11 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences1983See generally Sanders v. State, 604 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and cases cited there. 1982See generally Sanders v. State, 604 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and cases cited there. | 2 | 2 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Sefzikgreen1 sentence2025See generally Tex. DOT v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011) (“the proper defendant in an ultra vires action is the state official whose acts or omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff’s rights”); Kilgore Indep. | 1 | 1 |
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence2024See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 . | 1 | 1 |
Cosio v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 772 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Yadher Murillogreen1 sentence2015See Murillo, 389 S.W.3d at 929 (finding against the defendant on the issue of prejudice when, among other considerations, “[the defendant] presented no affirmative evidence that he had any factual or legal defenses to the charge, or that he believes he was not guilty [of the offense charged].”). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Stategreen1 sentence2007Harrison v. State , 205 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Creightongreen2 sentences1994Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45 , 107 S.Ct. at 3041-42 (noting that defining scope of authority in this manner "would introduce into qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we found sufficiently daunting to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to the nature of officials' duties or of the rights allegedly violated"). [10] In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single g 1994Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644-45 , 107 S.Ct. at 3041-42 (noting that defining scope of authority in this manner "would introduce into qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we found sufficiently daunting to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to the nature of officials' duties or of the rights allegedly violated"). [10] In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single g | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. Stategreen1 sentence1985The Court of Criminal Appeals in Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. Crim.App.1983), stated: It is an established generic principle of evidence that proof of prior specific acts of misconduct, similar happenings or extraneous transactions committed by a party is not probative of the contested material issues in the case on trial, and therefore inadmissible. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murphy v. State
green
2 sentences1983See generally Sanders v. State, 604 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and cases cited there. 1982See generally Sanders v. State, 604 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and cases cited there. | 2 | 1982–1983 |
United States v. Robert Dale Hart, United States of America v. Ruben Morales Robles
green
2 sentences1979None of these reasons, however, persuades us of the validity of the generic exception delineated by the Arizona Supreme Court. ..., we hold that the "murder scene exception" created by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.9 [Footnote omitted] Mincey did not announce any new rule of law, or represent a "sharp break in the web of the law." See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976). 1979None of these reasons, however, persuades us of the validity of the generic exception delineated by the Arizona Supreme Court. ., we hold that the “murder scene exception” created by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments— that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.9 [Footnote omitted] Mincey did not announce any new rule of law, or represent a “sharp break in the web of the law.” See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Graham v. Connor
green
2 sentences1994In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 , 109 S.Ct. at 1870 . 1994In criticizing the tendency of the lower courts to review excessive force claims solely under a substantive due process standard, the Court explained that it rejected "this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 , 109 S.Ct. at 1870 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.