Morris motion in Georgia

2018See, e.g., Letson v. State , 236 Ga. App. 340 , 341, 512 S.E.2d 55 (1999) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance because defendant failed to substantiate his claim that absent witness would have provided material testimony by failing to call that witness at motion for new trial hearing); see also Wells v. State , 281 Ga. 253 , 255, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to request continuance to locate potential exculpatory witness because defendant "did not make any proffer whatever to show that the testimony of such witness[ ] would have been rel

2018See, e.g., Letson v. State , 236 Ga. App. 340 , 341, 512 S.E.2d 55 (1999) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance because defendant failed to substantiate his claim that absent witness would have provided material testimony by failing to call that witness at motion for new trial hearing); see also Wells v. State , 281 Ga. 253 , 255, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to request continuance to locate potential exculpatory witness because defendant "did not make any proffer whatever to show that the testimony of such witness[ ] would have been rel

2018See, e.g., Letson v. State , 236 Ga. App. 340 , 341, 512 S.E.2d 55 (1999) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance because defendant failed to substantiate his claim that absent witness would have provided material testimony by failing to call that witness at motion for new trial hearing); see also Wells v. State , 281 Ga. 253 , 255, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to request continuance to locate potential exculpatory witness because defendant "did not make any proffer whatever to show that the testimony of such witness[ ] would have been rel

2018See, e.g., Letson v. State , 236 Ga. App. 340 , 341, 512 S.E.2d 55 (1999) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance because defendant failed to substantiate his claim that absent witness would have provided material testimony by failing to call that witness at motion for new trial hearing); see also Wells v. State , 281 Ga. 253 , 255, 637 S.E.2d 8 (2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to request continuance to locate potential exculpatory witness because defendant "did not make any proffer whatever to show that the testimony of such witness[ ] would have been rel

2015See Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 549, n. 2 ( 748 SE2d 400 ) (2013). (b) Similarly, Morris’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to Count 3, a felony murder count, is also moot.

2015See Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549, 549, n. 2 ( 748 SE2d 400 ) (2013). (b) Similarly, Morris’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to Count 3, a felony murder count, is also moot.

2018Morris lastly contends that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion as the thirteenth juror in denying his motion for a new trial on the so-called "general grounds." OCGA § 5-5-20 provides that "[i]n any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury," and section 5-5-21 provides that "[t]he presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evi

2018Morris lastly contends that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion as the thirteenth juror in denying his motion for a new trial on the so-called "general grounds." OCGA § 5-5-20 provides that "[i]n any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before another jury," and section 5-5-21 provides that "[t]he presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evi

2018But "[w]hether to grant a motion for continuance is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." Carter v. State , 285 Ga. 394 , 398, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009) (punctuation omitted).

2018But "[w]hether to grant a motion for continuance is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion." Carter v. State , 285 Ga. 394 , 398, 677 S.E.2d 71 (2009) (punctuation omitted).

2025However, a decree of annulment shall not operate to relieve the parties to a marriage of . . . responsibilities occasioned by the marriage.5 Speaking to those responsibilities occasioned by marriage, OCGA § 19-3-5 (a) states that “the issue of such a marriage born before the marriage is annulled and declared void by a competent court shall be legitimate.”6 The child in this case, however, was 5 OCGA § 19-4-5. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) See also Hall v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 576, 578-579 (1) ( 530 SE2d 485 ) (2000) (in a proceeding for third-party adoption in which the husband intervened the “child

2025However, a decree of annulment shall not operate to relieve the parties to a marriage of . . . responsibilities occasioned by the marriage.5 Speaking to those responsibilities occasioned by marriage, OCGA § 19-3-5 (a) states that “the issue of such a marriage born before the marriage is annulled and declared void by a competent court shall be legitimate.”6 The child in this case, however, was 5 OCGA § 19-4-5. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) See also Hall v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 576, 578-579 (1) ( 530 SE2d 485 ) (2000) (in a proceeding for third-party adoption in which the husband intervened the “child

2025However, a decree of annulment shall not operate to relieve the parties to a marriage of . . . responsibilities occasioned by the marriage.5 Speaking to those responsibilities occasioned by marriage, OCGA § 19-3-5 (a) states that “the issue of such a marriage born before the marriage is annulled and declared void by a competent court shall be legitimate.”6 The child in this case, however, was 5 OCGA § 19-4-5. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) See also Hall v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 576, 578-579 (1) ( 530 SE2d 485 ) (2000) (in a proceeding for third-party adoption in which the husband intervened the “child

2025However, a decree of annulment shall not operate to relieve the parties to a marriage of . . . responsibilities occasioned by the marriage.5 Speaking to those responsibilities occasioned by marriage, OCGA § 19-3-5 (a) states that “the issue of such a marriage born before the marriage is annulled and declared void by a competent court shall be legitimate.”6 The child in this case, however, was 5 OCGA § 19-4-5. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) See also Hall v. Coleman, 242 Ga. App. 576, 578-579 (1) ( 530 SE2d 485 ) (2000) (in a proceeding for third-party adoption in which the husband intervened the “child

2020We review Morris’s claim under the four-part balancing test set forth in Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256-260 (2) ( 626 SE2d 102 ) (2006).

2020We review Morris’s claim under the four-part balancing test set forth in Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256-260 (2) ( 626 SE2d 102 ) (2006).

2020Under Chatman, the court must examine the “length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) 280 Ga. at 256-257 (2) (a) (adopting the four-factor test for speedy- trial claims set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), for claims involving a right to a timely appeal).

2020Under Chatman, the court must examine the “length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) 280 Ga. at 256-257 (2) (a) (adopting the four-factor test for speedy- trial claims set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972), for claims involving a right to a timely appeal).

2009Accordingly, our reversal is limited to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Morris’s claim under OCGA § 14-8-28. 10 See City of Gainesville, 275 Ga. at 838 (“[w]hen a trial court grants a judgment clearly based on a certain issue, although it did so incorrectly, the appellate court has no other ruling to examine”).

1997The trial court properly rejected Morris’ motion for new trial because the evidence did not demand a finding that CSX’s alleged negligence “played a part, however small, in the injuries that he sustained.” Neal v. CSX Transp., 213 Ga. App. 707, 709 (2) ( 445 SE2d 766 ) (1994).

1997The trial court properly rejected Morris’ motion for new trial because the evidence did not demand a finding that CSX’s alleged negligence “played a part, however small, in the injuries that he sustained.” Neal v. CSX Transp., 213 Ga. App. 707, 709 (2) ( 445 SE2d 766 ) (1994).

1996(Cits.)’ The test is whether there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different verdict, absent the error of counsel. [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 217 Ga. App. 722, 723-724 (2) ( 458 SE2d 894 ) (1995).

1996(Cits.)’ The test is whether there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different verdict, absent the error of counsel. [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 217 Ga. App. 722, 723-724 (2) ( 458 SE2d 894 ) (1995).

1980Code Ann. § 38-801 (b) provides that “[T]he court, upon *512 written motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable...” See also, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 11, 12 (93 SC 764, 35 LE2d 67) (1973). (“The Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms ‘to be regarded as reasonable.’ Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 , 76 . . .”).