venue privilege in Florida

2012This Court’s holding that where a corporate defendant is subject to suit in the county in which the individual defendant resides, “Section 46.02 cannot be applied to defeat the individual defendant’s venue privilege,” id. at 540-41, has become known as the joint residency rule.

2011The corporate and individual defendants, all residing in Miami-Dade County, filed motions to dismiss based on the “joint residency rule.” The joint residency rule was first articulated by our supreme court, when it held: We hold, therefore, that where an individual defendant is joined as a party defendant with a foreign corporation defendant, and the corporate defendant has an agent in the county in which the individual defendant resides, Section 46.02[ 2 ] cannot be applied to defeat the individual defendant’s venue privilege granted by Section 46.01 .[ 3 ] Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538, 5

2009Constr., Inc, 894 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see Garcia Granados Quinones v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas), S.A., 509 So.2d 273, 274-75 (Fla.1987).

2007Constr., Inc, 894 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see Garcia Granados Quinones v. Swiss Bank Corp. (Overseas), S.A., 509 So.2d 273, 274-75 (Fla.1987).

2025Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So. 2d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“If the venue clause is phrased in mandatory terms, each party has a contractual right to demand that the case be litigated in the forum referred to in the contract.”); Glob.

2013“If the venue clause is phrased in mandatory terms, each party has a contractual right to demand that the case be litigated in the forum referred to in the contract.” Id.

2015Specifically, we held that “although the venue clause unequivocally states that Florida law shall apply to any litigation of the subcontract, it lacks mandatory language or words of exclusivity to show that venue is proper only in Palm Beach County.” Id.

2015Specifically, we held that “although the venue clause unequivocally states that Florida law shall apply to any litigation of the subcontract, it lacks mandatory language or words of exclusivity to show that venue is proper only in Palm Beach County.” Id.

1986Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission 354 So.2d 362 (Fla 1977); Graham v. Edwards 472 So.2d 803 (Fla 3rd DCA 1985). 2.

1985See Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1978); Greer v. Mathews, 409 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

2026A general principle of contract interpretation is that courts “will not interpret a contract in such a way as to render clauses meaningless when there is a reasonable interpretation that does not do so”; instead, courts “must strive to interpret a contract in such a way as to give meaning to all clauses while doing violence to none.” Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Whispering Lakes I, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citations omitted); see also Harris v. School Bd. of Duval Cnty., 921 So. 2d 725, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that an ambiguity between two contractual cla

2026A general principle of contract interpretation is that courts “will not interpret a contract in such a way as to render clauses meaningless when there is a reasonable interpretation that does not do so”; instead, courts “must strive to interpret a contract in such a way as to give meaning to all clauses while doing violence to none.” Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Whispering Lakes I, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citations omitted); see also Harris v. School Bd. of Duval Cnty., 921 So. 2d 725, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that an ambiguity between two contractual cla

2026A general principle of contract interpretation is that courts “will not interpret a contract in such a way as to render clauses meaningless when there is a reasonable interpretation that does not do so”; instead, courts “must strive to interpret a contract in such a way as to give meaning to all clauses while doing violence to none.” Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Whispering Lakes I, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citations omitted); see also Harris v. School Bd. of Duval Cnty., 921 So. 2d 725, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that an ambiguity between two contractual cla

2026A general principle of contract interpretation is that courts “will not interpret a contract in such a way as to render clauses meaningless when there is a reasonable interpretation that does not do so”; instead, courts “must strive to interpret a contract in such a way as to give meaning to all clauses while doing violence to none.” Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Whispering Lakes I, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citations omitted); see also Harris v. School Bd. of Duval Cnty., 921 So. 2d 725, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that an ambiguity between two contractual cla

2007See Perez, 932 So.2d at 391 (citing James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)) (explaining that section 47.021, Florida Statutes (2005), gave defendant a venue privilege and section 47.041, Florida Statutes (2005), allowed trial court to order separate trials).

2006Additionally, chapter 47 "confer[s] a venue privilege in the defendant[ ]." James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).

2006See Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580 , 35 So.2d 844 (1948).

2006See Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580 , 35 So.2d 844 (1948).

2005The Florida Supreme Court has said "that one who would assert the venue privilege should, at the earliest possible time, and no later than the filing of his answer, plead all matters then known to him which would negative proper venue." Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100, 103 (Fla.1955).

1987In Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100, 103 (Fla. 1955), the Court stated: [O]ne who would assert the venue privilege should, at the earliest possible time, and no later than the filing of his answer, plead all matters then known to him which would negative proper venue.

1996In Vance v. Minton, 444 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), this court examined the venue statutes and concluded that the venue privilege attaches only when the action is “commenced.” In the instant case, as in all others, the cause of action commenced when the plaintiff filed her initial complaint in the Circuit Court for Dade County.

1992The court also found preeminently significant that the statutory language of sections 47.011 and 47.021, Florida Statutes (1981), specifically refer to the venue privilege as attaching when the action is “begun” or “brought.” The court then noted that the Florida Statutes, in contrast to the statutory scheme in other states, do not prescribe “a subsequent, post-commencement determination of the venue issue and a consequent transfer or dismissal when there is a change in the parties defendant.” Vance , at 1164.

1978See, Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Rotocast Plastics Products, Inc., 341 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Northside Iron and Metal Co. v. Dobson and Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.1973); Landmark Bank of West Broward, N.A. v. Giroux, 358 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1978).

1977See Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Rotocast Plastics Products, Inc., 341 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and cases cited therein.

2005In that case the plaintiff Petrol "acknowledged that the improper venue defense had not been waived," id. at 1088 , and Host Marriott raised the defense of improper venue in its first responsive pleading.

2005Summit's reliance on Host Marriott Tollroads, Inc. v. Petrol Enters., Inc., 810 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), where the court found the venue defense had been properly raised, is misplaced.

2018Id.

2017Such a provision “must be honored by the trial court in the absence of a showing that the clause is unreasonable or unjust.” Michaluk v. Credorax (USA), Inc., 164 So.3d 719, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).

2006Following the teaching of Enfinger , we have stated that section 47.021 "applies only when codefendants reside in `different' counties." Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Mercer, 226 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).

1970Even if Financial Fire & Casualty Company were doing business in Hillsborough County, the unrebutted prima facie showing that it has its principal place of business in Broward County requires reversal of that portion of the lower court’s order appealed from under the rule announced by this court in Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Mercer, 226 So.2d 270 (Fla.App.1969).

1983However, we agree with the opinion in Grice v. Board of County Commissioners, 413 So.2d 88, 89-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) that: The cause of action is not properly severable under the usual rules, and strict adherence to the venue privilege would result in forcing the plaintiffs (appellants) to file identical suits in separate counties involving the same facts and issues.

1983I agree with the holding' of the court in Grice v. Board of County Commissioners, 413 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), that: The cause of action is not properly áeverable under the usual rules, and strict adherence to the venue privilege would result in forcing the plaintiffs (appellants) to file identical suits in separate counties involving the same facts and issues.

2026Augustine, 602 So. 2d 659, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (finding burden of showing jurisdiction not met where plaintiff did not rebut defendant’s affidavit and such burden not satisfied by showing jurisdiction solely through a venue clause waiving jurisdictional challenges attached to the complaint).

2024Indeed, this Court has held that “the non-mutuality of [a] forum selection clause does not render it invalid or permissive.” Antoniazzi, 259 So. 3d at 210 (citing Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (upholding forum selection clause which required account holder to file all legal action “at the location of the Bank’s office appearing on this Agreement,” while providing that Bank “may bring action against the Account Holder(s) before the courts or any other competent authority at the place of residence of the Account Holder(s) or elsewhere”)).

2024In support, Open MRI cites Nunez v. Geico General Insurance Co., 117 So. 3d 388, 389 (Fla. 2013), which involved a requirement that the insured attend an examination under oath as a condition precedent to recover PIP benefits.

2024Co., 134 So. 3d 566, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). 11 Because the venue clause is valid and enforceable, as set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s order transferring venue to Palm Beach County.

2020Section 79.09, F.S.A., imposes the venue requirement that in cases before a circuit judge the application for the writ shall be filed with the circuit court of the county in which the prisoner is detained."); Clough v. State, 136 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("The proper venue for these petitions is 'the circuit court of the county in which the prisoner is detained' " (quoting § 79.09, Fla. Stat. (2009))); State ex rel.

2020Wainwright v. Holley, 234 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) ("Fla. Stat. 1967, s 79.09, F.S.A., clearly imposed the venue requirement that in cases before a circuit judge, the application for a writ must be filed with the circuit court of the county in which the prisoner is detained."). -4- County was proper, see Clough v. State, 136 So. 3d 680, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("[W]hen a petitioner improperly seeks relief under section 79.01, the postconviction court may convert the [habeas] petition to a rule 3.850 motion, absent a procedural bar."); Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 647, 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 20