agreed defense in California

2024(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 598 .) “Defendant offers no reason to believe the jury failed to follow this instruction.” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 784 .) Finally, even if the juror understood the comment to be an endorsement of the prosecutor’s argument, that would simply mean the court agreed that the defense had access to an expert witness.

2024(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 598 .) “Defendant offers no reason to believe the jury failed to follow this instruction.” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 784 .) Finally, even if the juror understood the comment to be an endorsement of the prosecutor’s argument, that would simply mean the court agreed that the defense had access to an expert witness.

2024(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 598 .) “Defendant offers no reason to believe the jury failed to follow this instruction.” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 784 .) Finally, even if the juror understood the comment to be an endorsement of the prosecutor’s argument, that would simply mean the court agreed that the defense had access to an expert witness.

2024(People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 598 .) “Defendant offers no reason to believe the jury failed to follow this instruction.” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 784 .) Finally, even if the juror understood the comment to be an endorsement of the prosecutor’s argument, that would simply mean the court agreed that the defense had access to an expert witness.

2017Notice The first Dendrite requirement is that the plaintiff attempt to notify the anonymous Internet poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. ( Dendrite , supra , 775 A.2d at p. 760 .) Two California appellate panels recently have adopted a notice requirement, citing Krinsky . ( Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 , 634, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 ( Glassdoor ); Doe 2 , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 .) Although the anonymous Internet speaker whose

2017Notice The first Dendrite requirement is that the plaintiff attempt to notify the anonymous Internet poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. ( Dendrite , supra , 775 A.2d at p. 760 .) Two California appellate panels recently have adopted a notice requirement, citing Krinsky . ( Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 , 634, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 ( Glassdoor ); Doe 2 , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 .) Although the anonymous Internet speaker whose

2017Notice The first Dendrite requirement is that the plaintiff attempt to notify the anonymous Internet poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. ( Dendrite , supra , 775 A.2d at p. 760 .) Two California appellate panels recently have adopted a notice requirement, citing Krinsky . ( Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 , 634, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 ( Glassdoor ); Doe 2 , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 .) Although the anonymous Internet speaker whose

2017Notice The first Dendrite requirement is that the plaintiff attempt to notify the anonymous Internet poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. ( Dendrite , supra , 775 A.2d at p. 760 .) Two California appellate panels recently have adopted a notice requirement, citing Krinsky . ( Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 , 634, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 ( Glassdoor ); Doe 2 , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 .) Although the anonymous Internet speaker whose

2022(Mancilla, at p. 867.) Mancilla stated that “a murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine requires proof the defendant ‘personally harbored the mental state of malice.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., quoting Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) Accordingly, it rejected the appellant’s contention that provocative act murder is a subset of the natural and probable consequences doctrine for purposes of Sen.

2022(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 41 .) Vasquez noted the general rule is that delays caused by defense counsel and not caused by a systemic breakdown are properly attributed to the defendant.

2020Defense counsel explained that, when discussing the instructions to be used, while the court did not alter or amend the instructions for implied malice, the court agreed that defense counsel could use the legal terminology from Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290 to describe the legal standard for implied malice.

2020Defense counsel explained that, when discussing the instructions to be used, while the court did not alter or amend the instructions for implied malice, the court agreed that defense counsel could use the legal terminology from Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290 to describe the legal standard for implied malice.

2017(See Hadley v. Doe (Ill. 2015) 34 N.E.3d 549, 552 ; Cooley Law School v. Doe 1 (Mich.App. 2013) 833 N.W.2d 331, 336 ; Matter of Cohen v. Google, Inc. (2009) 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 , 425.) 10 The Krinsky court also ―recognize[d], however, that an Internet Web site, chat room, or message board may no longer exist or be active by the time the plaintiff brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and unprofitable to insist, as did the Cahill court, that a plaintiff ‗post a message notifying the anonymous defendant of the plaintiff‘s discovery request on the same message board where the allegedly

2017Notice The first Dendrite requirement is that the plaintiff attempt to notify the anonymous Internet poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or application for a disclosure order, giving a reasonable time for the poster to file opposition. ( Dendrite , supra , 775 A.2d at p. 760 .) Two California appellate panels recently have adopted a notice requirement, citing Krinsky . ( Glassdoor, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 623 , 634, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 395 ( Glassdoor ); Doe 2 , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1311 , 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 60 .) Although the anonymous Internet speaker whose

2017(See Hadley v. Doe (Ill. 2015) 34 N.E.3d 549, 552 ; Cooley Law School v. Doe 1 (Mich.App. 2013) 833 N.W.2d 331, 336 ; Matter of Cohen v. Google, Inc. (2009) 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 , 425.) 10 The Krinsky court also ―recognize[d], however, that an Internet Web site, chat room, or message board may no longer exist or be active by the time the plaintiff brings suit; consequently, it would be unrealistic and unprofitable to insist, as did the Cahill court, that a plaintiff ‗post a message notifying the anonymous defendant of the plaintiff‘s discovery request on the same message board where the allegedly

2015(See People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1321 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939 [“ ‘ “[p]articular vulnerability” is determined in light of “total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred” ’ ”]; see also People v. Huber (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 601, 629 [“ ‘Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act’ ”].) 7 The trial court agreed with defense counsel that it could not also use appellant’s poor performance on probation as a circumstance in ag

1998(See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 , 194-195 & fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ] [lesser included offense instructions are required when there is a question whether the elements of the greater offense are present and there is substantial evidence that the offense was less than that charged]; see also People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 , 684-685 & fn. 12 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Sedeño (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) As a result, the defense requested and received instructions explaining that the killing was excusable and

1998(See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 , 194-195 & fn. 4 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569 , 906 P.2d 531 ] [lesser included offense instructions are required when there is a question whether the elements of the greater offense are present and there is substantial evidence that the offense was less than that charged]; see also People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 , 684-685 & fn. 12 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Sedeño (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) As a result, the defense requested and received instructions explaining that the killing was excusable and

1998Thus, most of the normal incidents of ownership are held by the partnership as a group rather than the individual partners.” (Italics added.) In the more recent decision in Munkdale v. Giannini (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111 , footnote 6 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 ], the court agreed with this analysis: “In all material respects, California Corporations Code section 15025 is identical to section 25 of the Uniform Partnership Act, a provision which has been described as follows: ‘Although stating that each partner is a co-owner of the partnership property, [§ 25 of the Uniform Partnership] Act syst

1998Thus, most of the normal incidents of ownership are held by the partnership as a group rather than the individual partners.” (Italics added.) In the more recent decision in Munkdale v. Giannini (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111 , footnote 6 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 ], the court agreed with this analysis: “In all material respects, California Corporations Code section 15025 is identical to section 25 of the Uniform Partnership Act, a provision which has been described as follows: ‘Although stating that each partner is a co-owner of the partnership property, [§ 25 of the Uniform Partnership] Act syst

1994While the conduct of Seibert employees may have been `independent of and unrelated to' the conduct which originally brought plaintiff to the hospital, it is factually undisputed that it was the immediate cause of [plaintiff's] presence in or near the holding cell in which" the mental patient was fighting with the security officer. ( Id. at p. 411, italics in the original.) The court in Seibert Security Services, Inc., pointed out the case before it involved more than "the fortuitous presence" of a police officer. ( Seibert Security Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th at p.

1994While the conduct of Seibert employees may have been `independent of and unrelated to' the conduct which originally brought plaintiff to the hospital, it is factually undisputed that it was the immediate cause of [plaintiff's] presence in or near the holding cell in which" the mental patient was fighting with the security officer. ( Id. at p. 411, italics in the original.) The court in Seibert Security Services, Inc., pointed out the case before it involved more than "the fortuitous presence" of a police officer. ( Seibert Security Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th at p.

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1991That is, because the defendant could be directly prosecuted for killing the intended victim and separately charged for killing the unintended victim in accordance with his or her level of culpability, the rule is unnecessary. ( 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 ; contra, People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 321 ].) “There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.” (People v. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 460 .) In People v. Czahara (198

1989For example, in Stark v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 276, 287 , the court agreed with the analysis found in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 695 .

1989For example, in Stark v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 276, 287 , the court agreed with the analysis found in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 695 .

1989For example, in Stark v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 276, 287 , the court agreed with the analysis found in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 695 .

1988In emphasizing that “[i]t is speech *406 on ‘ “matters of public concern” ’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’ ” (Id., at pp. 758-759 [ 86 L.Ed.2d at p. 602 ], quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 776 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 707, 717 , 98 S.Ct. 1407 ], citing Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 101 [ 84 L.Ed. 1093, 1101-1102 , 60 S.Ct. 736 ]), the Dun & Bradstreet court quoted at length from the opinion two years earlier in Connick v. Myers (1983) 461 U.S. 138 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 708 , 103 S.Ct. 1684 ]: “The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure