10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2021See Webb v. Gittlen, 217 Ariz. 363 , 369 ¶ 32 (2008) (describing the Morris rule, “that a stipulated judgment may bind the insurer arises from the insurer’s contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured”). 1 Morris determined whether the cooperation clause was breached by the settlement, 154 Ariz. at 118 , so it made sense to consider the reasonableness of the settlement from the insured’s perspective. 2021See Webb v. Gittlen, 217 Ariz. 363 , 369 ¶ 32 (2008) (describing the Morris rule, “that a stipulated judgment may bind the insurer arises from the insurer’s contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured”). 1 Morris determined whether the cooperation clause was breached by the settlement, 154 Ariz. at 118 , so it made sense to consider the reasonableness of the settlement from the insured’s perspective. | 2 | 3 |
Webb v. Gittlengreen2 sentences2021See Webb v. Gittlen, 217 Ariz. 363 , 369 ¶ 32 (2008) (describing the Morris rule, “that a stipulated judgment may bind the insurer arises from the insurer’s contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured”). 1 Morris determined whether the cooperation clause was breached by the settlement, 154 Ariz. at 118 , so it made sense to consider the reasonableness of the settlement from the insured’s perspective. 2021See Webb v. Gittlen, 217 Ariz. 363 , 369 ¶ 32 (2008) (describing the Morris rule, “that a stipulated judgment may bind the insurer arises from the insurer’s contractual obligations to defend and indemnify its insured”). 1 Morris determined whether the cooperation clause was breached by the settlement, 154 Ariz. at 118 , so it made sense to consider the reasonableness of the settlement from the insured’s perspective. | 2 | 2 |
Campbell v. SZL Properties, Ltd.green2 sentences2004Campbell v. SZL Props., 204 Ariz. 221, ¶ 9 , 62 P.3d 966, 968 (App.2003) (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel). 2004Campbell v. SZL Props., 204 Ariz. 221, ¶ 9 , 62 P.3d 966, 968 (App.2003) (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Canezgreen1 sentence2025Cf. State v. Canez, 118 Ariz. 187, 191 (App. 1977) (construing the court’s comments at sentencing as “an explanation by the court of why it would not impose a more severe penalty”). | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Vincent Michael Allengreen1 sentence2019State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, 76, ¶ 13 (App. 2014). ¶9 The superior court did not err in denying Morris’s motion because substantial evidence supported her intent to defraud. | 1 | 1 |
Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesotagreen2 sentences2010See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Petty, 22 Ariz.App. 539, 541 , 529 P.2d 251, 253 (App.1974) (holding that a trial court's erroneous application of substantive law could not serve as the basis for a Rule 60(c)(6) motion because to do so would invite collateral attacks on judgments that are final). [3] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) states, in part, "[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." [4] A.R.S 2010See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Petty, 22 Ariz.App. 539, 541 , 529 P.2d 251, 253 (App.1974) (holding that a trial court's erroneous application of substantive law could not serve as the basis for a Rule 60(c)(6) motion because to do so would invite collateral attacks on judgments that are final). [3] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) states, in part, "[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." [4] A.R.S | 1 | 1 |
INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACH. & AERO. WKRS v. Pettygreen2 sentences2010See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Petty, 22 Ariz.App. 539, 541 , 529 P.2d 251, 253 (App.1974) (holding that a trial court's erroneous application of substantive law could not serve as the basis for a Rule 60(c)(6) motion because to do so would invite collateral attacks on judgments that are final). [3] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) states, in part, "[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." [4] A.R.S 2010See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Petty, 22 Ariz.App. 539, 541 , 529 P.2d 251, 253 (App.1974) (holding that a trial court's erroneous application of substantive law could not serve as the basis for a Rule 60(c)(6) motion because to do so would invite collateral attacks on judgments that are final). [3] 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) states, in part, "[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." [4] A.R.S | 1 | 1 |
Parking Concepts, Inc. v. Tenneygreen2 sentences2003Id. (emphasis in original); see also Parking Concepts Inc. v. Tenney, 203 Ariz. 562, 564, ¶ 7 , 58 P.3d 44, 46 (App.2002) (citing Morris test); Munzer, 195 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 31 , 985 P.2d at 621 (same); H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire & Cos. 2003Id. (emphasis in original); see also Parking Concepts Inc. v. Tenney, 203 Ariz. 562, 564, ¶ 7 , 58 P.3d 44, 46 (App.2002) (citing Morris test); Munzer, 195 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 31 , 985 P.2d at 621 (same); H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire & Cos. | 1 | 1 |
H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2003Co., 170 Ariz. 324, 327 , 823 P.2d 1332, 1335 (App.1991) (same). 2003Co., 170 Ariz. 324, 327 , 823 P.2d 1332, 1335 (App.1991) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Munzer v. Feolagreen2 sentences2003Id. (emphasis in original); see also Parking Concepts Inc. v. Tenney, 203 Ariz. 562, 564, ¶ 7 , 58 P.3d 44, 46 (App.2002) (citing Morris test); Munzer, 195 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 31 , 985 P.2d at 621 (same); H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire & Cos. 2003Id. (emphasis in original); see also Parking Concepts Inc. v. Tenney, 203 Ariz. 562, 564, ¶ 7 , 58 P.3d 44, 46 (App.2002) (citing Morris test); Munzer, 195 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 31 , 985 P.2d at 621 (same); H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire & Cos. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morris v. Jones
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 552 , 67 S.Ct. at 456-57 . 1997Id. at 552 , 67 S.Ct. at 456-57 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.