claimed instructional error in Connecticut

2020In other words, if the violations in this case arose from a single act, such as a violation for contacting the victim and a violation for threatening her, as presented by the ‘‘I’m going to kill you’’ hypothetical, there could be only one charge. 15 We note that the defendant contends that (1) the claimed instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15–17, 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2020In other words, if the violations in this case arose from a single act, such as a violation for contacting the victim and a violation for threatening her, as presented by the ‘‘I’m going to kill you’’ hypothetical, there could be only one charge. 15 We note that the defendant contends that (1) the claimed instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15–17, 119 S. Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2011Within the specific context of jury instructions, we have drawn from the traditional understanding of waiver as a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a right; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); in holding that a defendant waives appellate review of even a properly preserved instructional error only when the record demonstrates that the defendant affirmatively and knowingly accepted the instruction. [5] See State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 632-33 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002) (defendant waived preserved challenge to instructional error because "the

2011Within the specific context of jury instructions, we have drawn from the traditional understanding of waiver as a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a right; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); in holding that a defendant waives appellate review of even a properly preserved instructional error only when the record demonstrates that the defendant affirmatively and knowingly accepted the instruction. [5] See State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 632-33 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002) (defendant waived preserved challenge to instructional error because "the

2017Our Supreme Court held in State v. Ash , 231 Conn. 484 , 492, 651 A.2d 247 (1994), that *49 General Statutes § 53a-19 (b), which governs the duty to retreat, requires the finder of fact, in deciding whether the state had disproven self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, to ascertain whether the defendant had actual knowledge regarding his ability to retreat in complete safety.

2017Our Supreme Court held in State v. Ash , 231 Conn. 484 , 492, 651 A.2d 247 (1994), that *49 General Statutes § 53a-19 (b), which governs the duty to retreat, requires the finder of fact, in deciding whether the state had disproven self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, to ascertain whether the defendant had actual knowledge regarding his ability to retreat in complete safety.

2017Nevertheless, even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from prevailing under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the claimed instructional error was "so clear, obvious and indisputable to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal." See State v. Elias V ., 168 Conn.App. 321 , 338, 147 A.3d 1102 (concluding, but not deciding, that even if the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from seeking relief under the plain error doctrine, the claimed error did not warr

2017Nevertheless, even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from prevailing under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the claimed instructional error was "so clear, obvious and indisputable to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal." See State v. Elias V ., 168 Conn.App. 321 , 338, 147 A.3d 1102 (concluding, but not deciding, that even if the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from seeking relief under the plain error doctrine, the claimed error did not warr

2017Nevertheless, even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from prevailing under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the claimed instructional error was "so clear, obvious and indisputable to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal." See State v. Elias V ., 168 Conn.App. 321 , 338, 147 A.3d 1102 (concluding, but not deciding, that even if the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from seeking relief under the plain error doctrine, the claimed error did not warr

2017Nevertheless, even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from prevailing under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the claimed instructional error was "so clear, obvious and indisputable to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal." See State v. Elias V ., 168 Conn.App. 321 , 338, 147 A.3d 1102 (concluding, but not deciding, that even if the defendant's waiver under Kitchens would not preclude him from seeking relief under the plain error doctrine, the claimed error did not warr

2011Within the specific context of jury instructions, we have drawn from the traditional understanding of waiver as a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a right; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); in holding that a defendant waives appellate review of even a properly preserved instructional error only when the record demonstrates that the defendant affirmatively and knowingly accepted the instruction. [5] See State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 632-33 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002) (defendant waived preserved challenge to instructional error because "the

2011Within the specific context of jury instructions, we have drawn from the traditional understanding of waiver as a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a right; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); in holding that a defendant waives appellate review of even a properly preserved instructional error only when the record demonstrates that the defendant affirmatively and knowingly accepted the instruction. [5] See State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 632-33 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002) (defendant waived preserved challenge to instructional error because "the

2008The state claims that the defendant induced the claimed instructional error, and therefore is precluded from review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), because the trial court’s instruction with regard to the fourth substantial step was drafted in response to the defendant’s concern that he could not be held legally liable for attempted murder solely on the basis of an omission and because the defendant acquiesced to that instruction by not objecting to it.

2008The state claims that the defendant induced the claimed instructional error, and therefore is precluded from review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), because the trial court’s instruction with regard to the fourth substantial step was drafted in response to the defendant’s concern that he could not be held legally liable for attempted murder solely on the basis of an omission and because the defendant acquiesced to that instruction by not objecting to it.

2002The rule in Quintana , therefore, applies with equal force to the claimed instructional error now at issue: because “ ‘[t]he principal factual issues [in the case] . . . were not classically dependent upon [the subtleties of the law of self-defense] for their proof id., 47-48 ; the improper instruction reasonably cannot be said to have misled the jury.

1999The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 284 , 664 A.2d 743 (1995).

1999The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 284 , 664 A.2d 743 (1995).

1998State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 65 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993).

1998State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 65 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993).

1988We first note that the defendant did not take an exception to this claimed instructional error at trial and that he seeks review under the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).

1988We first note that the defendant did not take an exception to this claimed instructional error at trial and that he seeks review under the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973).