control test (Alabama) · Go Syfert
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control test in Alabama

10 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1987–1999 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
Terry v. Read Steel Productsgreen
ala · 1983 · cited in 3 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1987–1999
2 sentences

1999See id., at 864 .

1987See id., at 864 .

33
Khirieh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.green
ala · 1992 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1996–1997
2 sentences

1997Stated differently, ‘the exclusive control requirement is subordinated to its general purpose, that of indicating that it probably was the [alleged wrongdoer’s] negligence that caused the accident.’ 57B Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 1874 (1989).” Khirieh, 594 So.2d at 1224 (emphasis in the original).

1996Stated differently, 'the exclusive control requirement is subordinated to its general purpose, that of indicating that it probably was the [alleged wrongdoer's] negligence that caused the accident.' 57B Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 1874 (1989)." Khirieh , 594 So.2d at 1224 (emphasis in the original).

22
Ex Parte Stewartgreen
ala · 1987 · cited in 3 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1987–1995
2 sentences

1995In Stewart, our supreme court rejected the exclusive use of the control test in workers’ compensation cases where there are “two or more putative employers.” Our supreme court held “in cases [involving two or more putative employers], the finder of fact should concentrate, not solely on control, but also on additional indicia of the employment relationship in determining an employee’s status.” Stewart, 518 So.2d at 121 .

1992Our supreme court held that "in cases such as this, the finder of fact should concentrate, not solely on control, but also on additional indicia of the employment relationship in determining an employee's status." Stewart at 121.

13
Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp.green
fladistctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Stewart v. Carter Realty Co., Inc. green
alacivapp · 1986
2 sentences

1987In the instant case, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that "[t]here was certainly some testimony that employees or representatives of Carter directed the employee as to certain aspects of her work. . . ." Stewart v. Carter Realty Co. , 518 So.2d at 118 .

1987In the instant case, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that “[tjhere was certainly some testimony that employees or representatives of Carter directed the employee as to certain aspects of her work....” Stewart v. Carter Realty Co., 518 So.2d at 118 .

21987–1987
Garner v. Covington County green
ala · 1993
2 sentences

1995The Blount County defendants argue that the summary judgment was proper because, they say, Blount County had no duty to repair or to replace the stop sign under the control test set out in Garner, supra. In Garner , our Supreme Court stated that "[t]he test for determining whether a county or a municipality has a duty to maintain a roadway is whether it has a right to control, or to participate in the control, of the roadway." 624 So.2d at 1350 .

1995The Blount County defendants argue that the summary judgment was proper because, they say, Blount County had no duty to repair or to replace the stop sign under the control test set out in Garner, supra. In Garner , our Supreme Court stated that "[t]he test for determining whether a county or a municipality has a duty to maintain a roadway is whether it has a right to control, or to participate in the control, of the roadway." 624 So.2d at 1350 .

11995–1995
Rademaker v. Archer Daniels Midland Co. green
minn · 1976
2 sentences

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Clark v. Luther McGill, Inc. green
miss · 1961
2 sentences

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Getty Oil Company v. Loden green
del · 1974
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. green
me · 1984
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Selid Construction Co. v. Guarantee Insurance Co. green
alaska · 1960
1 sentence

1993Co. , 355 P.2d 389 , 393 (Alaska 1960) (holding that consent of an employee to a change in employers cannot be implied merely from his obedience to the orders of his master to serve another).

11993–1993
Crain v. Webster Electric Cooperative green
moctapp · 1978
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Loden v. Getty Oil Company green
delsuperct · 1974
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Latham v. Technar, Inc. green
tned · 1974
1 sentence

1993See Crawford v. Florida Steel Corp. , 478 So.2d 855 , 859-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) (distinguishing between the proof required to show special employment where the general employer is a temporary labor broker agency and the proof required where it is an independent contractor who performs services; where the plaintiff is employed by the latter, consent must be demonstrated and not implied); Bourette v. Dresser Industries, Inc. , 481 A.2d 170 , 172-73 (Me. 1984) (rejecting a control test for determining special employment and holding that, where the general employer is an independent contracto

11993–1993
Ex Parte Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc. neutral
ala · 1977
1 sentence

1987While the control test may have once been appropriate in a case such as that now before us, see Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc. , 340 So.2d 1127 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977), such is no longer necessarily true.

11987–1987
Ex Parte Kirkland green
ala · 1977
1 sentence

1987While the control test may have once been appropriate in a case such as that now before us, see Craig v. Decatur Petroleum Haulers, Inc. , 340 So.2d 1127 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976), cert. denied , 340 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977), such is no longer necessarily true.

11987–1987

Where else courts name it

NJ 51 (1951–2025) PA 47 (1929–2023) CA 37 (1930–2025) MI 35 (1929–2026) NY 33 (1888–2026) IL 24 (1979–2023) TX 18 (1967–2025) DE 12 (1992–2025) MO 12 (1892–2023) AL 10 (1987–1999) WI 10 (1970–2026) AZ 10 (1968–2025) HI 9 (1957–2025) MS 9 (1964–2017) IA 9 (1936–2025) NC 8 (1938–2022) MN 7 (1909–2015) FL 7 (1977–2024) MT 7 (1976–2002) GA 7 (1938–2001) IN 6 (1980–2025) MD 6 (1944–2025) NM 6 (1968–2023) CO 6 (1931–2009) MA 6 (1996–2023) OR 5 (1982–2019) TN 5 (1976–2019) OK 5 (1937–2010) VT 5 (1991–2015) RI 5 (1959–2013) CT 5 (1975–2021) LA 4 (1940–2005) NV 4 (1996–2014) KY 4 (1845–2022) WA 4 (2013–2024) UT 3 (1942–2022) ME 3 (1996–2026) KS 3 (1915–2009) AR 3 (1982–2000) DC 2 (2022–2024) VA 2 (1988–1995) NH 2 (1973–1977) SC 2 (1996–2009) OH 2 (2012–2018) NE 2 (1991–1998) AK 2 (1972–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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