open fields doctrine in Pennsylvania

2020See e.g., Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007) (Interpreting Article I, Section 8 the same as the Fourth Amendment in the course of considering the extent of the open fields doctrine); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985) (“[T]here is no substantial textual difference between the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that would require us to expand the protections afforded under the federal document.”).

2015In Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007), our Supreme Court explained and discussed the ‘open fields’ doctrine as follows: The open fields doctrine was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 , 44 S.Ct. 445 , 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924).

2020See e.g., Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007) (Interpreting Article I, Section 8 the same as the Fourth Amendment in the course of considering the extent of the open fields doctrine); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985) (“[T]here is no substantial textual difference between the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that would require us to expand the protections afforded under the federal document.”).

2014We have also concluded that, “[w]hile we can interpret our own [Constitution to afford defendants greater protections than the federal constitution does, there should be a compelling reason to do so.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476 , 503 A.2d 921, 926 (1985) (citation omitted).

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

2023Given the textual similarity between the two constitutional provisions, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s open fields doctrine, as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984),3 applied equally 2 The interpretative doctrine of ejusdem generis refers to “the same kind or class.” Department of Environmental Protection v. Cumberland Coal Resources, LP, 102 A.3d 962, 976 (Pa. 2014).

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014See, e.g., Russo, supra at 1200, 1205-13 (after conducting a detailed Edmunds analysis, concluding that the open fields doctrine is equally applicable under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 572 Pa. 438 , 817 A.2d 455, 459, 469 (2003) (distinguishing DeJohn, supra, in holding that the defendant-appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 8 in the name and address information provided by his bank to the police); In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445 , 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001) (concluding that there was “no reason at this juncture to embra

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

2014Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (1991) (stating that “it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated” and setting forth “certain factors to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania [Constitution”); Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119 , 934 A.2d 1199, 1213 (2007) (holding, after conducting an Edmunds analysis, that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer’s trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer’s entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a “fight in progress” radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa.Supe

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403 , 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer's trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135 speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552 , 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer's entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a "fight in progress" radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa

1988While the curtilage area surrounding a house is, of course, a protected area which lies outside the ambit of the open fields doctrine, Commonwealth v. Cihylik, 337 Pa.Super. 221, 230-31 , 486 A.2d 987, 992 (1985), this Court has held in several cases that evidence was reasonably and therefore constitutionally acquired despite the fact that the investigating officer was technically trespassing upon the curtilage of the property when the evidence was discovered.

1988While the curtilage area surrounding a house is, of course, a protected area which lies outside the ambit of the open fields doctrine, Commonwealth v. Cihylik, 337 Pa.Super. 221, 230-31 , 486 A.2d 987, 992 (1985), this Court has held in several cases that evidence was reasonably and therefore constitutionally acquired despite the fact that the investigating officer was technically trespassing upon the curtilage of the property when the evidence was discovered.