10 California opinions name it 1 courts 1939–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989ITT relies on Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 200 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 ], which states, "See also Westlack [ sic ] Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 482 ... where the court reaffirms the rule that Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 is a statute which confers an absolute privilege which attaches only to statements or publications, but not actions of the person invoking the privilege." ( Id. at p. 234, italics in original.) ITT more specifically asserts Dooley "is liable not just because the information was disclosed, but because he breached 1989ITT relies on Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 200 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 180 ], which states, “See also Westlack [sic] Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 482 . . . where the court reaffirms the rule that Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 is a statute which confers an absolute privilege which attaches only to statements or publications, but not actions of the person invoking the privilege.” (Id. at p. 234, italics in original.) ITT more specifically asserts Dooley “is liable not just because the information was disclosed, but because he breached the | 1 | 3 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States of America v. James W. Lawsongreen1 sentence2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; | 1 | 1 |
Prudhomme v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1980(Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 320, 326.) In Prudhomme , the court said, “[a]n ordinary witness need not actually prove the existence of an incriminatory hazard as that would surrender the very protection which the privilege against self-incrimination was *64 designed to guarantee. | 1 | 1 |
In Re GAULTgreen2 sentences1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin 1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin | 1 | 1 |
Spevack v. Kleingreen2 sentences1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin 1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF.green2 sentences1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin 1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin | 1 | 1 |
Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp.green2 sentences1963"Generally speaking,... a presumption is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying on it or of such party’s own witnesses.” (Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 517 [ 305 P.2d 36 ] (italics omitted); Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ].) 28 Accordingly, even evidence of violation of a statute will not dispel the presumption because such violation is not “wholly irreconcilable” with the presumption that the person invoking the presumption 1963"Generally speaking,... a presumption is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying on it or of such party’s own witnesses.” (Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 517 [ 305 P.2d 36 ] (italics omitted); Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ].) 28 Accordingly, even evidence of violation of a statute will not dispel the presumption because such violation is not “wholly irreconcilable” with the presumption that the person invoking the presumption | 1 | 1 |
Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences1963"Generally speaking,... a presumption is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying on it or of such party’s own witnesses.” (Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 517 [ 305 P.2d 36 ] (italics omitted); Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ].) 28 Accordingly, even evidence of violation of a statute will not dispel the presumption because such violation is not “wholly irreconcilable” with the presumption that the person invoking the presumption 1963"Generally speaking,... a presumption is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying on it or of such party’s own witnesses.” (Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509, 517 [ 305 P.2d 36 ] (italics omitted); Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [ 210 P. 269 ].) 28 Accordingly, even evidence of violation of a statute will not dispel the presumption because such violation is not “wholly irreconcilable” with the presumption that the person invoking the presumption | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. Futrellgreen2 sentences1963(See Heffington v. Paul, 152 Cal.App.2d 235, 238 [ 313 P.2d 157 , 67 A.L.R.2d 113 ]; Norton v. Futrell, 149 Cal.App.2d 586, 590 [ 308 P.2d 887 ].) A violation of statute may not be the proximate cause of the injury. 1963(See Heffington v. Paul, 152 Cal.App.2d 235, 238 [ 313 P.2d 157 , 67 A.L.R.2d 113 ]; Norton v. Futrell, 149 Cal.App.2d 586, 590 [ 308 P.2d 887 ].) A violation of statute may not be the proximate cause of the injury. | 1 | 1 |
Heffington v. Paulgreen2 sentences1963(See Heffington v. Paul, 152 Cal.App.2d 235, 238 [ 313 P.2d 157 , 67 A.L.R.2d 113 ]; Norton v. Futrell, 149 Cal.App.2d 586, 590 [ 308 P.2d 887 ].) A violation of statute may not be the proximate cause of the injury. 1963(See Heffington v. Paul, 152 Cal.App.2d 235, 238 [ 313 P.2d 157 , 67 A.L.R.2d 113 ]; Norton v. Futrell, 149 Cal.App.2d 586, 590 [ 308 P.2d 887 ].) A violation of statute may not be the proximate cause of the injury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goss v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin 1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Hodge And Zweig
green
2 sentences2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; 2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; | 2 | 1980–2001 |
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen
green
2 sentences1989ITT relies on Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 200 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 180 ], which states, “See also Westlack [sic] Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 482 . . . where the court reaffirms the rule that Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 is a statute which confers an absolute privilege which attaches only to statements or publications, but not actions of the person invoking the privilege.” (Id. at p. 234, italics in original.) ITT more specifically asserts Dooley “is liable not just because the information was disclosed, but because he breached the 1989ITT relies on Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 200 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 180 ], which states, “See also Westlack [sic] Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 482 . . . where the court reaffirms the rule that Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2 is a statute which confers an absolute privilege which attaches only to statements or publications, but not actions of the person invoking the privilege.” (Id. at p. 234, italics in original.) ITT more specifically asserts Dooley “is liable not just because the information was disclosed, but because he breached the | 2 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Victor Sherman
green
1 sentence2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Alfredo Flores, in the Matter of Robert L. Thorp, Witness-Appellant
green
1 sentence2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Willis v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; 2001Development of the Baird rule Subsequent California and Ninth Circuit opinions acknowledged the general rule *396 that the client's identity is not within the attorney-client privilege, but cited Baird for the proposition that "[a] client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." ( United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir.1977) 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 ; | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2001In People v. Sullivan (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 531 , 77 Cal.Rptr. 25 , an attorney testified on direct examination that he had obtained a box containing three pistols and certain papers on which defendant's name appeared by presenting a claim check given him by a client for whom he obtained the box. 2001In People v. Sullivan (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 531 , 77 Cal.Rptr. 25 , an attorney testified on direct examination that he had obtained a box containing three pistols and certain papers on which defendant's name appeared by presenting a claim check given him by a client for whom he obtained the box. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Gondolfo Miranti, United States of America v. Domenico Bando
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Goodman v. United States
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 98,322 Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc., William H. Howton
green
1 sentence1984C. v. First Financial Group of Texas, Inc. (5th Cir. 1981) 659 F.2d 660, 668-669 ; Hudson Tire Mart, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
United States of America and O. Gordon Delk, Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Richard Goodman, Also Known as Kick Goodman
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Robert R. Gehler v. Paul E. M. Iasigi
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Capitol Products Corporation, a Corporation, Judgment Creditor-Appellant v. Frederick E. Hernon, Judgment Debtor-Appellee
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Riley v. Pennsylvania Reading Seashore Lines
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re Master Key Litigation. States of Illinois, and v. Edward H. McCulloch Witness-Appellee And
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Lyles v. McCown
green
1 sentence1984Fed. 369 ]; In re Master Key Litigation (9th Cir. 1974) 507 F.2d 292, 293 ; United States v. Goodman (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 256, 259 , vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 75 , 82 S.Ct. 127 ]; United States v. Miranti (2d Cir. 1957) 253 F.2d 135, 139 .) The California and federal case law, which is not at all inconsistent, essentially stands for the proposition that, in situations such as that before us, assertion of the privilege in a civil proceeding cannot be sustained—that is, the court must conclude that an answer to the challenged question or production of a withheld docum | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Brunner v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1980As expressed in United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 1347 , 1353: “A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal service was sought. [Citation.]” These authorities reflect the tenor of the California cases, as well as the case of Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 623 , which was decided by reference to the California law. *292 In Brunne 1980As expressed in United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 1347 , 1353: “A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal service was sought. [Citation.]” These authorities reflect the tenor of the California cases, as well as the case of Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 623 , which was decided by reference to the California law. *292 In Brunne | 1 | 1980–1980 |
cluster 251279
green
1 sentence1980As expressed in United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 1347 , 1353: “A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal service was sought. [Citation.]” These authorities reflect the tenor of the California cases, as well as the case of Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 623 , which was decided by reference to the California law. *292 In Brunne | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Satterlee v. Bliss
neutral
1 sentence1980As expressed in United States v. Hodge and Zweig (9th Cir. 1977) 548 F.2d 1347 , 1353: “A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal service was sought. [Citation.]” These authorities reflect the tenor of the California cases, as well as the case of Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 623 , which was decided by reference to the California law. *292 In Brunne | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Griffin v. California
green
2 sentences1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin 1971(See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 577 , 87 S.Ct. 625 ]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ]; and see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-49 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557-558 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; and see 1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 374; Molinari, supra; but see Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 447 ]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California, 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 883 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 463 ].) Similarly, in the area of search and seizure the exclusionary rule has been assumed to be applicable in an admin | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Parker v. James Granger, Inc. green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.