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10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
American Home Assur. v. PLAZA MATERIALSgreen2 sentences2008Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 376 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599, 609 (Fla.2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (same). 2006As I stated in my concurring opinion in American Home Assurance, "this kind of analysis is `neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the statutes . . ., nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of [legislative] intent.'" 908 So.2d at 375 (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 , 109 S.Ct. 939 , 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gauldengreen2 sentences2016She noted that the legislative staff analysis of the 1999 revision to 316.027(1) explained that the reason for replacing accident with crash was “ ‘to update and conform terminology and to more accurately describe[] a collision involving a motor vehicle.’ ” Gaulden I, 134 So. 3d at 984 (Davis, J., dissenting). 2016She noted that the legislative staff analysis of the 1999 revision, to 316.027(1). explained that the reason for replacing accident with crash was “ ‘to update and conform terminology and to more accurately describe[ ] a collision involving a motor vehicle.’ ” Gaulden I, 134 So.3d at 984 (Davis, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Leegreen2 sentences2010The legislative staff analysis for the 1980 amendments explained that amendments to section 768.28 adopted in 1979 sought to prevent personal liability of governmental employees, [4] but that in light of the supreme court's opinion in Talmadge , "there is some concern ... that the 1979 legislation does not in fact achieve the results intended, to wit: no personal liability for employees acting within the scope of their employment." PCB 31 Staff Analysis, at 1; but cf. Rice v. Lee, 477 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that the 1979 amendments to section 768.28(9) eliminated the 2010The legislative staff analysis for the 1980 amendments explained that amendments to section 768.28 adopted in 1979 sought to prevent personal liability of governmental employees, 4 but that in light of the supreme court’s opinion in Talmadge , “there is some concern ... that the 1979 legislation does not in fact achieve the results intended, to wit: no personal liability for employees acting within the scope of their employment.” PCB 31 Staff Analysis, at 1; hut cf. Rice v. Lee, 477 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that the 1979 amendments to section 768.28(9) eliminated the in | 1 | 1 |
GULFSTREAM PARK RACING v. Tampa Bay Downsgreen1 sentence2008Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 376 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599, 609 (Fla.2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Braggs v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Id. at 660 (citation and footnotes omitted). [39] Thus, contrary to the majority's determination, see majority op. at 402, note 29, the retroactivity provision was not included to make section 810.015(2) only applicable to crimes occurring on or after February 1, 2000. [40] Another reference in the legislative staff analysis prepared for House Bill 953 supports the conclusion that the retroactivity language in section 810.015(2) was included to completely nullify the Delgado decision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rice v. Leegreen2 sentences2010The legislative staff analysis for the 1980 amendments explained that amendments to section 768.28 adopted in 1979 sought to prevent personal liability of governmental employees, [4] but that in light of the supreme court's opinion in Talmadge , "there is some concern ... that the 1979 legislation does not in fact achieve the results intended, to wit: no personal liability for employees acting within the scope of their employment." PCB 31 Staff Analysis, at 1; but cf. Rice v. Lee, 477 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that the 1979 amendments to section 768.28(9) eliminated the 2010The legislative staff analysis for the 1980 amendments explained that amendments to section 768.28 adopted in 1979 sought to prevent personal liability of governmental employees, 4 but that in light of the supreme court’s opinion in Talmadge , “there is some concern ... that the 1979 legislation does not in fact achieve the results intended, to wit: no personal liability for employees acting within the scope of their employment.” PCB 31 Staff Analysis, at 1; hut cf. Rice v. Lee, 477 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that the 1979 amendments to section 768.28(9) eliminated the in | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2016The cost-benefit considerations contained in subsection 921.002(l)(i) later came into play during the 2008-09 fiscal crisis, when the legislature enacted section 775.082(10) “as a part of a cost-savings measure for the Department of Corrections, and the legislative staff analysis characterized the statute as a ‘prison diversion approach.’ ” Jones v. State, 71 So.3d 173 , 175 n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. Comm, on Ways & Means, Bill Analysis & Fiscal Impact Statement FOR CS/SB 1722, at 1 (2009)). ’ Section 775.082(10) requires courts to “sentence certain non-violent low-scoring offende 2016The cost-benefit considerations contained in subsection 921.002(l)(i) later came into play during the 2008-09 fiscal crisis, when the legislature enacted section 775.082(10) “as a part of a cost-savings measure for the Department of Corrections, and the legislative staff analysis characterized the statute as a ‘prison diversion approach.’ ” Jones v. State, 71 So.3d 173 , 175 n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. Comm, on Ways & Means, Bill Analysis & Fiscal Impact Statement FOR CS/SB 1722, at 1 (2009)). ’ Section 775.082(10) requires courts to “sentence certain non-violent low-scoring offende | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sousa v. State
green
2 sentences2013After expressing this agreement with Mondesir , the second district acknowledged that the legislative staff analysis upon which Mondesir relied “appears to contrast with the wording of the statute.” Sousa I, 868 So.2d at 540 . 2013As the second district acknowledged in Sousa I, the legislative staff analysis “appears to contrast with the wording of the statute.” 868 So.2d at 540 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2011NOTES [1] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [2] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [3] We are satisfied that the first issue is preserved for appellate review in light of the argument presented below and the unique and tortured procedural history of the sentencing process in this case, which culminated in a perfunctory resentencing "hearing" at which the trial court simply imposed the same sentence it had initially imposed. [4] Section 775.082(10) was enacted in 2009 as a part of a cost-savings measure fo 2011NOTES [1] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [2] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [3] We are satisfied that the first issue is preserved for appellate review in light of the argument presented below and the unique and tortured procedural history of the sentencing process in this case, which culminated in a perfunctory resentencing "hearing" at which the trial court simply imposed the same sentence it had initially imposed. [4] Section 775.082(10) was enacted in 2009 as a part of a cost-savings measure fo | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2011NOTES [1] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [2] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [3] We are satisfied that the first issue is preserved for appellate review in light of the argument presented below and the unique and tortured procedural history of the sentencing process in this case, which culminated in a perfunctory resentencing "hearing" at which the trial court simply imposed the same sentence it had initially imposed. [4] Section 775.082(10) was enacted in 2009 as a part of a cost-savings measure fo 2011NOTES [1] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [2] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [3] We are satisfied that the first issue is preserved for appellate review in light of the argument presented below and the unique and tortured procedural history of the sentencing process in this case, which culminated in a perfunctory resentencing "hearing" at which the trial court simply imposed the same sentence it had initially imposed. [4] Section 775.082(10) was enacted in 2009 as a part of a cost-savings measure fo | 1 | 2011–2011 |
DHSMV v. Pelham
green
2 sentences2008In reaching this conclusion, the Pelham court was not unmindful of a legislative staff analysis which indicated that the amendment of section 322.2615 negated the need for DHSMV to show in an administrative review of a license suspension that a lawful arrest for a violation of section 316.1932 (the DUI statute) occurred. 979 So.2d at 307-08 . 2008However, given the provision in section 316.1932 that a breath or blood test must be incident to a lawful arrest, a provision which remains in force, our sister court rightly indicated that "[i]f the legislature intends to authorize DHSMV to suspend a driver's license for refusal to take a test, without regard to the validity of the police action preceding the request, then it should say so expressly." 979 So.2d at 308 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Blanchard v. Bergeron
green
2 sentences2006As I stated in my concurring opinion in American Home Assurance, "this kind of analysis is `neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the statutes . . ., nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of [legislative] intent.'" 908 So.2d at 375 (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 , 109 S.Ct. 939 , 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 2006As I stated in my concurring opinion in American Home Assurance, "this kind of analysis is `neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the statutes . . ., nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of [legislative] intent.'" 908 So.2d at 375 (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 , 109 S.Ct. 939 , 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tukes v. State
green
1 sentence1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Carlile v. GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COM'N
green
1 sentence1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex parte Bailey
green
1 sentence1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Henderson v. State
neutral
2 sentences1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 1994NOTES [1] Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof." [2] See Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734 , 23 So. 552 (1897); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977). [3] § 810.011(2), Fla. Stat. [4] Numerous cases have considered the common-law rule, see Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315 , 85 So. 911 (1920); Henderson v. State, 80 Fla. 49 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.