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11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1969–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green Acres Rehabilitation & Nursing Center v. Sullivangreen1 sentence2025Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly rejected the theory espoused in the Majority Opinion that Rule 126 applies even when a party ignores a rule’s mandatory requirements.6 Said another way, a party cannot bypass the clear and unambiguous mandates in a rule and then invoke Rule ____________________________________________ 6By contrast, in Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1271-72 (Pa. Super. 2015), the plaintiff served notice of default judgment, the notice itself was “virtually identical to the language set forth in current Rule 237.5”, albeit the praecip | 1 | 1 |
Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. Doe No. 3green2 sentences2004Under the New Jersey analysis, the identity of an anonymous internet speaker is discoverable only if: (1) the plaintiff has undertaken efforts to notify the anonymous speakers about the application for an order of disclosure so as to afford the anonymous declarant “a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application”; (2) the plaintiff identifies the exact statements purportedly made by the anonymous speaker which the “plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech”; (3) the plaintiff “has set forth aprima facie cause of action” against the anonymous speaker which “can wi 2004Super. 134, 141-42 , 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print. & Pub. Co.green2 sentences1977Id. at 276 , 197 A.2d at 419, 420 . 1977Id. at 276 , 197 A.2d at 419, 420 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gerhard v. the Travelers Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1990Under the New Jersey rule, divestment must be according to the terms of the policy: Gerhard v. Travelers Insurance Company, 107 N.J. 1990Super. 414 , 258 A.2d 724 (1969); John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Boston v. Heidrick, 135 N.J. | 2 | 1970–1990 |
Commonwealth v. Stokes
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Crews v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort
green
1 sentence2008Id., citing Reisman v. Great Am. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Dennis
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Singer v. Dong Sup Cha
green
2 sentences1989The court observed, however, that even though an identical New Jersey claim could not be used to bar the Pennsylvania claim on the basis of lis pendens, “the [trial] court [still] ha[d] the inherent equitable power to stay the proceedings in the second [Pennsylvania] suit during the pendency of the prior [New Jersey] suit.” Id., 379 Pa.Superior Ct. at 560, 550 A.2d at 793 . 1989The court observed, however, that even though an identical New Jersey claim could not be used to bar the Pennsylvania claim on the basis of lis pendens, “the [trial] court [still] ha[d] the inherent equitable power to stay the proceedings in the second [Pennsylvania] suit during the pendency of the prior [New Jersey] suit.” Id., 379 Pa.Superior Ct. at 560, 550 A.2d at 793 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Klein v. City of Philadelphia
green
1 sentence1989The Singer court relied heavily upon Klein v. City of Philadelphia, 77 Pa.Commw. 251, 465 A.2d 730 (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Commonwealth v. Draper
green
1 sentence1977Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453 [ 353 A.2d 441 ] (1976); Commonwealth v. Draper, 222 Pa.Superior Ct. 26 [ 293 A.2d 614 ] (1972).” However, the application of this principle in the instant case was improper as it was based upon the incorrect initial premise that appellant was a “parole violator” at the time he committed the subsequent New Jersey violation. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. Zuber
green
2 sentences1977Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453 [ 353 A.2d 441 ] (1976); Commonwealth v. Draper, 222 Pa.Superior Ct. 26 [ 293 A.2d 614 ] (1972).” However, the application of this principle in the instant case was improper as it was based upon the incorrect initial premise that appellant was a “parole violator” at the time he committed the subsequent New Jersey violation. 1977Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453 [ 353 A.2d 441 ] (1976); Commonwealth v. Draper, 222 Pa.Superior Ct. 26 [ 293 A.2d 614 ] (1972).” However, the application of this principle in the instant case was improper as it was based upon the incorrect initial premise that appellant was a “parole violator” at the time he committed the subsequent New Jersey violation. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1969Since the accident occurred in New Jersey, and since all the parties are domiciled in that State, Anthony Cutuli contends that under the “most significant relationship” doctrine, as set forth in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1 (1964) the New Jersey rule should govern, and he should be let out. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.