control test in California

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2006Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 782, 787 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ] [“When the insurer provides a defense to its insured, the insured has no right to interfere with the insurer’s control of the defense, and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant, without the consent of the insurer, is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer”]; accord, Low v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2006Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 782, 787 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ] [“When the insurer provides a defense to its insured, the insured has no right to interfere with the insurer’s control of the defense, and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant, without the consent of the insurer, is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer”]; accord, Low v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2024(Bono, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 975 .) We have repeatedly relied on Bono’s reasoning in cases interpreting the control clause, and we see no reason we should 32 HUERTA v. CSI ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. not do the same here.

2017These include (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) wheth

2017These include (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) wheth

2025When applying the control test, what matters “is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much control the hirer retains the right to exercise.” (Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 533 , italics omitted.) For example, “ ‘the right to discharge at will, without cause,’ ” is “ ‘[s]trong evidence in support of an employment relationship.’ ” (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350 .) However, no rigid test governs whether someone is an employee.

2017There, the question is " 'which injuries to the employee should be insured against by the employer.' " ( Id. at p. 352, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) In cases involving workers' compensation and other protective, remedial legislation, courts have declined to apply the control test "rigidly" or "in isolation." ( Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) Instead, "the 'control-of-work-details' test for determining whether a person rendering service to another is an 'employee' or an excluded 'independent contractor' must be applied with deference to the purpo

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2020Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 968, 972 (Bono) (disapproved on other grounds in Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 ), supports our interpretation of the control clause.

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2024In Frlekin, the Ninth Circuit asked us to resolve a similar question: whether time that Apple employees spent on Apple’s premises “waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees” is compensable as “ ‘hours worked.’ ” (Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1042 .) In answering yes, we conducted a “strictly textual analysis” of the control clause, which led us to conclude that “Apple employees are clearly under Apple’s control while awaiting, and during, the exit searches.” (

2014We note, however, that Consolidated Irrigation cited Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379 and Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 163 , 172, as cases in which a control test was applied to determine whether constructive possession existed.

2013We note, however, that Consolidated Irrigation cited Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 754 ] and Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 129 ], as cases in which a control test was applied to determine whether constructive possession existed.

2024(See Frlekin, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1047 [applying Bono]; Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 583 [same]; Mendiola, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 842 [citing Morillion’s application of Bono].) In Brinker, we cited Bono approvingly as “emphasizing absence of duty and freedom from employer control as central to unpaid meal periods.” (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1036, fn. 15 .) There, we agreed with an opinion of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) of the Department of Industrial Relations that an unpaid, off-duty meal period requires that the employee “(1) has at least 30 minutes u

2023None of the former owner defendants meets the common law test as plaintiff’s employer The California Supreme Court has explained that under “traditional common law principles” that apply in determining whether an employment relationship exists, courts have long “emphasized ‘the control exercised by the employer over the employee’s performance of employment duties.’” (Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 499 (Patterson).) Like the “control” test, which is derived from the wage orders, the common law “requires ‘a comprehensive and immediate level of ‘day-to-day’ authority’ ove

2023None of the former owner defendants meets the common law test as plaintiff’s employer The California Supreme Court has explained that under “traditional common law principles” that apply in determining whether an employment relationship exists, courts have long “emphasized ‘the control exercised by the employer over the employee’s performance of employment duties.’” (Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 499 (Patterson).) Like the “control” test, which is derived from the wage orders, the common law “requires ‘a comprehensive and immediate level of ‘day-to-day’ authority’ ove

2020Redefining the control clause to cover only unavoidably required employer- controlled activities would limit the scope of compensable activities, resulting in a narrow interpretation at odds with the wage order’s fundamental purpose of protecting and benefitting employees. ( Augustus, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 262, 269; see also Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 953 [courts must construe “hours worked” definition liberally to achieve wage order’s terms and serve its remedial purposes].) It would also “amount[] to improper judicial legislation” (Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 585 ), and we decl

2020Redefining the control clause to cover only unavoidably required employer- controlled activities would limit the scope of compensable activities, resulting in a narrow interpretation at odds with the wage order’s fundamental purpose of protecting and benefitting employees. ( Augustus, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 262, 269; see also Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 953 [courts must construe “hours worked” definition liberally to achieve wage order’s terms and serve its remedial purposes].) It would also “amount[] to improper judicial legislation” (Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 585 ), and we decl

2020J. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 853 ; Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 131, 137 (Hernandez).) With these principles in mind, we first consider whether the time spent waiting for and undergoing Apple’s exit searches is compensable as “hours worked” under the control standard.

2020(Ibid. [“hours worked” “includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so” (italics added)]; Rashidi v. Moser (2014) 60 Cal.4th 718, 725 [when the Legislature uses a word or phrase in one part of a statute differently from what it uses in other sections, two different meanings “must be presumed”]; Singh v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 10 FRLEKIN v. APPLE INC.

2014(People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 759 [the statutory language “inherently encompasses and conveys to a fact finder the requirement of a mental disorder that causes serious difficulty in controlling one’s criminal sexual behavior”].) Nonetheless, defendant argues a specific control instruction was required based on the prosecution’s opening statement and closing argument, which, according to defendant, suggested that a mere diagnosis of pedophilia could satisfy the SVPA requirements without regard to whether it affected defendant’s ability to control his sexual behavior.