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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1987In so holding, we cited Jones v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 283, 287 , 394 P.2d 213, 217 (1964), to support our broad conclusion that “the Commission has discretion to relieve an applicant of the consequences of his failure to make a timely filing of his claim for compensation where circumstances warrant relieving claimant from his failure to file claim within the time.” Parsons v. Industrial Comm’n, 98 Ariz. at 76 , 402 P.2d at 22 . 1987In so holding, we cited Jones v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 283, 287 , 394 P.2d 213, 217 (1964), to support our broad conclusion that “the Commission has discretion to relieve an applicant of the consequences of his failure to make a timely filing of his claim for compensation where circumstances warrant relieving claimant from his failure to file claim within the time.” Parsons v. Industrial Comm’n, 98 Ariz. at 76 , 402 P.2d at 22 . | 1 | 5 |
Parsons v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1987In so holding, we cited Jones v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 283, 287 , 394 P.2d 213, 217 (1964), to support our broad conclusion that “the Commission has discretion to relieve an applicant of the consequences of his failure to make a timely filing of his claim for compensation where circumstances warrant relieving claimant from his failure to file claim within the time.” Parsons v. Industrial Comm’n, 98 Ariz. at 76 , 402 P.2d at 22 . 1987In so holding, we cited Jones v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 283, 287 , 394 P.2d 213, 217 (1964), to support our broad conclusion that “the Commission has discretion to relieve an applicant of the consequences of his failure to make a timely filing of his claim for compensation where circumstances warrant relieving claimant from his failure to file claim within the time.” Parsons v. Industrial Comm’n, 98 Ariz. at 76 , 402 P.2d at 22 . | 1 | 2 |
Todd v. Toddgreen2 sentences2008In Todd v. Todd, the appellant mailed a notice of appeal, which the clerk’s office stamped as having been filed one day late. 137 Ariz. 404, 407-08 , 670 P.2d 1228, 1231-32 (App.1983). 2008In Todd v. Todd, the appellant mailed a notice of appeal, which the clerk’s office stamped as having been filed one day late. 137 Ariz. 404, 407-08 , 670 P.2d 1228, 1231-32 (App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cook v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
green
1 sentence2022Cook, 133 Ariz. at 312–13. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Garden Development Co. v. Carlaw
green
2 sentences2008By waiting to mail the document, the appellant was "hazarding the chance that it would reach the clerk by mail on time to prevent default." Id. ¶ 30 The court of appeals has also held that mailing within a time limit does not satisfy a timely filing requirement. 2008By waiting to mail the document, the appellant was “hazarding the chance that it would reach the clerk by mail on time to prevent default.” Id. ¶ 30 The court of appeals has also held that mailing within a time limit does not satisfy a timely filing requirement. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991The purpose of the timely filing requirement is “to give the property owner an opportunity to protect himself and time to investigate the claim to determine whether it is a proper charge.” Lewis, 114 Ariz. at 431 , 561 P.2d at 755 . 1991The purpose of the timely filing requirement is “to give the property owner an opportunity to protect himself and time to investigate the claim to determine whether it is a proper charge.” Lewis, 114 Ariz. at 431 , 561 P.2d at 755 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Chavez v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing. 1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Janis v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing. 1977On the basis of the later decision of Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364 , 529 P.2d 1181 (1974), and Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362 , 529 P.2d 1179 (1974), this Court determined that the hearing officer had too narrowly limited the applicable rule and set aside the award so the hearing officer could decide whether the interests of justice required a waiver of the attorney’s late filing. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Parsons v. Bekins Freight
green
2 sentences1977Because the reason for the late filing here was a miscalculation of the 60-day period by counsel for petitioner, the hearing officer refus *276 ed to apply the exception to the timely filing requirement created by Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972), which he felt was limited in application to its facts. 1977Because the reason for the late filing here was a miscalculation of the 60-day period by counsel for petitioner, the hearing officer refus *276 ed to apply the exception to the timely filing requirement created by Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972), which he felt was limited in application to its facts. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Collins v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1976In Collins v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 485 , 455 P.2d 963 (1969), our Supreme Court applied the doctrine, where, in the first case, it ruled that the “claim” giving the Commission jurisdiction was not timely filed, and in the second case the timely filing of the claim was raised again. 1976In Collins v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 485 , 455 P.2d 963 (1969), our Supreme Court applied the doctrine, where, in the first case, it ruled that the “claim” giving the Commission jurisdiction was not timely filed, and in the second case the timely filing of the claim was raised again. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.