11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Russell v. Stategreen1 sentence2024It means that the defendant, the cause, and the issues involved in the cause must not be prejudiced.” Russell v. State, 146 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (citing Durrough v. State, 562 S.W.2d 488 , 489–90 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ivey v. Stategreen1 sentence2019App. 2010) (explaining that, in conducting harm analysis as to whether “error affected appellant’s substantial rights to a fair sentencing hearing,” appellate courts “examine the entire trial record and calculate, as much as possible, the probable impact of the error upon the rest of the evidence”); Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365 (explaining that error does not affect substantial right if we have “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect” (citation omitted)); Ivey, 250 S.W.3d at 126 (explaining that, when assessing harm from improperly admitted evidence d | 1 | 1 |
Solomon v. Stategreen1 sentence2019App. 2010) (explaining that, in conducting harm analysis as to whether “error affected appellant’s substantial rights to a fair sentencing hearing,” appellate courts “examine the entire trial record and calculate, as much as possible, the probable impact of the error upon the rest of the evidence”); Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365 (explaining that error does not affect substantial right if we have “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect” (citation omitted)); Ivey, 250 S.W.3d at 126 (explaining that, when assessing harm from improperly admitted evidence d | 1 | 1 |
Motilla v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Based upon the complete record of this case, we find that the error in admitting Dr. Coons’s testimony did not affect appellant’s substantial right to a fair sentencing hearing because (1) There was ample other evidence supporting a finding that there was a probability that appellant would commit future acts of violence;89 89 See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 356-57 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Sanne v. Stategreen1 sentence2010App. 2002) (reiterating that “overwhelming evidence” of guilt is one consideration in deciding whether improper admission of evidence was harmful in a particular case); Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 773-74 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 255-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Gauldin v. State , 683 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Russell v. State , 665 S.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Shannon v. State , 567 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant contends that the evidence that he was a member of a prison gang was so inflammatory and of such minimal relevance that its admission was fundamental error because it denied him a fair sentencing hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Gauldin v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 255-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Gauldin v. State , 683 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Russell v. State , 665 S.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Shannon v. State , 567 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant contends that the evidence that he was a member of a prison gang was so inflammatory and of such minimal relevance that its admission was fundamental error because it denied him a fair sentencing hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Shannon v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 255-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Gauldin v. State , 683 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Russell v. State , 665 S.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Shannon v. State , 567 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant contends that the evidence that he was a member of a prison gang was so inflammatory and of such minimal relevance that its admission was fundamental error because it denied him a fair sentencing hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Muniz v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Muniz v. State , 851 S.W.2d 238, 255-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Gauldin v. State , 683 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Russell v. State , 665 S.W.2d 771, 777-78 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Shannon v. State , 567 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant contends that the evidence that he was a member of a prison gang was so inflammatory and of such minimal relevance that its admission was fundamental error because it denied him a fair sentencing hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dawson v. Delaware
green
2 sentences2008Appellant relies on Dawson v. Delaware , 503 U.S. 159, 166-67 , 112 S.Ct. 1093 , 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), as establishing that evidence of gang membership without evidence that the gang has engaged in unlawful acts or has endorsed such acts is not relevant to any legitimate sentencing consideration and is a violation of a defendant’s First Amendment rights. 2008Appellant relies on Dawson v. Delaware , 503 U.S. 159, 166-67 , 112 S.Ct. 1093 , 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), as establishing that evidence of gang membership without evidence that the gang has engaged in unlawful acts or has endorsed such acts is not relevant to any legitimate sentencing consideration and is a violation of a defendant’s First Amendment rights. | 5 | 2002–2008 |
May v. State
green
2 sentences2012In support of this argument, Young relies on May v. State , 722 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. 2012In support of this argument, Young relies on May v. State, 722 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Durrough v. State
green
1 sentence2024It means that the defendant, the cause, and the issues involved in the cause must not be prejudiced.” Russell v. State, 146 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (citing Durrough v. State, 562 S.W.2d 488 , 489–90 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Coble v. State
green
1 sentence2015Cf. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 282 n. 82 (holding that error in admitting unreliable testimony of expert did not affect defendant’s substantial right to a fair sentencing hearing because complained-of testimony was not particularly powerful, certain, or strong and was “remarkably similar” to the inadmissible testimony complained of by the defendant; the same basic psychiatric evidence was admissible and admitted through independent experts; and the admissible evidence was quite ample regarding the probability that the defendant would commit acts of future violence); Petriciolet, 442 S.W.3d at 654 (h | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.