State responds error in Oregon

2019The state responds that the rule does not have that effect, because the manual merely recites dates that are established elsewhere by constitutional provisions and state statute. 1 We agree with the state on the merits; moreover, petitioner's challenge to the rule relies on an understanding of the initiative process, and the secretary's role in that process, that has been rejected in Unger v. Rosenblum , 362 Or. 210 , 225, 407 P.3d 817 (2017), and Geddry v. Richardson , 296 Or.

2019App. 134 , 141, 437 P.3d 1163 (2019).

2015In addition, because “the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” Id.

2015However, defendant states, without development of any argument, that “the Partain rule should apply to the individual sentences imposed on each charge in a particular case.” The state responds that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply in this case, because defendant’s new total sentence, which is “about half as long” as his original total sentence, is “less severe than the original total sentence.” Thus, according to the state, “[i]n the absence of evidence of actual vindictiveness, defendant’s argument * * * fails.” The Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o state shall * * * depr

2008The state responds that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the testimony of the victim of the offenses “clearly established that each of the offenses was a separate incident; that is, they each occurred at different times and at different locations over a period of years.” See generally State v. Cook, 340 Or 530, 544 , 135 P3d 260 (2006) (describing federal constitutional harmless error standard).

2008The state responds that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the testimony of the victim of the offenses “clearly established that each of the offenses was a separate incident; that is, they each occurred at different times and at different locations over a period of years.” See generally State v. Cook, 340 Or 530, 544 , 135 P3d 260 (2006) (describing federal constitutional harmless error standard).

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: “No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is “to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search.” State v. Devine, 30

2002Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, provides: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the particularity requirement is "to minimize the risk of intrusion into premises other than those as to which a magistrate has found probable cause to search." State v. Devine, 30

2000The state further suggests that this court should revisit its conclusion in State v. Amini, 154 Or App 589 , 963 P2d 65 , rev allowed 327 Or 620 (1998), that jury instructions can ever violate the “impartial jury” provisions of Article I, section 11.

2000The state further suggests that this court should revisit its conclusion in State v. Amini, 154 Or App 589 , 963 P2d 65 , rev allowed 327 Or 620 (1998), that jury instructions can ever violate the “impartial jury” provisions of Article I, section 11.

1997The state argues, particularly, that the “law of the case” doctrine did not prevent the trial court from considering the state’s additional evidence on remand, because “the legal issue on remand was not the same one already decided by this court.” Thus, the state asserts, given our “sua sponte” consideration of the extra-executive authority issue in Custer I, 126 Or App at 435-36 , “neither the language of this court’s remand nor any other doctrine of law prohibited the trial court from giving the state a fair chance *493 to put on its proof [of extra-executive authority] at the hearing follow

1980Citing State v. Thompson, 25 Or App 511, 514-15 , 649 P2d 1292 (1976), the state concedes that the resenencing court was without power to impose costs upon efendant in addition to the restitution originally •rdered.

1980Citing State v. Thompson, 25 Or App 511, 514-15 , 649 P2d 1292 (1976), the state concedes that the resenencing court was without power to impose costs upon efendant in addition to the restitution originally •rdered.