give instruction in Oregon

2026Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 348 , 353 P3d 563 (2015).

2026Montara Owners Assn. v. La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 348 , 353 P3d 563 (2015).

1978See, e.g., Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 235 Or 454, 458 , 385 P2d 611 (1963). 3 The relevant statutes are: ORS 487.465, 487.470(4) (the basic speed rule and the 55 miles per hour limitation); ORS 487.165 (requiring driver to drive on the right of the highway); ORS 487.190 (requiring vehicles proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on the right and to give each other one half of the roadway); and ORS 487.195(3) (prohibiting driving on the left side of the center line when the driver’s view is obstructed). 4 We note that in Woosley v. Dunning, 268 Or 233 , 520 P2d 340 (1974), the defendant reque

1978See, e.g., Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 235 Or 454, 458 , 385 P2d 611 (1963). 3 The relevant statutes are: ORS 487.465, 487.470(4) (the basic speed rule and the 55 miles per hour limitation); ORS 487.165 (requiring driver to drive on the right of the highway); ORS 487.190 (requiring vehicles proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on the right and to give each other one half of the roadway); and ORS 487.195(3) (prohibiting driving on the left side of the center line when the driver’s view is obstructed). 4 We note that in Woosley v. Dunning, 268 Or 233 , 520 P2d 340 (1974), the defendant reque

1951Spence, Adm’x, v. Rasmussen et al., 190 Or. 662, 688 , 226 P. 2d 819 .

1951Spence, Adm’x, v. Rasmussen et al., 190 Or. 662, 688 , 226 P. 2d 819 .

1933Instructions must be considered as a whole, and if they fairly present the case to the jury the verdict will not be disturbed: Bank of California v. Portland Hide and Wool Co., 131 Or. 123 ( 282 P. 99 ).

1933Instructions must be considered as a whole, and if they fairly present the case to the jury the verdict will not be disturbed: Bank of California v. Portland Hide and Wool Co., 131 Or. 123 ( 282 P. 99 ).

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1927The question of whether there was probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact, and in this state where the facts are controverted it has always been held that it is necessary for the court to inform the jury that if they find a particular state of facts to exist, then they must find that there was probable cause or want of probable cause as the case may be, and that it is not proper for the court to give an instruction defining probable cause and then leave it to the jury to determine whether the facts are within or without the definition: Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or. 164 ; Gee v. Culver, 12

1924L.; State v. Stevenson, 98 Or. 985 ( 193 Pac. 1030 ).

1910In State v. Magers, 36 Or. 38 ( 58 Pac. 892 ), error was predicated upon the omission of the court to give the instruction alleged to have been requested in this case, and this court held that no appealable error was committed unless the instruction was requested.

1910In State v. Magers, 36 Or. 38 ( 58 Pac. 892 ), error was predicated upon the omission of the court to give the instruction alleged to have been requested in this case, and this court held that no appealable error was committed unless the instruction was requested.

1901But we think, while it would have been safer for the court to give the instruction so often approved by this court (State v. Morey, 25 .Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655 , 36 Pac. 573 ), the one given is substantially correct and could not have misled the jury in any way : State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 89 ( 21 N. W. 195 ); Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635 (4 Am.

1901But we think, while it would have been safer for the court to give the instruction so often approved by this court (State v. Morey, 25 .Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655 , 36 Pac. 573 ), the one given is substantially correct and could not have misled the jury in any way : State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 89 ( 21 N. W. 195 ); Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635 (4 Am.

1901But we think, while it would have been safer for the court to give the instruction so often approved by this court (State v. Morey, 25 .Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655 , 36 Pac. 573 ), the one given is substantially correct and could not have misled the jury in any way : State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 89 ( 21 N. W. 195 ); Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635 (4 Am.

1891(Hayden v. Long, 8 Or. 244 ; Moorhouse v. Donaca, 14 Or. 430 ; Woodward v. O.

1891(Hayden v. Long, 8 Or. 244 ; Moorhouse v. Donaca, 14 Or. 430 ; Woodward v. O.

1874Not guilty.” To ascertain whether this charge is erroneous or not it will be necessary to ascertain whether there was any evidence tending' to establish the crime of manslaughter; if there was it was error in the court to give the instruction above set forth, for the jury are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the weight of the evidence; bqt if on a trial for murder there is no evidence of facts and circumstances such as would, under the law, reduce the crime charged to manslaughter, the judge may so inform the jury, and may charge them that they cannot consider the question of manslaugh