helpful framework in California

1997Co. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 863, 874 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 5 ] [observing, in dicta, that jury found property owner was specially benefited by proximity to transit station].) Even if, as Continental and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Kennard suggest, factual differences among these apparently similar situations justify these apparently conflicting results, it is difficult to glean from the results in these individual cases a helpful rule of general application.

1997Co. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 863, 874 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 5 ] [observing, in dicta, that jury found property owner was specially benefited by proximity to transit station].) Even if, as Continental and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Kennard suggest, factual differences among these apparently similar situations justify these apparently conflicting results, it is difficult to glean from the results in these individual cases a helpful rule of general application.

2002We find no error in the presentation of both definitions to the jury, and we find no prejudice in light of the instruction limiting the jury's consideration to `the applicable factors of aggravation].' "( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 78, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ; see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 [citing Dyer ].) In light of these decisions, the Committee revised CALJIC No. 8.88 to add a paragraph defining "aggravating" and "mitigating" derived from the instructions given in those cases. [9] Although trial in this case o

2002We find no error in the presentation of both definitions to the jury, and we find no prejudice in light of the instruction limiting the jury's consideration to `the applicable factors of aggravation].' "( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 78, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ; see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 [citing Dyer ].) In light of these decisions, the Committee revised CALJIC No. 8.88 to add a paragraph defining "aggravating" and "mitigating" derived from the instructions given in those cases. [9] Although trial in this case o

2002We find no error in the presentation of both definitions to the jury, and we find no prejudice in light of the instruction limiting the jury's consideration to `the applicable factors of aggravation].' "( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 78, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ; see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 [citing Dyer ].) In light of these decisions, the Committee revised CALJIC No. 8.88 to add a paragraph defining "aggravating" and "mitigating" derived from the instructions given in those cases. [9] Although trial in this case o

2002We find no error in the presentation of both definitions to the jury, and we find no prejudice in light of the instruction limiting the jury's consideration to `the applicable factors of aggravation].' "( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 78, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ; see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55 , 763 P.2d 906 [citing Dyer ].) In light of these decisions, the Committee revised CALJIC No. 8.88 to add a paragraph defining "aggravating" and "mitigating" derived from the instructions given in those cases. [9] Although trial in this case o

1999Disclosure of Names and Addresses First, we note that the United States Supreme Court has stated that, “disclosure of records regarding private citizens, identifiable by name, is not what the framers of the FOIA had in mind.” (Reporters Committee, supra, 489 U.S. 749, 765 [ 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1478 ].) Courts have scrutinized requests for disclosure of names and home addresses contained in public records, because individuals have a substantial privacy interest in their home addresses and in preventing unsolicited and unwanted mail.

1999Disclosure of Names and Addresses First, we note that the United States Supreme Court has stated that, “disclosure of records regarding private citizens, identifiable by name, is not what the framers of the FOIA had in mind.” (Reporters Committee, supra, 489 U.S. 749, 765 [ 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1478 ].) Courts have scrutinized requests for disclosure of names and home addresses contained in public records, because individuals have a substantial privacy interest in their home addresses and in preventing unsolicited and unwanted mail.

1965(Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, at p. 169; Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal.2d 815, 818, 819 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 376 P.2d 561 ].) Appellants were denied this helpful instruction and were left to the proof of negligence under the common instructions as to their burden of proof. *884 Appellants were also entitled to have the trial judge take the res ipsa loquitur doctrine into consideration in ruling on motion for new trial.

1965(Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, at p. 169; Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal.2d 815, 818, 819 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 376 P.2d 561 ].) Appellants were denied this helpful instruction and were left to the proof of negligence under the common instructions as to their burden of proof. *884 Appellants were also entitled to have the trial judge take the res ipsa loquitur doctrine into consideration in ruling on motion for new trial.

1943The rule, expressio unius, exclusio alterius, “is frequently a helpful rule; but it is always to be subordinated to the primary rule that the intent shall prevail over the letter” (Gallagher v. Campodonico, (1931) 121 Cal.App.Supp. 765, 774 [ 5 P.2d 486 ]; and see Sobey v. Molony, (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 381, 389 [ 104 P.2d 868 ]).

1943The rule, expressio unius, exclusio alterius, “is frequently a helpful rule; but it is always to be subordinated to the primary rule that the intent shall prevail over the letter” (Gallagher v. Campodonico, (1931) 121 Cal.App.Supp. 765, 774 [ 5 P.2d 486 ]; and see Sobey v. Molony, (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 381, 389 [ 104 P.2d 868 ]).

1943The rule, expressio unius, exclusio alterius, “is frequently a helpful rule; but it is always to be subordinated to the primary rule that the intent shall prevail over the letter” (Gallagher v. Campodonico, (1931) 121 Cal.App.Supp. 765, 774 [ 5 P.2d 486 ]; and see Sobey v. Molony, (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 381, 389 [ 104 P.2d 868 ]).

1943The rule, expressio unius, exclusio alterius, “is frequently a helpful rule; but it is always to be subordinated to the primary rule that the intent shall prevail over the letter” (Gallagher v. Campodonico, (1931) 121 Cal.App.Supp. 765, 774 [ 5 P.2d 486 ]; and see Sobey v. Molony, (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 381, 389 [ 104 P.2d 868 ]).