tax upon privilege in Illinois

2013Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill. 2d 491, 500 (1979) (holding that a tax upon the privilege 22 1-12-0265) 1-12-1556)Cons. of participating in or witnessing an amusement was not a tax on an occupation) (citing Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 2d 10 (1976)).

2013Kerasotes Rialto Theater Corp. v. City of Peoria, 77 Ill. 2d 491, 500 (1979) (holding that a tax upon the privilege of participating in or witnessing an amusement was not a tax on an occupation (citing Town of Cicero v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 65 Ill. 2d 10 (1976))).

1989DECISION The Department quotes Justice Ryan’s statement in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 446, 449 , 419 N.E.2d 899 , 901: “The Illinois use tax is a tax upon the privilege of using personal property within the State.” United involved petroleum purchased in Indiana from Shell Oil Company and delivered to United in Illinois for use in United planes.

1989DECISION The Department quotes Justice Ryan’s statement in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Johnson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 446, 449 , 419 N.E.2d 899 , 901: “The Illinois use tax is a tax upon the privilege of using personal property within the State.” United involved petroleum purchased in Indiana from Shell Oil Company and delivered to United in Illinois for use in United planes.

1989(United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 45, 46 , 273 N.E.2d 585, 586 .) As is apparent, the reason for the use tax is to complement the retailers’ occupation tax by preventing the evasion of tax on purchases made outside the State and equalize a competitive disadvantage of Illinois retailers who face retailers’ occupational tax liability.

1989(United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 45, 46 , 273 N.E.2d 585, 586 .) As is apparent, the reason for the use tax is to complement the retailers’ occupation tax by preventing the evasion of tax on purchases made outside the State and equalize a competitive disadvantage of Illinois retailers who face retailers’ occupational tax liability.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1999Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the subsequent decisions of the supreme court in Commercial National Bank v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. 2d 45 , 432 N.E.2d 227 (1982), Waukegan Community Unit School District No. 60 v. City of Waukegan, 95 Ill. 2d 244 , 447 N.E.2d 345 (1983), and Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1 , 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), mandate a different result in this case.

1982(Reif v. Barrett (1933), 355 Ill. 104, 117 .) The tax was not upon a given occupation as that term may be narrowly used.

1982In fact, in Reif this court upheld this State's retailers' occupation tax as a tax upon the privilege to engage in the business of selling tangible personal property to purchasers for use or consumption. ( Reif v. Barrett (1933), 355 Ill. 104, 117 .) The tax was not upon a given occupation as that term may be narrowly used.

1976(Granite City Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 552 ; Spring Hill Cemetery v. Ryan (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 608 ; People ex rel.

1976(Granite City Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 552 ; Spring Hill Cemetery v. Ryan (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 608 ; People ex rel.

1975(Mutual Tobacco Co. v. Halpin (1953), 414 Ill. 226 , 111 N.E.2d 155 .) On the other hand, the Cigarette Use Tax Act, both in its title and in paragraph 453.32 which contains the taxing provision, purports to impose a tax upon the privilege of using cigarettes in Illinois.

1975(Mutual Tobacco Co. v. Halpin (1953), 414 Ill. 226 , 111 N.E.2d 155 .) On the other hand, the Cigarette Use Tax Act, both in its title and in paragraph 453.32 which contains the taxing provision, purports to impose a tax upon the privilege of using cigarettes in Illinois.

1975If so the tax on storage and use-retention and exercise of a right of ownership, respectively — was effective.' (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus, in Southern Pacific and in its companion case Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 182 , 83 L.Ed. 595 , 59 S.Ct. 396 , the assessment of a use tax by California was upheld even though the equipment was installed immediately upon arrival in California.

1975If so the tax on storage and use-retention and exercise of a right of ownership, respectively — was effective.' (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus, in Southern Pacific and in its companion case Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 182 , 83 L.Ed. 595 , 59 S.Ct. 396 , the assessment of a use tax by California was upheld even though the equipment was installed immediately upon arrival in California.

1975A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” A tax on property or upon a taxable event in the State, apart from operation, does not interfere with interstate commerce (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 ), and “‘[practical continuity’ does not always make an act a part of interstate commerce.” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167, 177 , 83 L.Ed. 586, 593 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus wh

1975A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” A tax on property or upon a taxable event in the State, apart from operation, does not interfere with interstate commerce (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 ), and “‘[practical continuity’ does not always make an act a part of interstate commerce.” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167, 177 , 83 L.Ed. 586, 593 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus wh

1975A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” A tax on property or upon a taxable event in the State, apart from operation, does not interfere with interstate commerce (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 ), and “‘[practical continuity’ does not always make an act a part of interstate commerce.” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167, 177 , 83 L.Ed. 586, 593 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus wh

1975A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena of debate.” A tax on property or upon a taxable event in the State, apart from operation, does not interfere with interstate commerce (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167 , 83 L.Ed. 586 , 59 S.Ct. 389 ), and “‘[practical continuity’ does not always make an act a part of interstate commerce.” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher (1939), 306 U.S. 167, 177 , 83 L.Ed. 586, 593 , 59 S.Ct. 389 .) Thus wh

1968Every one who has paid a use or sales tax anywhere, or, more accurately, in any state, is to that extent to be exempt from the payment of another tax * * 300 U.S. at 583-84 , 81 L.

1968Every one who has paid a use or sales tax anywhere, or, more accurately, in any state, is to that extent to be exempt from the payment of another tax * * 300 U.S. at 583-84 , 81 L.