Olsen claim in Washington

2010Instead, a defendant must "`demonstrate[] that the conflict is so prejudicial that. . . the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.'" Grisby, 97 Wash.2d at 508 , 647 P.2d 6 (quoting United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 194-95 (1st Cir.1980)). ¶ 37 Here, Olsen's defense was that Totten's murder had occurred before he participated in the robbery of the home and in the disposal of his body, whereas Sublett's defense was a general denial of any involvement in the crime.

2010Instead, a defendant must “ ‘demónstrate! ] that the conflict is so prejudicial that . . . the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.’ ” Grisby, 97 Wn.2d at 508 (quoting United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 194-95 (1st Cir. 1980)). ¶37 Here, Olsen’s defense was that Totten’s murder had occurred before he participated in the robbery of the home and in the disposal of his body, whereas Sublett’s defense was a general denial of any involvement in the crime.

2024Further, additional analysis of the interior of the car could have corroborated Olsen’s claim that the baking soda was not used to dilute drugs but had been sprinkled in the car to deodorize it. 3 In short, Olsen potentially could have obtained at least some “exonerating” evidence after testing the car and, to that extent, it was “potentially useful.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58 .

2022RAP 18.1(b) provides that a party seeking attorney fees on appeal “must devote a section of its opening brief to the request for fees or expenses.” “The rule requires more than a bald request for attorney fees on appeal.” Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn.

2019State v. Corona, 164 Wn.

2015App. 875, 891 , 138 P.3d 1095 (2006), a jury convicted Mr. Leming of (1) felony violation of a court order based on his assault of the victim by pushing her and hitting her with folded papers, which did not amount to first or second degree assault, and (2) second degree assault based on his subsequent conduct of threatening to “ ‘snap [her] like a twig.’ ” (Alteration in original.) In analyzing whether double jeopardy was vio lated by punishing conduct twice, the Leming court applied the three-step legislative intent analysis of In re Personal Restraint of Burchfield, 111 Wn.

2015App. 875, 891 , 138 P.3d 1095 (2006), a jury convicted Mr. Leming of (1) felony violation of a court order based on his assault of the victim by pushing her and hitting her with folded papers, which did not amount to first or second degree assault, and (2) second degree assault based on his subsequent conduct of threatening to “ ‘snap [her] like a twig.’ ” (Alteration in original.) In analyzing whether double jeopardy was vio lated by punishing conduct twice, the Leming court applied the three-step legislative intent analysis of In re Personal Restraint of Burchfield, 111 Wn.

2015Rather, the jury was properly instructed and found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Olsen’s violation of the no-contact order was reckless and created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm to another. ¶18 In State v. Leming, 133 Wn.

2013Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Olsen’s prior bad acts. 5 Felony Harassment Instruction ¶21 Olsen next argues that the trial court erred in giving a “to convict” instruction on the felony harassment charge that omitted the requirement that the threat be a “true threat.” Because the trial court properly gave a definitional instruction limiting criminalized behavior to “true threats” and the Washington Supreme Court has recently held that when such a definitional instruction is given, “true threat” need not be defined as an element

2013Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 77-78 .

2013In Olsen v. Roberts, the supreme court considered Olsen's claim against her deceased former husband's estate to recover one half of former community property.40 The complaint failed to allege that the claim was filed within six months after publication of notice to creditors.41 But the supreme court reversed the dismissal of her claim, concluding that her petition was not a claim for a debt, and that Olsen was not a creditor.42 35 Clerk's Papers at 109-10. 36 Report of Proceedings (Dec. 2, 2011) at 20. 37150 Wash. 391 , 273 P. 524 (1928). 38 30 Wn.

2013App. 923 , 640 P.2d 28 (1982). 39 See Compton. 150 Wash, at 396-97; O'Steen. 30 Wn.

2013In Olsen v. Roberts, the supreme court considered Olsen's claim against her deceased former husband's estate to recover one half of former community property.40 The complaint failed to allege that the claim was filed within six months after publication of notice to creditors.41 But the supreme court reversed the dismissal of her claim, concluding that her petition was not a claim for a debt, and that Olsen was not a creditor.42 35 Clerk's Papers at 109-10. 36 Report of Proceedings (Dec. 2, 2011) at 20. 37150 Wash. 391 , 273 P. 524 (1928). 38 30 Wn.

2013Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Olsen’s prior bad acts. 5 Felony Harassment Instruction ¶21 Olsen next argues that the trial court erred in giving a “to convict” instruction on the felony harassment charge that omitted the requirement that the threat be a “true threat.” Because the trial court properly gave a definitional instruction limiting criminalized behavior to “true threats” and the Washington Supreme Court has recently held that when such a definitional instruction is given, “true threat” need not be defined as an element

2010State v. Peterson, 133 Wn.2d 885, 891 , 948 P.2d 381 (1997) (jury instruction on inferior degree offense not warrented unless there is evidence that defendant committed only the inferior offense).

2010State v. Peterson, 133 Wn.2d 885, 891 , 948 P.2d 381 (1997) (jury instruction on inferior degree offense not warrented unless there is evidence that defendant committed only the inferior offense).

1989Also, contempt under this power is coercive; it lasts until the contemnor "has purged himself of contempt by his subsequent conduct and attitude." Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 91 , 323 P.2d 231 (1958).

1989Also, contempt under this power is coercive; it lasts until the contemnor "has purged himself of contempt by his subsequent conduct and attitude." Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 91 , 323 P.2d 231 (1958).

1983In State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9, 23 , 475 P.2d 109 (1970), the court approved the Olsen rule and stated, There is no logical basis for drawing a distinction between an authorization contained in one statute, to charge for either a misdemeanor or a felony, and the same authorization contained in different statutes, if the prosecution under either statute is for the identical act.

1983In State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9, 23 , 475 P.2d 109 (1970), the court approved the Olsen rule and stated, There is no logical basis for drawing a distinction between an authorization contained in one statute, to charge for either a misdemeanor or a felony, and the same authorization contained in different statutes, if the prosecution under either statute is for the identical act.

1983App. 704 , 626 P.2d 39 (1981) characterized the Olsen issue as one of legislative intent.

1983App. 355, 361 , 563 P.2d 212 (1977) (Olsen rule applies only where statutes permit charging either a felony or a misdemeanor).

1983The Zornes court, citing State v. Reid, 66 Wn.2d 243 , 401 P.2d 988 (1965), delineated the permissible scope of the prosecutor's discretion: "a prosecutor may exercise discretion in deciding whether to prosecute an offender or not, and ... he may decide also whether to proceed under one statute or another, provided the facts to be proven are not the same." (Italics ours.) 78 Wn.2d at 22 .

1983The Zornes court, citing State v. Reid, 66 Wn.2d 243 , 401 P.2d 988 (1965), delineated the permissible scope of the prosecutor's discretion: "a prosecutor may exercise discretion in deciding whether to prosecute an offender or not, and ... he may decide also whether to proceed under one statute or another, provided the facts to be proven are not the same." (Italics ours.) 78 Wn.2d at 22 .