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14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Premogreen2 sentences2023In the post-conviction proceeding in this case, the court char- acterized the venue defense as “weak,” Johnson III, 361 Or at 691, 710 , providing “no reasonable prospect for acquittal,” id. at 710 , and further observed that it “had the significant drawback of essentially acknowledging that petitioner had committed aggravated murder, and had done so in a particularly callous man- ner by throwing a youth whom he had sexually assaulted off a bridge.” Id. 2023In the post-conviction proceeding in this case, the court char- acterized the venue defense as “weak,” Johnson III, 361 Or at 691, 710 , providing “no reasonable prospect for acquittal,” id. at 710 , and further observed that it “had the significant drawback of essentially acknowledging that petitioner had committed aggravated murder, and had done so in a particularly callous man- ner by throwing a youth whom he had sexually assaulted off a bridge.” Id. | 3 | 5 |
Samuel v. Vanderheidengreen2 sentences2017Relying on this court’s decision in Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 361 , 39 P3d 851 (2002), and the post-conviction court’s determination that counsel knew that a drug overdose theory of defense was “plausi- ble,” the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s decision to limit the investigation of that defense “was not based on a 9 Peters acknowledged in the post-conviction trial that he understood the venue defense to be very undesirable. 698 Johnson v. Premo reasonable evaluation of the likely costs and potential ben- efits to petitioner.” Johnson, 277 Or at 239 (internal quota- tion marks a 2017Relying on this court’s decision in Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 361 , 39 P3d 851 (2002), and the post-conviction court’s determination that counsel knew that a drug overdose theory of defense was “plausi- ble,” the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s decision to limit the investigation of that defense “was not based on a 9 Peters acknowledged in the post-conviction trial that he understood the venue defense to be very undesirable. 698 Johnson v. Premo reasonable evaluation of the likely costs and potential ben- efits to petitioner.” Johnson, 277 Or at 239 (internal quota- tion marks a | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cloutiergreen2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 2 |
State v. Blairgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 541-42 , 396 P3d 908 (2017) (vacating and remand- ing where the record was not clear on a dispositive factual issue and we could not presume the court found that fact consistently with its ultimate conclusion because it was not apparent that the trial court understood the required fac- tual inquiry); State v. Shaw, 317 Or App 746, 751 , 507 P3d 280 (2022) (vacating and remanding for a new evidentiary hearing under similar circumstances to Blair). 2026See, e.g., State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 541-42 , 396 P3d 908 (2017) (vacating and remand- ing where the record was not clear on a dispositive factual issue and we could not presume the court found that fact consistently with its ultimate conclusion because it was not apparent that the trial court understood the required fac- tual inquiry); State v. Shaw, 317 Or App 746, 751 , 507 P3d 280 (2022) (vacating and remanding for a new evidentiary hearing under similar circumstances to Blair). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millsgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Mills, 354 Or 350, 371-73 , 312 P3d 515 (2013). 2015See State v. Mills, 354 Or 350, 371-73 , 312 P3d 515 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stevens v. State
green
2 sentences2016Contrary to the state’s assertion, we further conclude that counsels’ decision to rely on Ferris’s opinion and the venue defense was not a reasonable tactical decision deserving of deference. “[T]actical decisions made in the course of preparing for trial must involve ‘a conscious choice by a lawyer either to take or to omit some action on the basis of an evaluation of the nature and complexity of the case, the likely costs and potential benefits of the contemplated action, and other factors.’” Lichau, 333 Or at 360 (quoting Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 109 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). 2016Contrary to the state’s assertion, we further conclude that counsels’ decision to rely on Ferris’s opinion and the venue defense was not a reasonable tactical decision deserving of deference. “[T]actical decisions made in the course of preparing for trial must involve ‘a conscious choice by a lawyer either to take or to omit some action on the basis of an evaluation of the nature and complexity of the case, the likely costs and potential benefits of the contemplated action, and other factors.’” Lichau, 333 Or at 360 (quoting Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 109 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). | 4 | 2016–2017 |
Gorham v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2017As this court has observed on numerous occasions, “tactical decisions must be grounded on a reasonable investigation.” Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567 , 34 P3d 161 (2001) (citing Krummacher, 290 Or at 875 ; Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). 2017As this court has observed on numerous occasions, “tactical decisions must be grounded on a reasonable investigation.” Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567 , 34 P3d 161 (2001) (citing Krummacher, 290 Or at 875 ; Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). | 4 | 2016–2017 |
Lichau v. Baldwin
green
2 sentences2017Relying on this court’s decision in Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 361 , 39 P3d 851 (2002), and the post-conviction court’s determination that counsel knew that a drug overdose theory of defense was “plausi- ble,” the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s decision to limit the investigation of that defense “was not based on a 9 Peters acknowledged in the post-conviction trial that he understood the venue defense to be very undesirable. 698 Johnson v. Premo reasonable evaluation of the likely costs and potential ben- efits to petitioner.” Johnson, 277 Or at 239 (internal quota- tion marks a 2017Relying on this court’s decision in Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 361 , 39 P3d 851 (2002), and the post-conviction court’s determination that counsel knew that a drug overdose theory of defense was “plausi- ble,” the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel’s decision to limit the investigation of that defense “was not based on a 9 Peters acknowledged in the post-conviction trial that he understood the venue defense to be very undesirable. 698 Johnson v. Premo reasonable evaluation of the likely costs and potential ben- efits to petitioner.” Johnson, 277 Or at 239 (internal quota- tion marks a | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Krummacher v. Gierloff
green
2 sentences2017As this court has observed on numerous occasions, “tactical decisions must be grounded on a reasonable inves- tigation.” Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567 , 34 P3d 161 (2001) (citing Krummacher, 290 Or at 875 ; Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). 2017As this court has observed on numerous occasions, “tactical decisions must be grounded on a reasonable investigation.” Gorham v. Thompson, 332 Or 560, 567 , 34 P3d 161 (2001) (citing Krummacher, 290 Or at 875 ; Stevens v. State of Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108 , 902 P2d 1137 (1995)). | 3 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Leverich
neutral
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Woolard
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Woolard
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or 45, 50-51 , 522 P2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court” means "could properly be consolidated.” Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or 232 , 484 P2d 314 , 485 P2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for punishment | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Shaw
neutral
2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 541-42 , 396 P3d 908 (2017) (vacating and remand- ing where the record was not clear on a dispositive factual issue and we could not presume the court found that fact consistently with its ultimate conclusion because it was not apparent that the trial court understood the required fac- tual inquiry); State v. Shaw, 317 Or App 746, 751 , 507 P3d 280 (2022) (vacating and remanding for a new evidentiary hearing under similar circumstances to Blair). 2026See, e.g., State v. Blair, 361 Or 527, 541-42 , 396 P3d 908 (2017) (vacating and remand- ing where the record was not clear on a dispositive factual issue and we could not presume the court found that fact consistently with its ultimate conclusion because it was not apparent that the trial court understood the required fac- tual inquiry); State v. Shaw, 317 Or App 746, 751 , 507 P3d 280 (2022) (vacating and remanding for a new evidentiary hearing under similar circumstances to Blair). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10846689
green
1 sentence2026Otherwise, my view on the kidnap- ping charge remains as expressed in my original separate Cite as 348 Or App 579 (2026) 585 opinion. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2017Johnson, 340 Or at 342 . 12 Every charge of aggravated murder that the state alleged in the underlying criminal proceeding was based on allegations that the crime was committed intentionally. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. MacNab
green
2 sentences2010Here, we agree with defendant and the state that the stipulated facts contained no direct information concerning venue and no information from which venue could be inferred. [2] Cf. State v. Macnab, 222 Or.App. 332 , 194 P.3d 164 (2008) (discussing the use of circumstantial evidence from which venue may be inferred). 2010Here, we agree with defendant and the state that the stipulated facts contained no direct information concerning venue and no information from which venue could be inferred. [2] Cf. State v. Macnab, 222 Or.App. 332 , 194 P.3d 164 (2008) (discussing the use of circumstantial evidence from which venue may be inferred). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Cervantes
green
2 sentences2010As the Supreme Court stated in Cervantes , "Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial `in the county in which the offense shall have been committed.' This venue requirement is a material allegation of the indictment that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 123 , 873 P.2d 316 . 2010As the Supreme Court stated in Cervantes , "Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial `in the county in which the offense shall have been committed.' This venue requirement is a material allegation of the indictment that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 123 , 873 P.2d 316 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Roper
green
2 sentences2006State v. Roper, 286 Or 621, 624 , 595 P2d 1247 (1979). 2006State v. Roper, 286 Or 621, 624 , 595 P2d 1247 (1979). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Cooksey
green
2 sentences1994State v. Cooksey, 242 Or 250, 251 , 409 P2d 335 (1965); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 130 , 400 P2d 524 (1965). 1994State v. Cooksey, 242 Or 250, 251 , 409 P2d 335 (1965); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 130 , 400 P2d 524 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1994State v. Cooksey, 242 Or 250, 251 , 409 P2d 335 (1965); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 130 , 400 P2d 524 (1965). 1994State v. Cooksey, 242 Or 250, 251 , 409 P2d 335 (1965); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 130 , 400 P2d 524 (1965). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p 1980In State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45, 50-51 , 522 P.2d 1390 (1974), we held that the Brown phrase "could have been tried in the same court" means "could properly be consolidated." [13] Although the dissenting judge in Cloutier disagreed with the result of our application of the principles in Cloutier and State v. Woolard, 259 Or. 232 , 484 P.2d 314 , 485 P.2d 1194 (1971), to penal objectives, he endorsed the approach: "[The pre Woolard rule] was a clear and workable rule and one which was based upon the assumption that it was the prerogative of the legislature to define crimes and to provide for p | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.