declaration standard in Pennsylvania

2022Appellant cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Dice, supra, alleging that “all that [is] required to assert a common law lis pendens action is a declaration that a claim touches and concerns the land.” Id. at 12 (underline in original) (citing generally Dice, 117 A.2d 725 ).

2022Appellant cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Dice, supra, alleging that “all that [is] required to assert a common law lis pendens action is a declaration that a claim touches and concerns the land.” Id. at 12 (underline in original) (citing generally Dice, 117 A.2d 725 ).

1986Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1986Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1984I write simply to observe that, in my view, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Terfinko, 504 Pa. 385 , 474 A.2d 275 (1984), declared that the Rule 1100(c)(4) requirement that any scheduled trial date after the expiration of 180 days need be “the earliest date possible” is met if the record reflects either (1) presentation by the prosecution of sufficient evidence to form the basis for a conclusion by the court that the scheduled date is the “earliest possible date”, or (2) a declaration by the hearing judge that such conclusion has been made as a matter of judicial notice.

1984I write simply to observe that, in my view, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Terfinko, 504 Pa. 385 , 474 A.2d 275 (1984), declared that the Rule 1100(c)(4) requirement that any scheduled trial date after the expiration of 180 days need be “the earliest date possible” is met if the record reflects either (1) presentation by the prosecution of sufficient evidence to form the basis for a conclusion by the court that the scheduled date is the “earliest possible date”, or (2) a declaration by the hearing judge that such conclusion has been made as a matter of judicial notice.

1952Moreover, dying declarations which contain inferences and conclusions of the declarant from facts which he knows or observes but does not state may be admissible; and the opinion rule has no application to dying declarations: Commonwealth v. Plubell, 367 Pa. 452 , 80 A. 2d 825 ; Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441 , 62 A. 2d 37 ; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 5, Sec. 1447.

1952Moreover, dying declarations which contain inferences and conclusions of the declarant from facts which he knows or observes but does not state may be admissible; and the opinion rule has no application to dying declarations: Commonwealth v. Plubell, 367 Pa. 452 , 80 A. 2d 825 ; Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441 , 62 A. 2d 37 ; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 5, Sec. 1447.

1952Moreover, dying declarations which contain inferences and conclusions of the declarant from facts which he knows or observes but does not state may be admissible; and the opinion rule has no application to dying declarations: Commonwealth v. Plubell, 367 Pa. 452 , 80 A. 2d 825 ; Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441 , 62 A. 2d 37 ; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 5, Sec. 1447.

1952Moreover, dying declarations which contain inferences and conclusions of the declarant from facts which he knows or observes but does not state may be admissible; and the opinion rule has no application to dying declarations: Commonwealth v. Plubell, 367 Pa. 452 , 80 A. 2d 825 ; Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441 , 62 A. 2d 37 ; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 5, Sec. 1447.

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery's Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland's Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor's Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey's Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson's Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery's Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland's Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor's Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey's Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson's Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery's Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland's Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor's Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison's Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey's Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson's Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951What is reasonable and just, or as it is sometimes expressed, fair and just compensation is a matter for the discretion of the court below, subject to review by an appellate court: Strickler Estate, 354 Pa. 276, 277 , 47 A. 2d 134 ; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 .

1951What is reasonable and just, or as it is sometimes expressed, fair and just compensation is a matter for the discretion of the court below, subject to review by an appellate court: Strickler Estate, 354 Pa. 276, 277 , 47 A. 2d 134 ; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 .

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1951This was merely a declaration of the standard or rule for determining compensation of fiduciaries, which rule has been by now so long and well established that it is universally recognized as the bedrock on which compensation must always be based: Montgomery’s Appeal, 86 Pa. 230, 234, 235 ; Harland’s Appeal, 5 Rawle 323, 330 ; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 203, 208; Taylor’s Estate, 281 Pa. 440, 443 , 126 A. 809 ; Harrison’s Estate, 217 Pa. 207, 210 , 66 A. 354 ; McCaskey’s Estate, 307 Pa. 172, 182 , 160 A. 707 ; Davidson’s Estate, 324 Pa. 90, 96 , 186 A. 796 ; Crawford Estate, 340 Pa. 187, 197

1941In Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N. Y. 161 , 172 N. E. 455 , a church had claimed it was free to build a church edifice in disregard of a restriction limiting the use of the land to residential purposes.

1941In Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N. Y. 161 , 172 N. E. 455 , a church had claimed it was free to build a church edifice in disregard of a restriction limiting the use of the land to residential purposes.

1941In Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613 , 2 Pac. (2d) 782 , the Supreme Court of California said in a case in which a covenantor in a deed sought to obtain a declaration of his privilege to depart from the restriction: “If such a declaration is refused, the plaintiff is put in the hazardous position of being obliged to violate the terms of the restriction before he can know whether or not he must suffer the penalties mentioned”.

1941In Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613 , 2 Pac. (2d) 782 , the Supreme Court of California said in a case in which a covenantor in a deed sought to obtain a declaration of his privilege to depart from the restriction: “If such a declaration is refused, the plaintiff is put in the hazardous position of being obliged to violate the terms of the restriction before he can know whether or not he must suffer the penalties mentioned”.

1940In Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216 , the court said (p. 223) : “Consequently, in such cases, after recovery of a judgment against the insured, the party injured may have a remedy against the company by garnishee process or by resort to a suit in equity ...” The particular language, and the circumstances under which it was used, does not warrant us in adopting the above quotation as the declaration of a rule of procedure; nevertheless, we are not prepared to hold that the instant plaintiff may not proceed directly against the insurer. 2.

1929In Levin v. Clad & Sons, Inc., 244 Pa. 194 , it was held: “In an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries, an amendment to the statement of claim, averring the date of the accident to be April 26, 1907, instead of April 22, 1907, does not set up a new cause of action and may be made after the statute of limitations has run, and. the plaintiff in such case is not required to file a new declaration and rule the defendant to file a new plea:” McKane v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 168 ; Chapman v. Welsh, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 225 .

1929In Levin v. Clad & Sons, Inc., 244 Pa. 194 , it was held: “In an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries, an amendment to the statement of claim, averring the date of the accident to be April 26, 1907, instead of April 22, 1907, does not set up a new cause of action and may be made after the statute of limitations has run, and. the plaintiff in such case is not required to file a new declaration and rule the defendant to file a new plea:” McKane v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 168 ; Chapman v. Welsh, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 225 .

1929Only such facts “as the pleader depends upon to show liability” need be averred: Frey v. Dougherty, 286 Pa. 45 ; Lincoln v. Martin, 5 Pa. C.

1929In Levin v. Clad & Sons, Inc., 244 Pa. 194 , it was held: “In an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries, an amendment to the statement of claim, averring the date of the accident to be April 26, 1907, instead of April 22, 1907, does not set up a new cause of action and may be made after the statute of limitations has run, and. the plaintiff in such case is not required to file a new declaration and rule the defendant to file a new plea:” McKane v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 168 ; Chapman v. Welsh, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 225 .

1928This case presents in the aggregate an accumulation of bad pleadings, to which, no doubt, this court has contributed when the judgment by default entered in this case on July 26, 1926, was opened, for, under the authority of Rader v. Keiper, 285 Pa. 579 , the judgment of default should have been maintained in its full integrity.

1786See Caton v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 141 ; 1 Yeates 103 .