good ground challenge in Alabama

1996In Hood , the Court said that, although it could not find an Alabama case directly on point on the question, there were several cases stating that a good ground for challenge could be waived, citing Lyman v. State, 45 Ala. 72 (1871); Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275 , 113 So. 300 (1927).

1970Lyman v. State, 45 Ala. 72 (1871); Batson v. State, ex rel.

2009Drish and Choate were not competent jurors; and for the error in putting them upon the prisoner, this case must be reversed." See also § 12-16-150(2), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that "[i]t is a good ground for challenge of a juror by either party ... [t]hat the person has not been a resident householder or freeholder of the county for the last preceding six months."); Williams v. State, 51 Ala.App. 1 , 282 So.2d 349 (Ala.Crim.App.1973) (holding that the requirement of Title 30, § 55(1), Ala.Code 1940, that a juror must have been a resident householder or freeholder for the preceding year was con

2009Drish and Choate were not competent jurors; and for the error in putting them upon the prisoner, this case must be reversed." See also § 12-16-150(2), Ala.Code 1975 (providing that "[i]t is a good ground for challenge of a juror by either party ... [t]hat the person has not been a resident householder or freeholder of the county for the last preceding six months."); Williams v. State, 51 Ala.App. 1 , 282 So.2d 349 (Ala.Crim.App.1973) (holding that the requirement of Title 30, § 55(1), Ala.Code 1940, that a juror must have been a resident householder or freeholder for the preceding year was con

2009The term `householder' is defined by Mr. Webster to mean, `the master or chief of a family; one who keeps house with his family.' `Household: those who dwell under the same roof, and compose a family.' In the case of Bourne v. Witt, ( 19 Wend. 475 ,) Bronson, J., said, `The word "householder," in this statute, means the head, master, or person who has the charge of, and provides for a family.' `A person having and *843 providing for a household, is a householder.'— Griffin v. Sutherland, 14 Barb.

2009The term ‘householder’ is defined by Mr. Webster to mean, ‘the master or chief of a family; one who keeps house with his family.’ ‘Household: those who dwell under the same roof, and compose a family.’ In the case of Bowne v. Witt, ( 19 Wend. 475 ,) Bronson, J., said, ‘The word “householder,” in this statute, means the head, master, or person who has the charge of, and provides for a family.’ ‘A person having and providing for a household, is a house holder.’ — Griffin v. Sutherland, 14 Barb.

1996The Court *1380 quoted from Oliver v. Herron, 106 Ala. 639 , 17 So. 387 (1895), as follows: "`...

1996In Hood , the Court said that, although it could not find an Alabama case directly on point on the question, there were several cases stating that a good ground for challenge could be waived, citing Lyman v. State, 45 Ala. 72 (1871); Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275 , 113 So. 300 (1927).

1996In Hood , the Court said that, although it could not find an Alabama case directly on point on the question, there were several cases stating that a good ground for challenge could be waived, citing Lyman v. State, 45 Ala. 72 (1871); Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275 , 113 So. 300 (1927).

1980Notwithstanding those instances where a clear-cut interest exists, as when an insurance company is either directly or indirectly involved, Mitchell v. Vann , 278 Ala. 1 , 174 So.2d 501 (1965), the question as to whether to sustain a challenge for cause on the ground of interest or bias is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

1980Notwithstanding those instances where a clear-cut interest exists, as when an insurance company is either directly or indirectly involved, Mitchell v. Vann , 278 Ala. 1 , 174 So.2d 501 (1965), the question as to whether to sustain a challenge for cause on the ground of interest or bias is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1976In Letson v. State, 215 Ala. 229 , 110 So. 21 , the Supreme Court said: “It is the policy of the law not to have persons over or under age on the jury.” In Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215 , 224 So.2d 247 , Justice Bloodworth writing for the Court said: “Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same.” In Gardner v. Baker, 40 Ala.App. 374 , 113 So.2d 695 , Judge Cates (now Presi

1973That he has a fixed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, which would bias his verdict. * * * In searching for a definition of a fixed opinion, our Supreme Court in Long v. State, 86 Ala. 36 , 5 So. 443 , stated: “ * * * The mere formation of an opinion founded on rumor or hearsay, which is subject to change on hearing the evidence, and leaves the mind of the juror free to impartially consider the *678 whole evidence, without giving undue credence to that which tends to prove the facts as heard, and to apply to the evidence the law as pronounced by the court, is not sufficient

1965In any civil case, that the juror is an officer, employee or stockholder of, or in case of a mutual company is the holder of a policy of insurance with, an insurance company indemnifying any party to the suit against liability in whole or in part or holding a subrogation claim to any portion of the proceeds of the claim sued on or being otherwise financially interested in the result of the suit.” Subdivision 12 provides, that it is good ground for challenge “that the juror is an officer .... of .... an insurance company indemnifying any party . or being otherwise financially interested in the

1965In any civil case, that the juror is an officer, employee or stockholder of, or in case of a mutual company is the holder of a policy of insurance with, an insurance company indemnifying any party to the suit against liability in whole or in part or holding a subrogation claim to any portion of the proceeds of the claim sued on or being otherwise financially interested in the result of the suit.” Subdivision 12 provides, that it is good ground for challenge “that the juror is an officer .... of .... an insurance company indemnifying any party . or being otherwise financially interested in the

1959In Willingham v. State, 262 Ala. 550 , 80 So.2d 280, 282 , we said: “Our statute, Code of 1940, Title 30, § 55(7) reads: “ ‘It is a good ground for challenge by either party: * * * 7.

1959In Willingham v. State, 262 Ala. 550 , 80 So.2d 280, 282 , we said: “Our statute, Code of 1940, Title 30, § 55(7) reads: “ ‘It is a good ground for challenge by either party: * * * 7.

1959Lee v. State, 23 Ala. App. 29 , 120 So. 299 , shows an objection to three jurors claimed to be over age.

1959Lee v. State, 23 Ala. App. 29 , 120 So. 299 , shows an objection to three jurors claimed to be over age.

1957As to the makeup of the jury roll and of the names in the jury box, Code 1940, Title 30, § 21, as amended by Act No. 325, General Acts 1943, p. 309, approved July 1, 1943, reads in part: “ * * * but no person must be selected * * * who has ever been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. * * * ” A parallel path is followed by Code 1940, Title 30, § 55, as amended by Act No. 260, Acts 1955, pp. 605, 606, approved August 23, 1955, which, in subdiv. 5, provides a good ground for challenge (inter alia) that a venireman “has been convicted of a felony.” Code 1940, Title 30, § 64, relat

1957As to the makeup of the jury roll and of the names in the jury box, Code 1940, Title 30, § 21, as amended by Act No. 325, General Acts 1943, p. 309, approved July 1, 1943, reads in part: “ * * * but no person must be selected * * * who has ever been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. * * * ” A parallel path is followed by Code 1940, Title 30, § 55, as amended by Act No. 260, Acts 1955, pp. 605, 606, approved August 23, 1955, which, in subdiv. 5, provides a good ground for challenge (inter alia) that a venireman “has been convicted of a felony.” Code 1940, Title 30, § 64, relat

1957In Hendry v. State, 215 Ala. 635 , 112 So. 212 , our Supreme Court construed predecessor provisions to §§ 55 and 64 in pari materia.

1957In Hendry v. State, 215 Ala. 635 , 112 So. 212 , our Supreme Court construed predecessor provisions to §§ 55 and 64 in pari materia.