contractual indemnification claim in New York

2020The contractual indemnification clause requires Marcato to indemnify 61 Broadway Owner for claims and damages arising out of, inter alia, Marcato's negligence or performance of the contract, to the full extent permitted by law, and is not void pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d 204, 208-209 [2008]).

2020The contractual indemnification clause requires Marcato to indemnify 61 Broadway Owner for claims and damages arising out of, inter alia, Marcato's negligence or performance of the contract, to the full extent permitted by law, and is not void pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 ( see Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc. , 11 NY3d 204, 208-209 [2008]).

2014In opposition, Tomchinsky failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the contractual indemnification clause should not be enforced (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2014In opposition, Tomchinsky failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the contractual indemnification clause should not be enforced (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2013Although a party is not entitled to summary judgment on a contractual indemnification claim where issues of fact remain whether the indemnitee was actively negligent (see Jamindar v Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d 612, 616 [2011]; Stranz v New York State Energy Research & Dev.

2013Although a party is not entitled to summary judgment on a contractual indemnification claim where issues of fact remain whether the indemnitee was actively negligent (see Jamindar v Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 90 AD3d 612, 616 [2011]; Stranz v New York State Energy Research & Dev.

2024LLC , 203 AD3d 524, 525 [1st Dept 2022] [law of the case barred the indemnitors from dismissing a contractual indemnification claim after conditional summary judgment was granted to the indemnitee]; Glynwill Invs. v Shearson Lehman Hutton , 216 AD2d 78, 79 [1st Dept 1995] [law of the case precluded the court from granting summary judgment to the indemnitee because, in a prior action, another judge resolved the construction of a release as having limited effect]). [FN3] Even if the doctrine did not apply, the court should not have relied on the indemnity provision in the purchase because it is

2024LLC , 203 AD3d 524, 525 [1st Dept 2022] [law of the case barred the indemnitors from dismissing a contractual indemnification claim after conditional summary judgment was granted to the indemnitee]; Glynwill Invs. v Shearson Lehman Hutton , 216 AD2d 78, 79 [1st Dept 1995] [law of the case precluded the court from granting summary judgment to the indemnitee because, in a prior action, another judge resolved the construction of a release as having limited effect]). [FN3] Even if the doctrine did not apply, the court should not have relied on the indemnity provision in the purchase because it is

2024LLC , 203 AD3d 524, 525 [1st Dept 2022] [law of the case barred the indemnitors from dismissing a contractual indemnification claim after conditional summary judgment was granted to the indemnitee]; Glynwill Invs. v Shearson Lehman Hutton , 216 AD2d 78, 79 [1st Dept 1995] [law of the case precluded the court from granting summary judgment to the indemnitee because, in a prior action, another judge resolved the construction of a release as having limited effect]). [FN3] Even if the doctrine did not apply, the court should not have relied on the indemnity provision in the purchase because it is

2024LLC , 203 AD3d 524, 525 [1st Dept 2022] [law of the case barred the indemnitors from dismissing a contractual indemnification claim after conditional summary judgment was granted to the indemnitee]; Glynwill Invs. v Shearson Lehman Hutton , 216 AD2d 78, 79 [1st Dept 1995] [law of the case precluded the court from granting summary judgment to the indemnitee because, in a prior action, another judge resolved the construction of a release as having limited effect]). [FN3] Even if the doctrine did not apply, the court should not have relied on the indemnity provision in the purchase because it is

2023The parties' contract relieves Freeman of its duty to indemnify TIA "for occurrences or accidents caused by any other party not under Freeman's direct control." While the record demonstrates that Freeman exerted a substantial amount of control over the exhibitors who are alleged to have caused plaintiff's accident, issues of fact remain as to whether that control amounts to "direct control" for purposes of the contractual indemnification clause in Freeman's contract with TIA ( see Sommer [*2]v Federal Signal Corp. , 79 NY2d 540, 555 [1992]).

2023The parties' contract relieves Freeman of its duty to indemnify TIA "for occurrences or accidents caused by any other party not under Freeman's direct control." While the record demonstrates that Freeman exerted a substantial amount of control over the exhibitors who are alleged to have caused plaintiff's accident, issues of fact remain as to whether that control amounts to "direct control" for purposes of the contractual indemnification clause in Freeman's contract with TIA ( see Sommer [*2]v Federal Signal Corp. , 79 NY2d 540, 555 [1992]).

2021Nostrand Enterprises is unconditionally entitled to contractual indemnification to the extent not barred by the anti-subrogation rule ( Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, LLC , 179 AD3d 508, 511 [2020]; see DeJesus v Tyree Org. , 307 AD2d 897, 898-899 [1st Dept 2003]).

2021Nostrand Enterprises is unconditionally entitled to contractual indemnification to the extent not barred by the anti-subrogation rule ( Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, LLC , 179 AD3d 508, 511 [2020]; see DeJesus v Tyree Org. , 307 AD2d 897, 898-899 [1st Dept 2003]).

2021Nostrand Enterprises is unconditionally entitled to contractual indemnification to the extent not barred by the anti-subrogation rule ( Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, LLC , 179 AD3d 508, 511 [2020]; see DeJesus v Tyree Org. , 307 AD2d 897, 898-899 [1st Dept 2003]).

2021Nostrand Enterprises is unconditionally entitled to contractual indemnification to the extent not barred by the anti-subrogation rule ( Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, LLC , 179 AD3d 508, 511 [2020]; see DeJesus v Tyree Org. , 307 AD2d 897, 898-899 [1st Dept 2003]).

2020Defendants agreed to indemnify plaintiffs for damages and litigation costs connected to claims for physical injury, so long as they or their subcontractors were negligent ( see Lipari v AT Spring LLC , 92 AD3d 502, 504-505 [1st Dept 2012]).

2020Defendants agreed to indemnify plaintiffs for damages and litigation costs connected to claims for physical injury, so long as they or their subcontractors were negligent ( see Lipari v AT Spring LLC , 92 AD3d 502, 504-505 [1st Dept 2012]).

2014Contrary to Tomchinsky’s contention, since the alteration agreement was not entered into in connection with, or collateral to, a lease, General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable (cf. Dwyer v Central Park Studios, Inc., 98 AD3d 882, 884 [2012]; Hadzihasanovic v 155 E. 72nd St.

2014Contrary to Tomchinsky’s contention, since the alteration agreement was not entered into in connection with, or collateral to, a lease, General Obligations Law § 5-321 is inapplicable (cf. Dwyer v Central Park Studios, Inc., 98 AD3d 882, 884 [2012]; Hadzihasanovic v 155 E. 72nd St.

2013Auth. [NYSERDA], 87 AD3d 1279, 1283 [2011]), as addressed in our analysis with respect to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action, Sicoli established that it was not negligent as a matter of law (see Nicholas v EPO-Harvey Apts., Ltd.

2013Auth. [NYSERDA], 87 AD3d 1279, 1283 [2011]), as addressed in our analysis with respect to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action, Sicoli established that it was not negligent as a matter of law (see Nicholas v EPO-Harvey Apts., Ltd.

2013Dismissal of the contractual indemnification claim against Sherry Hill was proper, since there was no indemnification agreement in existence at the time of the accident, and nothing indicates that the terms and conditions on the back of the purchase order, which contains the indemnification clause, were to have a retroactive effect (see Regno v City of New York, 88 AD3d 610 [1st Dept 2011]; Temmel v 1515 Broadway Assoc., L.P., 18 AD3d 364, 365-366 [1st Dept 2005]).

2013Dismissal of the contractual indemnification claim against Sherry Hill was proper, since there was no indemnification agreement in existence at the time of the accident, and nothing indicates that the terms and conditions on the back of the purchase order, which contains the indemnification clause, were to have a retroactive effect (see Regno v City of New York, 88 AD3d 610 [1st Dept 2011]; Temmel v 1515 Broadway Assoc., L.P., 18 AD3d 364, 365-366 [1st Dept 2005]).

2013Dismissal of the contractual indemnification claim against Sherry Hill was proper, since there was no indemnification agreement in existence at the time of the accident, and nothing indicates that the terms and conditions on the back of the purchase order, which contains the indemnification clause, were to have a retroactive effect (see Regno v City of New York, 88 AD3d 610 [1st Dept 2011]; Temmel v 1515 Broadway Assoc., L.P., 18 AD3d 364, 365-366 [1st Dept 2005]).

2013Dismissal of the contractual indemnification claim against Sherry Hill was proper, since there was no indemnification agreement in existence at the time of the accident, and nothing indicates that the terms and conditions on the back of the purchase order, which contains the indemnification clause, were to have a retroactive effect (see Regno v City of New York, 88 AD3d 610 [1st Dept 2011]; Temmel v 1515 Broadway Assoc., L.P., 18 AD3d 364, 365-366 [1st Dept 2005]).

2025Con Edison may be entitled to pursue a contractual indemnification claim against Danella based on the terms of their agreement, even in the absence of any finding of negligence or liability against Con Edison (see Olivieri v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 208 AD3d 1001 [4th Dept 2022][recognizing enforceability of indemnification provisions that are not conditioned on a finding of fault]).

2025Con Edison may be entitled to pursue a contractual indemnification claim against Danella based on the terms of their agreement, even in the absence of any finding of negligence or liability against Con Edison (see Olivieri v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 208 AD3d 1001, 1418 [4th Dept 2022][recognizing enforceability of indemnification provisions that are not conditioned on a finding of fault]).

2008Accordingly, summary judgment on the contractual indemnification claim is premature (see DiPerna v American Broadcasting Cos., 200 AD2d 267, 270 [1994]; Cichon v Brista Estates Assoc., 193 AD2d 926, 927-928 [1993]).

1996In addition, to recover under the contractual indemnification clause, the City is required to demonstrate that Builders & Contractors was negligent and that its negligence proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries (Cichon v Brista Estates Assocs., 193 AD2d 926 ).

2008Accordingly, summary judgment on the contractual indemnification claim is premature (see DiPerna v American Broadcasting Cos., 200 AD2d 267, 270 [1994]; Cichon v Brista Estates Assoc., 193 AD2d 926, 927-928 [1993]).

1998The determination of the trial court in the underlying action that CCC’s application seeking indemnification from Anthony Concrete was moot (see, DiPerna v American Broadcasting Cos., 200 AD2d 267 ) was not a determination on the merits that would collaterally estop either CCC or plaintiff as subrogee (see, Matter of City of Oneida v Chassin, 229 AD2d 855, 857 ).

2005Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172, 178-181 [1990]), or had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the manner of the work that caused the injury (see Naranjo v Star Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 11 AD3d 436, 438 [2004]; Lazzaro v MJM Indus., 288 AD2d 440, 441 [2001]).

2004Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172 [1990]), or had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the work that caused the injury (see Lazzaro v MJM Indus., 288 AD2d 440 [2001]).

2005Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172, 178-181 [1990]), or had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the manner of the work that caused the injury (see Naranjo v Star Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 11 AD3d 436, 438 [2004]; Lazzaro v MJM Indus., 288 AD2d 440, 441 [2001]).

2004Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172 [1990]), or had the authority to supervise, direct, or control the work that caused the injury (see Lazzaro v MJM Indus., 288 AD2d 440 [2001]).

2026Although the parties entered into a separate agreement in 2015 for Everest to obtain an initial permit and furnish, install, and remove scaffolds for the subject construction project, during which plaintiff was allegedly injured, Hite's full lump sum payment to Everest in connection with that agreement could not support the 2016 agreement, since "past consideration is no consideration" at common law ( Kastil v Carro , 145 AD2d 388, 389 [1st Dept 1988], lv dismissed 74 NY2d 650 [1989] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2026Although the parties entered into a separate agreement in 2015 for Everest to obtain an initial permit and furnish, install, and remove scaffolds for the subject construction project, during which plaintiff was allegedly injured, Hite's full lump sum payment to Everest in connection with that agreement could not support the 2016 agreement, since "past consideration is no consideration" at common law (<i>Kastil v Carro</i>, 145 AD2d 388 , 389 [1st Dept 1988], <i>lv dismissed</i> 74 NY2d 650 [1989] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2026The language also provided that Universal would indemnify the general contractor and owners for loss due to an act or omission of Universal's workers, or where Universal's personnel or equipment were in "the vicinity" of the accident by reason of their performance of the work (<i>see</i> <i>Cackett v Gladden Props., LLC</i>, 183 AD3d 419, 422 [1st Dept 2020]).