where the provision acts as a penalty, and where the terms of the provision are not freely negotiable. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stuart v. Stuart
green
1 sentence1953In December 1944, in Stuart v. Stuart, supra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of the Durham case. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.