Palmer motion in Florida

2024Following the December 3 hearing, Palmer filed a second motion for postconviction relief based on the fingerprint evidence, which Palmer argued was a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and additionally raised a newly discovered evidence claim based on an affidavit executed by the victim, British Mitchell.

2024“Absent a record that conclusively refutes the allegations in the affidavit, or a finding that the newly-discovered evidence is inherently incredible, an evidentiary hearing generally will be required to resolve claims of newly-discovered evidence, especially when resolution of those claims necessarily requires the trial court to make credibility determinations.” Harris v. State, 128 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where nothing in the record established the affidavit was “inherently incredible”) (citing McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 955-57 ; Jones v. S

2008See Gomez v. State, 984 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding claim for foreign jail credit should be raised on direct appeal or in a timely rule 3.850 motion); Krause v. State, 857 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (addressing pleading requirements for claim of entitlement to foreign jail time credit).

2001Company, 301 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). [1] In the instant case, the insurer *1022 failed to verify Palmer's claim within 30 days, and delayed payment on the claim until it received proof of coverage.

1999Under Dixon v. State, 730 So.2d 265 (Fla.1999), defendants making a Palmer claim would have a two year window from the issuance of Bass to raise the instant issue.

1999Under Dixon v. State, 730 So.2d 265 (Fla.1999), defendants making a Palmer claim would have a two year window from the issuance of Bass to raise the instant issue.

1989Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955), the court found that although a contract for sale of the vehicle was not executed until the day after the accident, "the definite intention existed on the part of [the buyer] and [the seller's] representative to make immediate transfer of the beneficial ownership of the vehicle to [the buyer] ..." Palmer, 81 So.2d at 636 . *434 The determinative factor in the Palmer exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was the fact that the buyer had beneficial ownership of the automobile, notwithstanding the fact that the seller held legal ti

1989Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955), the court found that although a contract for sale of the vehicle was not executed until the day after the accident, "the definite intention existed on the part of [the buyer] and [the seller's] representative to make immediate transfer of the beneficial ownership of the vehicle to [the buyer] ..." Palmer, 81 So.2d at 636 . *434 The determinative factor in the Palmer exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was the fact that the buyer had beneficial ownership of the automobile, notwithstanding the fact that the seller held legal ti

1988In Palmer this court affirmed the trial court's denial of Palmer's motion to suppress on two grounds: 1) the trial court *287 found that the officers were justified in their belief that the malleable and distinctively wrapped, shaped, and sized packages constituted probable cause to believe that narcotics were present, and 2) the consent to search the tote bag extended to the packages "particularly in light of the fact that, unlike, for example, Goldberg v. State, 407 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Major v. State, 389 So.2d 1203 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 408 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1981), Pa

1988In Palmer this court affirmed the trial court's denial of Palmer's motion to suppress on two grounds: 1) the trial court *287 found that the officers were justified in their belief that the malleable and distinctively wrapped, shaped, and sized packages constituted probable cause to believe that narcotics were present, and 2) the consent to search the tote bag extended to the packages "particularly in light of the fact that, unlike, for example, Goldberg v. State, 407 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Major v. State, 389 So.2d 1203 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 408 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1981), Pa

1988In Palmer this court affirmed the trial court's denial of Palmer's motion to suppress on two grounds: 1) the trial court *287 found that the officers were justified in their belief that the malleable and distinctively wrapped, shaped, and sized packages constituted probable cause to believe that narcotics were present, and 2) the consent to search the tote bag extended to the packages "particularly in light of the fact that, unlike, for example, Goldberg v. State, 407 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Major v. State, 389 So.2d 1203 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 408 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1981), Pa

1986We recently held to the contrary, and affirmed the vitality of the Palmer analysis under the guidelines in State v. Suarez, 485 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 1986).

1984Recently, we had occasion to consider a Palmer objection to consecutive mandatory minimum sentences in Wilson v. State, 449 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (on rehearing).