decertification hearing in Pennsylvania

2024However, waiver is inappropriate because the “issue of certification between the juvenile and criminal divisions is jurisdictional and, therefore, not waivable.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 669 A.2d at 320-21 ). 10 The decertification court stated in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that the reasons for its grant of Defendant’s petition for decertification appeared in the decertification hearing transcript.

2011Initially we note that at a decertification hearing, the defendant bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6322(a); see also Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2024See Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 2022) (juvenile homicide defendant raised substantial question in alleging that trial court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors when imposing life without possibility of parole); see also Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that the appellant’s claim that the “trial court improperly relied on factors derived from a prior decertification hearing” raised a substantial question).

2016All of the foregoing· were considered in light of the Miller and Batts "factors." On review the Superior Court affirmed judgment of sentence, concluding that in Seagraves '.s' case the trial court did not abuse ifs discretion when it imposed a Life sentence without the possibility of.parole after consideration of all of the factors that must be considered following Mi/lerand Batts. 103 A.3d 839 (Pa.Super. 2014) In the case sub Judice, contrary to the Defendant's claim, the sentence imposed was not based exclusively on the seriousness of the offense.

2026See id. - 14 - J-S13034-25 First, we address the Commonwealth’s claim that the trial court’s January 18, 2023 order and opinion is a legal nullity, and that this Court should not rely on its reasoning.

2024See Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 2022) (juvenile homicide defendant raised substantial question in alleging that trial court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors when imposing life without possibility of parole); see also Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that the appellant’s claim that the “trial court improperly relied on factors derived from a prior decertification hearing” raised a substantial question).

2019See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 5. 3 Hicks v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2000 (2017). -2- J-S83006-18 2.) Whether the defective criminal information open charge of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501 criminal homicide statute is facially unconstitutional under “Alleyne”4[?] 3.) Whether petitioner is consider[ed] a juvenile under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, under (21) standard, where he was denied a decertification hearing in juvenile court violating his due process and equal protection rights[?] Appellant’s Brief, at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

2018In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2017See Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009), cert denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010). -6- J-A09005-17 prior criminal history, and psychological reports presented during the decertification hearing that found he was amenable to rehabilitation.

2017See Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009), cert denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010). -6- J-A09005-17 prior criminal history, and psychological reports presented during the decertification hearing that found he was amenable to rehabilitation.

2011Cf. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571 , 379 A.2d 102, 106-07 (1977) (concluding that a sentence must be vacated where "it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon [an unconstitutional] factor" in imposing a harsher sentence, and the harsher sentence amounted to a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right; the sentence must be vacated even though the trial judge considered other permissible factors as well); cf. also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587 , 517 A.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1986) (stating that where this Court vacates a convictio

2011Cf. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571 , 379 A.2d 102, 106-07 (1977) (concluding that a sentence must be vacated where "it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon [an unconstitutional] factor" in imposing a harsher sentence, and the harsher sentence amounted to a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right; the sentence must be vacated even though the trial judge considered other permissible factors as well); cf. also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587 , 517 A.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1986) (stating that where this Court vacates a convictio

2011See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.Cir.1990).

2011See In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.Cir.1990).

2011Cf. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571 , 379 A.2d 102, 106-07 (1977) (concluding that a sentence must be vacated where "it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon [an unconstitutional] factor" in imposing a harsher sentence, and the harsher sentence amounted to a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right; the sentence must be vacated even though the trial judge considered other permissible factors as well); cf. also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587 , 517 A.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1986) (stating that where this Court vacates a convictio

2011Cf. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571 , 379 A.2d 102, 106-07 (1977) (concluding that a sentence must be vacated where "it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon [an unconstitutional] factor" in imposing a harsher sentence, and the harsher sentence amounted to a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right; the sentence must be vacated even though the trial judge considered other permissible factors as well); cf. also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587 , 517 A.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1986) (stating that where this Court vacates a convictio