venue hearing in Texas

2021See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58 (“[A]n appellate court is obliged to conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of suit.”); Bleeker v. Villarreal, 941 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ dism’d by agr.) (“[T]his unusual standard of review can result in an appellate court reversing a trial court’s judgment based on a venue ruling that was correctly decided at the venue hearing.”).

2016P. 87.1, .3 (providing that a trial court’s “determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial” based on allegations in pleadings and “prima facie proof’ presented at venue hearing). “[T]his unusual standard of review can result in an appellate court reversing a trial court’s judgment based on a venue ruling that was correctly decided at the venue hearing.” Bleeker, 941 S.W.2d at 167 (citing Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757 ).

1976Compton v. Elliott, supra; Lynch v. Millican, 304 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex.Civ.App.- *7 Waco 1957, n. w. h.); Young v. Young, 340 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1960, n. w. h.).

1972Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Comm. of App., 1935, holding approved); Lynch v. *162 Millican, 304 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1957, n. w. h.); Young v. Young, 340 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1960, n. w. h.).

2002Inc. v. Salinas , 838 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1992), and Henderson v. O'Neill , 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990), for his position that a failure to give statutory notice before conducting a venue hearing may be addressed through a writ of mandamus.

1994See, e.g., Henderson v. O'Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905, 905 (Tex.1990) (The trial court did not give party 45 days notice of the venue hearing.); Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1987) (mandatory venue under Family Code § 11.06 enforceable by mandamus); Dorchester Master Ltd.

1961Thus, we think the holding of the Court in the Posey case, to the effect that on a venue hearing plaintiff must actually establish that he has an easement appurtenant to his land before he can maintain venue in the county of suit, has been overruled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Piazza v. Phillips, 153 Tex. 115 , 264 S.W.2d 428 , and Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446 , 186 S.W.2d 69 .

1961Thus, we think the holding of the Court in the Posey case, to the effect that on a venue hearing plaintiff must actually establish that he has an easement appurtenant to his land before he can maintain venue in the county of suit, has been overruled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Piazza v. Phillips, 153 Tex. 115 , 264 S.W.2d 428 , and Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446 , 186 S.W.2d 69 .

2008In re Estate of Izer, 693 S.W.2d 481, 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2008In re Estate of Izer, 693 S.W.2d 481, 482, 484 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).

2008See Bellair, Inc. v. Aviall of Texas, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (equating a special appearance to a venue challenge and explaining that in determining such a challenge, the court must consider the entire record, “including the evidence adduced at the trial on the merits.”).

2008See Bellair, Inc. v. Aviall of Texas, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (equating a special appearance to a venue challenge and explaining that in determining such a challenge, the court must consider the entire record, “including the evidence adduced at the trial on the merits.”).

2007Bradley v. Swearingen , 525 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. Civ.

2006Bradley v. Swearingen , 525 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. Civ.

1998Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 743 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

1993Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 743 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cer t. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S.Ct. 3272 , 106 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989).

1996Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex.1990).

1996Union Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex.1990).

1980Compton v. Elliott, 88 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex.Comm.App. 1935, opinion adopted); Cowden v. Cowden, 186 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex.1945); Flowers v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. 472 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tex.1971); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Treadway, 382 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1964, writ dism’d); Kimbell, Inc. v. Roberson, 570 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).

1980Flowers v. Dempsey Tegeler & Co., 472 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tex.1971); Cowden v. Cowden, supra; Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 95 (1935); Kimbell, Inc. v. Roberson, supra; Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Treadway, 382 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1964, writ dism’d).

1954May we observe that the general rules with reference to the issues of .yenue provide that the filing of a plea of privilege established defendant’s prima facie right to have the suit transferred to. the coutjty of his residence and the burden' of proof is. upon plaintiff to refute such prima facie right; Rule 86, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Rasberry v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 947 , and other authorities there cited; Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502 , 240 S.W. 896 ; that the mle is well established that a venue challenge by a- proper plea of privilege has. pla’ced the burden upon pla

1954May we observe that the general rules with reference to the issues of .yenue provide that the filing of a plea of privilege established defendant’s prima facie right to have the suit transferred to. the coutjty of his residence and the burden' of proof is. upon plaintiff to refute such prima facie right; Rule 86, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Rasberry v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 947 , and other authorities there cited; Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502 , 240 S.W. 896 ; that the mle is well established that a venue challenge by a- proper plea of privilege has. pla’ced the burden upon pla

2021The statutory language “contemplates the 6 admission, in some instances, of a broader range of evidence than would be admissible in a venue hearing.” Id.

2016See Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603 (“[W]e conclude that the trial court has discretion to allow a broad er range of proof in making a section 15.003(a) joinder determination than it would in a venue hearing.

1975Texas courts, however, as stated in Stockyards National Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633 , 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (1936), have imposed two additional requirements: (1) plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and nonresident defendants, or a cause of action against the resident defendant “so intimately connected” with the cause of action against the nonresident defendant that the two may be joined to avoid a multiplicity of suits, and (2) plaintiff must introduce evidence at the venue hearing sufficient to establish the cause of action alleged against the resident defendant

1975Texas courts, however, as stated in Stockyards National Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633 , 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (1936), have imposed two additional requirements: (1) plaintiff must allege a joint cause of action against the resident and nonresident defendants, or a cause of action against the resident defendant “so intimately connected” with the cause of action against the nonresident defendant that the two may be joined to avoid a multiplicity of suits, and (2) plaintiff must introduce evidence at the venue hearing sufficient to establish the cause of action alleged against the resident defendant

2002The then-current statute provided several statutory prerequisites to appeal from the Industrial Accident Board's determinations, including a venue requirement that suit be brought "in the county where the injury occurred." Mingus , 285 S.W. at 1087-88 .

2002The then-current statute provided several statutory prerequisites to appeal from the Industrial Accident Board’s determinations, including a venue requirement that suit be brought “in the county where the injury occurred.” *473 Mingus, 285 S.W. at 1087-88 .

2021See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58 (“[A]n appellate court is obliged to conduct an independent review of the entire record to determine whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of suit.”); Bleeker v. Villarreal, 941 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ dism’d by agr.) (“[T]his unusual standard of review can result in an appellate court reversing a trial court’s judgment based on a venue ruling that was correctly decided at the venue hearing.”).

2016P. 87.1, .3 (providing that a trial court’s “determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial” based on allegations in pleadings and “prima facie proof’ presented at venue hearing). “[T]his unusual standard of review can result in an appellate court reversing a trial court’s judgment based on a venue ruling that was correctly decided at the venue hearing.” Bleeker, 941 S.W.2d at 167 (citing Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757 ).

2015The [writer's] absolute reliance on Schmutz is not only misplaced, but is a direct violation of Article 1 §§ 9 & 10 of the United States Constitution, and Article 1 § 16 of the Texas Constitution. j Prior to Schmutz/ the Court of Criminal Appeals' case of Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) controlled i the standard of review when reviewing a venue challenge.

2010Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim.

1998See Petromark Minerals, 633 S.W.2d at 659 .

1998See Petromark Minerals, 633 S.W.2d at 659 .

1981Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758, 763-764 (1956), Tex.R.Civ.P., R. 86.

1981Ladner v. Reliance Corp., 156 Tex. 158 , 293 S.W.2d 758, 763-764 (1956), Tex.R.Civ.P., R. 86.

2022See, e.g., Williams v. State, 356 S.W.3d 508, 518-19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (overruling the appellant’s venue challenge on appeal when the appellant “did not challenge venue in the trial court and the record does not affirmatively show that venue [did] not exist”).

2021See, e.g., Williams v. State, 356 S.W.3d 508, 518-19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (overruling the appellant’s venue challenge on appeal when the appellant “did not challenge venue in the trial court and the record does not affirmatively show that venue [did] not exist”).

1959As was held in Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, 138 Tex. 216 , 158 S.W.2d 63 , and Rogers v. Fort Worth Poultry & Egg Co., Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 165 , for a plaintiff to maintain venue against a defendant domestic corporation outside of the county where its principal office is located under Exception 23, he must prove a cause of action by the preponderance of the *367 evidence on the venue hearing.

1959As was held in Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Monteith, 138 Tex. 216 , 158 S.W.2d 63 , and Rogers v. Fort Worth Poultry & Egg Co., Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 165 , for a plaintiff to maintain venue against a defendant domestic corporation outside of the county where its principal office is located under Exception 23, he must prove a cause of action by the preponderance of the *367 evidence on the venue hearing.

1979The defendant’s valuable right to be sued in the county *877 of his residence requires that the application of a venue exception depend upon the existence, rather than mere allegation, of venue facts and it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish those venue facts. 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, § 4.55 (1965); Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527 , 111 S.W.2d 1062 (1938).

1976Since the application of a venue exception depends upon the existence rather than on the allegation of venue facts, a plaintiff generally has the burden to establish those facts which make a prima facie case in his favor. 1 McDonald’s, Texas Civil Practice, Sec. 455, p. 611 (1965); Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527 , 111 S.W.2d 1062 (1938).

2024Id. at 40 . 3 ANALYSIS Appellant contends the intent of the conversation between he and Agent Khatib was to meet on the agreed date, not to engage in any sexual acts.

2014A venue error is distinguished from insufficient evidence in that it involves “merely a finding concerning the geographic location where the case may be tried, and it is not a finding of insufficient evidence of a required element of the offense or even a finding that the court lacked jurisdiction.” Schmutz v. State, No. PD-0530-13,__S.W.3d__, 2014 WL 300810 .