Hernandez motion in Texas

2018See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ; see also TEX.

2014A. Standard of review In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, observing the “crucial role” the right to counsel plays in our adversarial system. 466 U.S. 668, 685 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); see Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866 , 882–83 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978). • Zacatecan law does not recognize joint enterprise as a basis for imposing vicarious liability.

2024See Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. 1978). • Zacatecan law does not recognize joint enterprise as a basis for imposing vicarious liability.

2022We note that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, in Chapter 64 proceedings, “all of the evidence that was before the trial court before it made its ruling should be available to, and considered by, the reviewing court.” Asberry v. State, 507 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim.

2022We note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, in Chapter 64 proceedings, “all of the evidence that was before the trial court before it made its ruling should be available to, and considered by, the reviewing court.” Asberry v. State, 507 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim.

2013See, e.g. , Blakeney , 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal , 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates , 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court's attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez , 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g., Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court’s attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g. , Blakeney , 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal , 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates , 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court's attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez , 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g., Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court’s attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g. , Blakeney , 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal , 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates , 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court's attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez , 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g., Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court’s attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 .

2013See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 .

2013See, e.g. , Blakeney , 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal , 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates , 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court's attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez , 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013See, e.g., Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662-63 (delay of between five to seven months not unreasonable based on circumstances of that case); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (five-month delay not per se unreasonable); Bates, 65 S.W.3d at 136 (six-month delay from date of filing of motions and seven-week delay from date of bringing motions to court’s attention not considered unreasonable); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (two-month delay not unreasonable).

2013State v. Walker , 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984).

2013State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984).

2010See, e.g., Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim.

2010See, e.g., Scarbrough v. State , 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim.

2010Hernandez v. State, 190 S.W.3d 856, 866-73 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.) (concluding that a new punishment trial was warranted because: (1) the State failed to read two enhancement counts to the jury; (2) Hernandez’s plea to the enhancements was not taken; and (3) the State failed to reintroduce evidence in support of the enhancements).

2010Hernandez v. State , 190 S.W.3d 856, 866-73 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.) (concluding that a new punishment trial was warranted because: (1) the State failed to read two enhancement counts to the jury; (2) Hernandez's plea to the enhancements was not taken; and (3) the State failed to reintroduce evidence in support of the enhancements).

2004See Miller, 741 S.W.2d at 389 .

2004See Miller , 741 S.W.2d at 389 .

2024Other Evidence Hernandez’s motion for new trial was based in relevant part on the argument that the jury was improperly subjected to an “outside influence” 5 when juror W.Z. informed his 5 In using the phrase “outside influence,” P.M.’s affidavit and Hernandez’s brief conflate Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3(f), which provides a basis for entitlement to a new trial, with Rule of Evidence 606(b), which “prohibits a juror from testifying about ‘any matter or statement occurring during the jury’s deliberations,’ with two exceptions,” including “whether any outside influence was improperly brough

2019We overrule Hernandez’s nineteenth issue. 38 McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. Crim.

2025See Sponable v. State, No. 04-17-00817-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10816 , at *21 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that jury’s rejection of self-defense “precludes the possibility that a rational jury would have nevertheless concluded his actions were justified to protect his daughter[]”); Evans v. State, 945 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (negative jury finding on self-defense precluded the possibility that appellant was justified in using deadly force to defend a third person); Hernandez v. State, 914 S.W.2d

2025Assuming, arguendo, that the State’s questioning improperly shifted the burden of proof, nothing in the record suggests the questioning was of such a nature 16 that the State’s questions were “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or so indelibly ingrained in their minds that [they were] not susceptible to withdrawal or retraction by an instruction to disregard.” Calderon, 847 S.W.2d at 380 ; Faulkner, 940 S.W.2d at 313 (we presume the jury will obey an instruction to disregard).

2025We will review the trial court’s ruling on limitations de novo because the sufficiency of an indictment, see Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2025We will review the trial court’s ruling on limitations de novo because the sufficiency of an indictment, see Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim.

2025According to Appellant, when there is an allegation that a juror is biased, the remedy is a hearing during which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias, and Appellant cites Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982).

2025See Sponable v. State, No. 04-17-00817-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10816 , at *21 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that jury’s rejection of self-defense “precludes the possibility that a rational jury would have nevertheless concluded his actions were justified to protect his daughter[]”); Evans v. State, 945 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (negative jury finding on self-defense precluded the possibility that appellant was justified in using deadly force to defend a third person); Hernandez v. State, 914 S.W.2d

2024App. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5682, 2024 WL 1607737 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024); see Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (“Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial’” (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978))).

2024App. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5682, 2024 WL 1607737 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024); see Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (“Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial’” (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978))).

2022See Schronk v. City of Burleson, 387 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. denied) (“There is no rule specifying the manner in which a party must present evidence in support of a plea to the jurisdiction.”). 4 In her brief, Guerra states that she has “not yet been able to discover” all of appellants’ defamatory statements because discovery has been stayed.

2021See Hernandez v. U.S. Bank Trust N.A., No. 08-16-00218-CV, 2016 WL 4801601 (Tex.App.—El Paso Sept. 14, 2016, no pet.)(mem. op.) (dismissing appeal of supersedeas order for want of jurisdiction); Hernandez v. U.S. Bank Trust N.A. for LSF8 Master Participation Trust, 527 S.W.3d 307, 308 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.)(mem. op.)(holding untimely payment of supersedeas bond was ineffective to stay judgment awarding possession to Bank and denying as moot Hernandez’s motion to reduce the supersedeas bond); Hernandez v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. for LSF8 Master Participation Trust, No. 08-16-00290- CV,

2021Under a notice-focused Hernandez inquiry as informed by Marks, the notice provided by the Tramadol-alleging prior indictment in Appellee’s case failed to give him the adequate notice necessary to preserve facts essential to defending against the Oxycodone-alleging subsequent indictment. “[There] is [not] a strong indication that [Appellee] would have understood both indictments to reach the same core conduct or act.” See Marks, 560 S.W.3d at 173 (Keasler, J., dissenting).

2019See 505 S.W.3d at 567 .

2019See 505 S.W.3d at 567 .