11 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1913–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Federal Paper Board Co. v. Kosydargreen2 sentences2011The use tax, therefore, is not a tax laid upon the property, itself, but, rather, ‘is a tax upon the privilege of use of property * * *.’ Federal Paper Board Co. v. Kosydar (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 28, at 32 , 306 N.E.2d 416 . 2011The use tax, therefore, is not a tax laid upon the property, itself, but, rather, ‘is a tax upon the privilege of use of property * * *.’ Federal Paper Board Co. v. Kosydar (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 28, at 32 , 306 N.E.2d 416 . | 2 | 6 |
Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levingreen2 sentences2020See Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2009-Ohio-4872 , 916 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 17 (“we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor” [emphasis deleted]). 2020See Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2009-Ohio-4872 , 916 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 17 (“we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor” [emphasis deleted]). | 1 | 1 |
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porterfieldgreen2 sentences1983The fact that, subsequent to the ‘taxable moment,’ the property is newly inserted into interstate commerce does not affect the validity of the use tax assessment.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porterfield (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 154, 158 [ 54 O.O.2d 277 ]. 1983The fact that, subsequent to the ‘taxable moment,’ the property is newly inserted into interstate commerce does not affect the validity of the use tax assessment.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porterfield (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 154, 158 [ 54 O.O.2d 277 ]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts. Reading Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2009Gross Receipts (1872), 82 U.S. 284 , 15 Wall. 284, 296 , 21 L.Ed. 164 (“nor is it deniable that gross receipts may be a measure of proximate value” of a business privilege). {¶ 17} Second, in this context, we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor. 2009Gross Receipts (1872), 82 U.S. 284 , 15 Wall. 284, 296 , 21 L.Ed. 164 (“nor is it deniable that gross receipts may be a measure of proximate value” of a business privilege). {¶ 17} Second, in this context, we have long recognized a distinction between a tax upon a certain factor and a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Aluminum Co. of America v. Evatt
green
2 sentences2009But as we explained in Aluminum Co. of Am., “it must be kept crystal clear that the only purpose of the [franchise-tax] formula * * * is to determine by uniform rules * * * the value of the use of the corporate franchise in this state.” (Emphasis deleted.) 140 Ohio St. at 394 , 24 O.O. 405 , 45 N.E.2d 118 . 2009But as we explained in Aluminum Co. of Am., “it must be kept crystal clear that the only purpose of the [franchise-tax] formula * * * is to determine by uniform rules * * * the value of the use of the corporate franchise in this state.” (Emphasis deleted.) 140 Ohio St. at 394 , 24 O.O. 405 , 45 N.E.2d 118 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Howell Air, Inc. v. Porterfield
green
1 sentence1988Under the statutes in question, ‘ “Use” means and includes the exercise of any right or power incidental to the ownership of the thing used.’ R.C. 5741.01(C).” Saviers v. Smith (1920), 101 Ohio St. 132 , 128 N.E. 269 , cited in Howell Air, supra, provides the following definition of an excise at paragraph four of the syllabus: “An excise is a tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation or the enjoyment of a privilege, and by the provisions of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, specific authority has been conferred for the levying of such a tax.” When the c | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Louisville Title Agency for N. W. Ohio, Inc. v. Kosydar
green
1 sentence1981Ohio v. Kosydar (1975), 43 Ohio St. 2d 109, 111 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
green
2 sentences1971However, a tax upon the privilege of use or storage of property purchased in another state after the property has come to rest in the taxing state, and has reached the end of its interstate transit, was upheld in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. (1937), 300 U. S. 577 , 81 L. 1971However, a tax upon the privilege of use or storage of property purchased in another state after the property has come to rest in the taxing state, and has reached the end of its interstate transit, was upheld in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. (1937), 300 U. S. 577 , 81 L. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co.
green
1 sentence1913It is sought by the state in this case to sustain the tax upon the principle that the state has not levied a tax upon the defendant which includes the full value of its property as a going concern, but the United States Supreme Court in the case of Myer, Auditor, v. Wells Fargo Company, 223 U. S., 298 , in construing the statute of Oklahoma, which contained the same language substantially as the Ohio statute with reference to the taxation of the tangible property of the company, applied the doctrine of the Texas case. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.