agreed doctrine in Pennsylvania

1983Although Green Tree involved a plurality opinion, our Supreme Court, in Shenango Valley, noted that: [I]t was clear from [Green Tree] that four members of this court agreed the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies -would not bar equitable intervention where there are both a substantial question of constitutionality and the absence of an adequate statutory remedy. [Emphasis in original.] Id. at , 451 A.2d at 438 . 5 Here, however, Lai’s challenge focuses not on the •general validity of the taxing statute, but on whether that statute has been administered arbitrarily.

1982Nevertheless, it was clear from that decision that four members of this Court agreed the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies would not bar equitable intervention where there are both a substantial question of constitutionality and the absence of an adequate statutory remedy. 459 Pa. at 276 , 328 A.2d at 819 . [9] Appellee charges that (1) the delegation of authority to the Department under the Act contravenes Art.

2024Id. at 180- 81.10 The OAJC expressly defined the public policy supporting the presumption of paternity as “the concern that marriages which function as family units should not be 10 Four members of the Court agreed that the presumption’s application is limited to cases where its underlying policies are furthered, as Justice Cappy joined the OAJC, and Justice Newman’s concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Justice Castille joined, expressly agreed with this portion of the OAJC. [J-61-2023] - 16 destroyed by disputes over the parentage of children conceived or born during the marriage.” Id.

2024Id. at 180- 81.10 The OAJC expressly defined the public policy supporting the presumption of paternity as “the concern that marriages which function as family units should not be 10 Four members of the Court agreed that the presumption’s application is limited to cases where its underlying policies are furthered, as Justice Cappy joined the OAJC, and Justice Newman’s concurring and dissenting opinion, in which Justice Castille joined, expressly agreed with this portion of the OAJC. [J-61-2023] - 16 destroyed by disputes over the parentage of children conceived or born during the marriage.” Id.

2019Upon the stipulation of counsel, appropriate notice as to this Gagnon II hearing’s date, time, location, and purpose was established as [were] [appellant’s] violations of both past imposed probation and previously granted parole per the criminal information’s [C]ounts 1 – driving under the influence, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and 8 – possession of a controlled substance[Endnote 21] with an agreed violation sentencing recommendation in the aggregate of one (1) to three (3) years[’] 1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 761 A.2d 613 (Pa.Super. 20

1995However, in Commonwealth v. Correa, 423 Pa.Super. 57 , 620 A.2d 497 , appeal denied, 536 Pa. 638 , 639 A.2d 24 (1993), this court agreed with the defense contention that simple possession of a controlled substance was not evidence of crimen falsi which could be employed for impeachment purposes. 4 See also Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282 , 428 A.2d 993 (1981) (possession of marijuana is not crimen falsi (per Brosky, J. with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting)).

1995However, in Commonwealth v. Correa, 423 Pa.Super. 57 , 620 A.2d 497 , appeal denied, 536 Pa. 638 , 639 A.2d 24 (1993), this court agreed with the defense contention that simple possession of a controlled substance was not evidence of crimen falsi which could be employed for impeachment purposes. 4 See also Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282 , 428 A.2d 993 (1981) (possession of marijuana is not crimen falsi (per Brosky, J. with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting)).

1995However, in Commonwealth v. Correa, 423 Pa.Super. 57 , 620 A.2d 497 , appeal denied, 536 Pa. 638 , 639 A.2d 24 (1993), this court agreed with the defense contention that simple possession of a controlled substance was not evidence of crimen falsi which could be employed for impeachment purposes. 4 See also Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282 , 428 A.2d 993 (1981) (possession of marijuana is not crimen falsi (per Brosky, J. with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting)).

1995However, in Commonwealth v. Correa, 423 Pa.Super. 57 , 620 A.2d 497 , appeal denied, 536 Pa. 638 , 639 A.2d 24 (1993), this court agreed with the defense contention that simple possession of a controlled substance was not evidence of crimen falsi which could be employed for impeachment purposes. 4 See also Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282 , 428 A.2d 993 (1981) (possession of marijuana is not crimen falsi (per Brosky, J. with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting)).

1980In Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 , 99 S.Ct. 2898 , 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) the Court was called upon to determine whether a judge may order a closed pretrial proceeding to safeguard the fair trial guarantee of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. 1 Mr. Justice Stewart in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, upheld the trial court’s order of closure excluding the press from a pretrial suppression evidentiary hearing, where the prosecutor and the court agreed with the defense’s assessment that an unabated buildup of

1980In Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 , 99 S.Ct. 2898 , 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) the Court was called upon to determine whether a judge may order a closed pretrial proceeding to safeguard the fair trial guarantee of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. 1 Mr. Justice Stewart in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, upheld the trial court’s order of closure excluding the press from a pretrial suppression evidentiary hearing, where the prosecutor and the court agreed with the defense’s assessment that an unabated buildup of