agreed principle in Illinois

2011Id. at 356-57 , 134 N.E.2d 329 (collecting authorities). ¶ 20 In House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37 Ill.2d 32 , 225 N.E.2d 21 (1967), an employer brought an action to enforce an employee's covenant not to compete.

2011Id. at 356-57 , 134 N.E.2d 329 (collecting authorities). ¶ 20 In House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37 Ill.2d 32 , 225 N.E.2d 21 (1967), an employer brought an action to enforce an employee's covenant not to compete.

2003In the 1984 Oklahoma Supreme Court case, First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Riggs , 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984), the court agreed in principle with our trial court and stated that the dormancy period of an unexecuted foreign judgment filed under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act begins to run when judgment is rendered in the originating forum state.

2003In the 1984 Oklahoma Supreme Court case, First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984), the court agreed in principle with our trial court and stated that the dormancy period of an unexecuted foreign judgment filed under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act begins to run when judgment is rendered in the originating forum state.

2026The court stated that it had reviewed Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 127-28 , and went on to indicate as follows: “And in order to instruct the jury on self-defense, the defendant must establish some evidence of each of the following elements.

2023ANALYSIS -4- 2023 IL App (2d) 220313 ¶ 13 At issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. ¶ 14 A. Standard of Review ¶ 15 We employ a two-part standard when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.

2018The trial court stated on the record its belief that the willful and wanton supervision claim could not stand, absent some type of allegation that the defendant has prior knowledge of a similar injury arising from the condition (citing Floyd v. Rockford Park District, 355 Ill.

2014Nevertheless, the court found that, because Chaplain Fricks was working as a chaplain when he took N.H.’s confession, N.H. presumably -9- 2014 IL App (2d) 121001 expected his conversation to be private.

2009Stump, 385 Ill.App.3d at 522 , 324 Ill.Dec. 828 , 896 N.E.2d at 909 .

2009Stump, 385 Ill.

1989App. 3d 130, 132 , 501 N.E.2d 364, 365 , this court agreed with the analysis in Burmeister and held that, pursuant to section 4 — 3 of the Code (Ill.

1969In Alford v. United States, 282 US 687, 689 , the court agreed with defense counsel that “the jury was entitled to know ‘who the witness is, where he lives and what his business is.’ ” We do not feel, however, that this statement was meant to be available to every defendant in every criminal prosecution, regardless of the facts.