control requirement in Illinois

2017Id.

2015Id.

1989Francis Hospital (1984), 121 Ill.

1988Francis Hospital (1984), 121 Ill.

2008Plaintiff acknowledges that Yellow Cab Affiliation’s control of affiliates’ use of the logo and color “would not alone be sufficient to create a principal-agent relationship” but insist that it “remains a factor to be weighed with the other control factors.” As plaintiff concedes, however, the Lanham Act ( 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. (2006)) requires that licensors of trademarks control their use so the public is not deceived and maintaining such control “does not automatically saddle the licensor with the responsibilities under state law of a principal for his agent.” Oberlin v. Marlin American C

2008Plaintiff acknowledges that Yellow Cab Affiliation’s control of affiliates’ use of the logo and color “would not alone be sufficient to create a principal-agent relationship” but insist that it “remains a factor to be weighed with the other control factors.” As plaintiff concedes, however, the Lanham Act ( 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. -20- 1-06-1256 (2006)) requires that licensors of trademarks control their use so the public is not deceived, and maintaining such control “does not automatically saddle the licensor with the responsibilities under state law of a principal for his agent.” Oberlin v. M

2007Holzer, 295 Ill.App.3d at 974 , 230 Ill.Dec. 317 , 693 N.E.2d 446 .

2007Holzer, 295 Ill.App.3d at 974 , 230 Ill.Dec. 317 , 693 N.E.2d 446 .

2004Defendants call our attention to City of Bloomington, Indiana v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1989), as an example of a case in which nuisance liability was precluded because the instrumentality of the nuisance was no longer in the control of the defendant.

2004Defendants call our attention to City of Bloomington, Indiana v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.1989), as an example of a case in which nuisance liability was precluded because the instrumentality of the nuisance was no longer in the control of the defendant.

2000Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 953 F.2d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Evans v. Abbott Products, Inc. , 150 Ill.

2000Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc., 953 F.2d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 1992), citing Evans v. Abbott Products, Inc., 150 Ill.

2023Accordingly, the court acted within its discretion in denying Control’s motion to stay the proceedings to compel settlement negotiations. ¶ 18 Proceedings in the Missouri State Action ¶ 19 Control next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a stay because rulings in the ongoing Missouri state action could “moot actions in the trial court and create inconsistent rulings.” ¶ 20 “When several actions are pending that involve substantially the same subject matter, a court may stay the proceedings in one matter to see whether the disposition of one action may settle the o

2023Nov. 1, 2017) (allowing interlocutory appeals from a denial of injunctive relief). ¶ 14 ANALYSIS ¶ 15 The trial court “may stay proceedings as part of its inherent authority to control the disposition of cases before it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161785, ¶ 30 .

2006App. 3d 916 , 627 N.E.2d 1265 (1994), and Brooks v. Midwest Grain Products of Illinois, Inc., 311 Ill.

2006In the Third District, we have adopted two approaches to the control requirement in the following cases: Fris v. Personal Products Co., 255 Ill.

2006App. 3d 916 , 627 N.E.2d 1265 (1994), and Brooks v. Midwest Grain Products of Illinois, Inc., 311 Ill.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994(Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters, Local No. 2, 160 Ill.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1994Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24 , 177 Ill.Dec. 163 , 602 N.E.2d 1335 ; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428 , 137 Ill.Dec. 90 , 545 N.E.2d 743 .) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 ; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141 , 149 Ill.Dec. 263 , 561 N.E.2d 633 ; accord 7A C.J.S.

1991(Coffey v. Brodsky (1987), 165 Ill.

1990Relying upon Ybarra v. Spanguard (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 486 , 154 P.2d 687 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the control requirement of res ipsa loquitur was satisfied because plaintiff demonstrated that “the physicians and hospital, at the time of surgery, each owed an independent duty to the patient and exercised concurrent control over the operation and equipment.” Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 396 ; see also Lynch, 93 Ill. 2d at 274 (Kolakowski was “a multiple-defendant, shared-control case”).

1990Relying upon Ybarra v. Spanguard (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 486 , 154 P.2d 687 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the control requirement of res ipsa loquitur was satisfied because plaintiff demonstrated that “the physicians and hospital, at the time of surgery, each owed an independent duty to the patient and exercised concurrent control over the operation and equipment.” Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 396 ; see also Lynch, 93 Ill. 2d at 274 (Kolakowski was “a multiple-defendant, shared-control case”).

1990Relying upon Ybarra v. Spanguard (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 486 , 154 P.2d 687 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that the control requirement of res ipsa loquitur was satisfied because plaintiff demonstrated that “the physicians and hospital, at the time of surgery, each owed an independent duty to the patient and exercised concurrent control over the operation and equipment.” Kolakowski, 83 Ill. 2d at 396 ; see also Lynch, 93 Ill. 2d at 274 (Kolakowski was “a multiple-defendant, shared-control case”).

1988(See Curtis v. County of Cook (1982), 109 Ill.

1988App. 3d 1 , 364 N.E.2d 423 , the case cited to in Bell in support of the control requirement, is “inapposite to the rule for which it is cited.” We first observe that our supreme court has not taken exception to application of the fourth requirement as an element of stating a cause of action in negligence against police officers under the special duty exception to their tort immunity under the Act.

1988We also reject plaintiff’s contention that the police owed him a special duty based on his status as a “material witness.” Plaintiff relies on Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge (1966), 71 Ill.

1988In support thereof, he first asserts that the “control” requirement, which was originally articulated in Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill.

1987Further, the same arguments maintained by the plaintiffs here— that the control requirement should be expanded or abolished because it oversimplifies the question of duty — were likewise raised and rejected in Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill.

1987App. 3d 758 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 .

1987In support of this position, defendant relies upon the case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187 , 355 N.E. 2d 24 .

1987In support of this position, defendant relies upon the case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187 , 355 N.E. 2d 24 .