tax upon privilege in Washington

1940Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402 , 25 P. (2d) 91 , said: “ ‘The privilege of engaging in business and gainful pursuits under the protection of our laws is something which must and does exist before the business can be established, and something far and away beyond and above the mere ownership of a business . . . “ ‘This is the privilege . . . which it is now sought to tax.’ ” The occupational tax imposed by chapter 191, Laws of 1933, and the public utility tax imposed by title V, chapter 180, Laws of 1935, were both sustained as a tax upon the privilege of engaging in certain businesses, includi

1940Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402 , 25 P. (2d) 91 , said: “ ‘The privilege of engaging in business and gainful pursuits under the protection of our laws is something which must and does exist before the business can be established, and something far and away beyond and above the mere ownership of a business . . . “ ‘This is the privilege . . . which it is now sought to tax.’ ” The occupational tax imposed by chapter 191, Laws of 1933, and the public utility tax imposed by title V, chapter 180, Laws of 1935, were both sustained as a tax upon the privilege of engaging in certain businesses, includi

1964Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 429-431 , 214 S. W. 2d 248, 253-254 .

1964Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 429-431 , 214 S. W. 2d 248, 253-254 .

1941Ed. 1232 , 52 S. Ct. 631 , and cases therein cited, and Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra. In the last cited case, the United States supreme court said: “A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” In Great Northern R.

1941Ed. 814 , 57 S. Ct. 524 , said: “A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” In the face of that decision, this court held in Pacific Tel. & Tel.

1941Co. v. Henneford, 195 Wash. 553 , 81 P. (2d) 786 , that the compensating tax could not be collected upon property bought in other states for use in this *23 state if such property could not be purchased in this state.

1941Co. v. Henneford, 195 Wash. 553 , 81 P. (2d) 786 , that the compensating tax could not be collected upon property bought in other states for use in this *23 state if such property could not be purchased in this state.

1941Co. v. Cohn, 3 Wn. (2d) 672, 101 P. (2d) 985 , this court held that the legislature, in both the 1937 statute and the 1939 act, had restricted the tax to those engaged in the business of selling fuel oil; and that a railway company which brought fuel oil into the state and stored it solely for its own use, was not a distributor within the statutory definition of *391 the term.

1936In Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 5 , supra, the Union Pacific Railway, a corporation chartered by Congress, soug’ht by reason of the source of its incorporation and certain services agreed to be rendered to the government of the United States, to avoid taxes levied upon its property by one of the counties of the state of Nebraska.

1935In Barataria Canning Co. v. State, 101 Miss. 890 , 58 So. 769 , a tax of three cents per barrel, “laid upon all oysters canned and packed in, and all oysters shipped raw in or from this state,” was upheld as a tax upon the privilege of doing-business.

1935In Barataria Canning Co. v. State, 101 Miss. 890 , 58 So. 769 , a tax of three cents per barrel, “laid upon all oysters canned and packed in, and all oysters shipped raw in or from this state,” was upheld as a tax upon the privilege of doing-business.

1935The case of Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494 , 34 S. Ct. 377 , and Foote & Co. v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228 , 81 Atl. 511 , cited by the majority, are clearly distinguishable.

1935The case of Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494 , 34 S. Ct. 377 , and Foote & Co. v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228 , 81 Atl. 511 , cited by the majority, are clearly distinguishable.

1935The case of Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494 , 34 S. Ct. 377 , and Foote & Co. v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228 , 81 Atl. 511 , cited by the majority, are clearly distinguishable.

1935The case of Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494 , 34 S. Ct. 377 , and Foote & Co. v. Clagett, 116 Md. 228 , 81 Atl. 511 , cited by the majority, are clearly distinguishable.

1935Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402 , 25 P. (2d) 91 , in upholding chapter 191, Laws of 1933, p. 869 [Rem. 1933 Sup., §8326-1 et seq.~], imposing a tax upon the privilege of engaging in business activities, after quoting article VII, § 1, of the state constitution, we said: " This being an excise tax, the legislature, under the 14th amendment'to our state constitution, has very broad power, and we cannot interfere with that power except for arbitrary action, clear abuse, or constructive fraud appearing on the face of the act or from facts of which we may take judicial knowledge. ’ ’ The appellant r

1935Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402 , 25 P. (2d) 91 , in upholding chapter 191, Laws of 1933, p. 869 [Rem. 1933 Sup., §8326-1 et seq.~], imposing a tax upon the privilege of engaging in business activities, after quoting article VII, § 1, of the state constitution, we said: " This being an excise tax, the legislature, under the 14th amendment'to our state constitution, has very broad power, and we cannot interfere with that power except for arbitrary action, clear abuse, or constructive fraud appearing on the face of the act or from facts of which we may take judicial knowledge. ’ ’ The appellant r

1931These cases were cited with distinct approval, and the rule they applied in distinguishing *401 between the subject and the measure of the tax was recognized as an established one, in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 165 .