generic standard in California

2024(People v. Selivanov, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 758 .) “The trial court has the sole discretion, under section 17(b), to treat a wobbler as a felony or a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. [Citation.] ‘By its terms, [section 17(b)] sets a broad generic standard.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the tri

2021(Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) “By its terms, [section 17(b)] sets a broad generic standard.” (Ibid.) “[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ [Citations.] When appropriate, judges should also consider the general objectives of sentencing such as those set forth in California Rules of Court, rule [4.410]

2025We conclude the trial court did not err by denying Luna’s petition for reduction and expungement. “[T]here is a special category of crimes that is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the severity of the facts surrounding its commission. [Citation.] These crimes, referred to as ‘wobbler[s],’ are ‘punishable either by a term in state prison or by imprisonment in county jail and/or by a fine.’ ” (People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 885 .) Section 17, subdivision (b) affords the trial court discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor under “a broad generic stand

2021(Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) “By its terms, [section 17(b)] sets a broad generic standard.” (Ibid.) “[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ [Citations.] When appropriate, judges should also consider the general objectives of sentencing such as those set forth in California Rules of Court, rule [4.410]

2017Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ; §§ 496d, subd. (a), 21310.) The trial court has the sole discretion, under section 17(b), to treat a wobbler as a felony or a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. ( Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 928 P.2d 1171 .) "By its terms, [ section 17(b) ] sets a broad generic standard." ( Ibid. ) "[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including 'the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits o

2017Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ; §§ 496d, subd. (a), 21310.) The trial court has the sole discretion, under section 17(b), to treat a wobbler as a felony or a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. ( Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 928 P.2d 1171 .) "By its terms, [ section 17(b) ] sets a broad generic standard." ( Ibid. ) "[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including 'the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits o

2025The record does not “ ‘ ‘as a whole demonstrate[] that [Bacci] understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” ’ ” (Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 241 .) There was no discussion of the risks of self-representation in a proceeding where this court had remanded for consideration of three new sentencing laws and, as we will explain, a fourth had also taken effect.

2025As relevant here, discretionary expungement relief may be awarded “in the interest of justice.” (§ 1203.4, subd. (c)(2).) “If granted, section 1203.4 relief provides substantial benefits; the successful [petitioner] is generally released from all the ‘penalties and disabilities’ which otherwise would have resulted from the convictions.” (People v. Mazumder (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 732, 745 .) Here, the trial court considered Luna’s requests for reduction and expungement at a hearing in which he was represented by counsel.

2024(People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 892 .) “We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to reduce a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to . . . section 17[(b)] for an abuse of discretion and give deference to the trial court’s weighing of the relevant factors.” (People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 611 .) We review the court’s underlying factual 8 determinations for substantial evidence.7 (People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 901 .) B.

2024(People v. Selivanov, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 758 .) “The trial court has the sole discretion, under section 17(b), to treat a wobbler as a felony or a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. [Citation.] ‘By its terms, [section 17(b)] sets a broad generic standard.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the tri

2024(People v. Selivanov, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 758 .) “The trial court has the sole discretion, under section 17(b), to treat a wobbler as a felony or a misdemeanor for sentencing purposes. [Citation.] ‘By its terms, [section 17(b)] sets a broad generic standard.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]ince all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the tri

2024(People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 892 .) “We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to reduce a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to . . . section 17[(b)] for an abuse of discretion and give deference to the trial court’s weighing of the relevant factors.” (People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 611 .) We review the court’s underlying factual 8 determinations for substantial evidence.7 (People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 901 .) B.

2024(See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96 [finding no harm from instructions that were ‘supported by common sense, which many jurors are likely to indulge even without an instruction’].)” (Id. at p. 1201.) In this case, the People do not suggest that Mercado’s pretrial statements were similarly conflicting or that the trial court’s cautionary admonition here had no greater effect than a generic instruction for assessing witness testimony.

2022(See People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 ; People v. Hewitt (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 251 .) Thus, the remainder of CALCRIM No. 252, listing extortion as a general intent crime, did not negate specific intent.

2022Not once in the entire course of the morning proceeding did the court reiterate the generic instruction that lawyer talk is not evidence.” (Tootick, supra, 952 F.2d at p. 1084 .) Although some limiting instructions were given, those instructions “consisted of brief statements to the effect that arguments were not evidence, given only at the traditional times, and a generic instruction pertaining to joint trials, given at the end of the trial.” (Id. at p. 1085, fn. omitted.) As well, “[n]o cautioning instructions were given directly after the damaging opening arguments of the respective defenda

2022(See People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 232 ; People v. Hewitt (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 247, 251 .) Thus, the remainder of CALCRIM No. 252, listing extortion as a general intent crime, did not negate specific intent.

2021(People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1393 .) 24.

2015(See, e.g., Welco, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 211-212 [misappropriation of line of credit on credit card actionable]; Los Angeles Federal Credit Union v. Madatyan, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 [credit union with lien on car prevailed where body shop cashed insurance proceeds]; Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP 19 (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 48 [attorney with contingent fee lien had actionable conversion claim]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125 [misappropriation of net operating losses actionable conversion]; Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 5

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d at p. 1328 .) In 1998, The Rugby Group, Inc., was acquired by defendant Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Generic defendants Barr Laboratories, Inc., The Rugby Group, Inc., Watson, and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., are referred to collectively as Barr. 3 As discussed below, both In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, supra, 544 F.3d 1323 and a second decision rejecting a federal antitrust challenge to the Cipro settlement, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, supra, 604 F.3d 98 , were decided

2015(See, e.g., Welco, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 211-212 [misappropriation of line of credit on credit card actionable]; Los Angeles Federal Credit Union v. Madatyan, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 [credit union with lien on car prevailed where body shop cashed insurance proceeds]; Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP 19 (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 48 [attorney with contingent fee lien had actionable conversion claim]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125 [misappropriation of net operating losses actionable conversion]; Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 5

2014(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847 .) By its terms, section 17, subdivision (b), “sets a broad generic standard.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) In People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 , the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s admission to an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury did not automatically convert a wobbler for assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury under section 245, subdivision (a), into a straight felony.

2014(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847 .) By its terms, section 17, subdivision (b), “sets a broad generic standard.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) In People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426 , the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s admission to an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury did not automatically convert a wobbler for assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury under section 245, subdivision (a), into a straight felony.

2014It also ignores the relief they seek—a writ requiring Partnership to set new reimbursement rates based on petitioners’ costs to acquire pharmaceutical products, overhead costs, and service costs, so that rates are “reasonably related to costs of pharmacies to furnish quality pharmacy and prescription services.” In further supplemental briefing, petitioners contended they have stated a claim under the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services (3d Cir. 2013) 730 F.3d 291 (Christ the King Manor).

2013The trial court termed this “ ‘a very limited alternate remedy.’ ” (Quantification, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 859 .) On appeal, we stated: “In essence, the trial court appeared to recognize (1) that the Quantification Settlement Agreement PEIR is at issue in the validation action only by virtue of the answering parties’ denial of [Imperial’s] allegation that it ‘complied with all laws necessary for contracts A through M to be valid, legal, and binding, including . . . all applicable California . . .