10 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cornelius Johnsongreen1 sentence2012We note, in addition, that even for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, a number of federal circuit courts have held that a felon in possession of a firearm is not a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 521 (3rd Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 27 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Singleton, Carlos T.green1 sentence2012We note, in addition, that even for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, a number of federal circuit courts have held that a felon in possession of a firearm is not a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 521 (3rd Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 27 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Donald K. Lanegreen1 sentence2012We note, in addition, that even for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, a number of federal circuit courts have held that a felon in possession of a firearm is not a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 521 (3rd Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 27 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rysheen Bowersgreen1 sentence2012We note, in addition, that even for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, a number of federal circuit courts have held that a felon in possession of a firearm is not a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 521 (3rd Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 27 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Wulfgreen2 sentences2004In a further comment, which should emphasize the relationship between § 52-109 and rule 15 (c), the authors go on to say: “Although an amendment that seeks to add a new plaintiff who asserts an entirely different claim will not relate back, an amendment by which plaintiff seeks to add a claim in another capacity has been held to relate back by several federal courts.” Id.; see, e.g., Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 , 33 S. Ct. 135 , 57 L. 2004In a further comment, which should emphasize the relationship between § 52-109 and rule 15 (c), the authors go on to say: “Although an amendment that seeks to add a new plaintiff who asserts an entirely different claim will not relate back, an amendment by which plaintiff seeks to add a claim in another capacity has been held to relate back by several federal courts.” Id.; see, e.g., Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570 , 33 S. Ct. 135 , 57 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berchtold v. Maggi
green
2 sentences2006Rather than being required to take as true the evidence offered by the plaintiff, the trier of fact can disbelieve any evidence, even if uncontradicted.” Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983). 2006Rather than being required to take as true the evidence offered by the plaintiff, the trier of fact can disbelieve any evidence, even if uncontradicted.” Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983). | 3 | 1984–2006 |
Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2016In particular, I agree with Justice Zarella that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, ‘‘did not raise a procedural default defense’’ in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 774 , 12 A.3d 817 (2008), and that, therefore, that case ‘‘provides no guidance as to the applicability of the procedural default rule when a petitioner who has not requested a Salamon1 instruction at trial or raised the issue on direct appeal makes a Salamon claim in a subsequent habeas proceeding.’’ (Footnote added.) I also agree with Justice Zarella that, because the petitioner himself does 2016In particular, I agree with Justice Zarella that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, ‘‘did not raise a procedural default defense’’ in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 774 , 12 A.3d 817 (2008), and that, therefore, that case ‘‘provides no guidance as to the applicability of the procedural default rule when a petitioner who has not requested a Salamon1 instruction at trial or raised the issue on direct appeal makes a Salamon claim in a subsequent habeas proceeding.’’ (Footnote added.) I also agree with Justice Zarella that, because the petitioner himself does | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ghant v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences2016The majority also acknowledges that the respondent is contending only that ‘‘the Appellate Court did not correctly apply the legal standard for assessing cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default.’’ Although the petitioner purportedly makes a brief, sec- ondary argument that procedural default is not a bar to habeas review pursuant to the reasoning in Luurtsema, even he never goes so far as to suggest that the proce- dural default rule should be replaced by an entirely different standard.1 It is thus improper for the majority to consider the issue in the present case without the input 2016The majority also acknowledges that the respondent is contending only that ‘‘the Appellate Court did not correctly apply the legal standard for assessing cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default.’’ Although the petitioner purportedly makes a brief, sec- ondary argument that procedural default is not a bar to habeas review pursuant to the reasoning in Luurtsema, even he never goes so far as to suggest that the proce- dural default rule should be replaced by an entirely different standard.1 It is thus improper for the majority to consider the issue in the present case without the input | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Salamon
green
2 sentences2016In particular, I agree with Justice Zarella that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, ‘‘did not raise a procedural default defense’’ in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 774 , 12 A.3d 817 (2008), and that, therefore, that case ‘‘provides no guidance as to the applicability of the procedural default rule when a petitioner who has not requested a Salamon1 instruction at trial or raised the issue on direct appeal makes a Salamon claim in a subsequent habeas proceeding.’’ (Footnote added.) I also agree with Justice Zarella that, because the petitioner himself does 2016In particular, I agree with Justice Zarella that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, ‘‘did not raise a procedural default defense’’ in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 774 , 12 A.3d 817 (2008), and that, therefore, that case ‘‘provides no guidance as to the applicability of the procedural default rule when a petitioner who has not requested a Salamon1 instruction at trial or raised the issue on direct appeal makes a Salamon claim in a subsequent habeas proceeding.’’ (Footnote added.) I also agree with Justice Zarella that, because the petitioner himself does | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sabrowski v. Sabrowski
green
2 sentences2016The majority also acknowledges that the respondent is contending only that ‘‘the Appellate Court did not correctly apply the legal standard for assessing cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default.’’ Although the petitioner purportedly makes a brief, sec- ondary argument that procedural default is not a bar to habeas review pursuant to the reasoning in Luurtsema, even he never goes so far as to suggest that the proce- dural default rule should be replaced by an entirely different standard.1 It is thus improper for the majority to consider the issue in the present case without the input 2016The majority also acknowledges that the respondent is contending only that ‘‘the Appellate Court did not correctly apply the legal standard for assessing cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default.’’ Although the petitioner purportedly makes a brief, sec- ondary argument that procedural default is not a bar to habeas review pursuant to the reasoning in Luurtsema, even he never goes so far as to suggest that the proce- dural default rule should be replaced by an entirely different standard.1 It is thus improper for the majority to consider the issue in the present case without the input | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Shinkle v. Union City Body Co.
green
1 sentence2004Ed. 355 (1913); Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 303 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1962); Shinkle v. Union City Body Co., 94 F.R.D. 631 (D. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Shirley M. Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company and Consumers Public Power District
green
1 sentence2004Ed. 355 (1913); Russell v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 303 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1962); Shinkle v. Union City Body Co., 94 F.R.D. 631 (D. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Hill
green
1 sentence2000Id., 100 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Boscarino
green
2 sentences1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. 1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Herring
green
2 sentences1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. 1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Herring v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Washington v. Texas
green
1 sentence1995State v. Bosearino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), and State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S. Ct. 3230 , 106 L. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Strickland v. Vescovi
green
2 sentences1993Rather than being required to take as true the evidence offered by the plaintiff, the trier of fact can disbelieve any evidence, even if uncontradicted.’ (Citations omitted.)” Strickland v. Vescovi, 3 Conn. App. 10, 15 , 484 A.2d 460 (1984), quoting Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983). 1993Rather than being required to take as true the evidence offered by the plaintiff, the trier of fact can disbelieve any evidence, even if uncontradicted.’ (Citations omitted.)” Strickland v. Vescovi, 3 Conn. App. 10, 15 , 484 A.2d 460 (1984), quoting Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 272 , 464 A.2d 1 (1983). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Torres v. City of Waterbury
green
2 sentences1993Torres v. Waterbury, 30 Conn. App. 620 , 626 n.3, 621 A.2d 764 (1993). 1993Torres v. Waterbury, 30 Conn. App. 620 , 626 n.3, 621 A.2d 764 (1993). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.