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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Raymond v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that these strategies were not deficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Raymond v. State, 298 Ga. App. 549, 550-551 (1) (a) ( 680 SE2d 598 ) (2009). 2013Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that these strategies were not deficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Raymond v. State, 298 Ga. App. 549, 550-551 (1) (a) ( 680 SE2d 598 ) (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Meredith v. Stategreen2 sentences2011The record, however, does not support Chandler’s claim that the prosecutor’s actions constituted “misconduct.” “A charge of pros-ecutorial misconduct is-a serious charge and is not to be lightly made; having raised it, appellant has the duty to prove it by the record and by legal authority.” Meredith v. State, 211 Ga. App. 213, 215 (4) ( 438 SE2d 644 ) (1993). 2011The record, however, does not support Chandler’s claim that the prosecutor’s actions constituted “misconduct.” “A charge of pros-ecutorial misconduct is-a serious charge and is not to be lightly made; having raised it, appellant has the duty to prove it by the record and by legal authority.” Meredith v. State, 211 Ga. App. 213, 215 (4) ( 438 SE2d 644 ) (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Hendrix v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 62 (2) (a) n. 2 ( 779 SE2d 322 ) (2015). 2016See Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 62 (2) (a) n. 2 ( 779 SE2d 322 ) (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Grano v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Grano v. State, 265 Ga. 346, 346 ( 455 SE2d 582 ) (1995). 2012See Grano v. State, 265 Ga. 346, 346 ( 455 SE2d 582 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Dodd v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Dodd v. State, 293 Ga.App. 816, 820 (2), 668 S.E.2d 311 (2008) (" Brady . . . is not violated when the [exculpatory] evidence is presented to the jury at trial.") (citations and punctuation omitted.) Thus, Chandler has failed to show that the prosecutor violated the law, prejudiced Chandler's defense, or committed any act that could be construed as misconduct. 2011See Dodd v. State, 293 Ga.App. 816, 820 (2), 668 S.E.2d 311 (2008) (" Brady . . . is not violated when the [exculpatory] evidence is presented to the jury at trial.") (citations and punctuation omitted.) Thus, Chandler has failed to show that the prosecutor violated the law, prejudiced Chandler's defense, or committed any act that could be construed as misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
Malone v. Stategreen2 sentences1997See Malone *232 v. State, 225 Ga. App. 315 ( 484 SE2d 6 ) (1997) (reversing a conviction where reasons given for strikes were race-neutral); O’Neal v. State, supra (jurors’ employment status, marital status, and hostile attitudes are race-neutral reasons for strikes); Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227 ( 483 SE2d 691 ) (1997) (potential business relationship between prospective jurors a race-neutral reason to strike). 2 In O’Neal v. State, supra, we noted that the trial court had likely combined steps two and three of the Chandler analysis and disapproved such combination. 1997See Malone *232 v. State, 225 Ga. App. 315 ( 484 SE2d 6 ) (1997) (reversing a conviction where reasons given for strikes were race-neutral); O’Neal v. State, supra (jurors’ employment status, marital status, and hostile attitudes are race-neutral reasons for strikes); Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227 ( 483 SE2d 691 ) (1997) (potential business relationship between prospective jurors a race-neutral reason to strike). 2 In O’Neal v. State, supra, we noted that the trial court had likely combined steps two and three of the Chandler analysis and disapproved such combination. | 1 | 1 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences1992King v. State, 202 Ga. App. 817, 818, fn. 1 ( 415 SE2d 684 ) (1992). 1992King v. State, 202 Ga. App. 817, 818, fn. 1 ( 415 SE2d 684 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Lolley v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Although Chandler itself is silent on this issue, the Supreme Court in Chandler based its new rule on Justice Weltner's concurrence in Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 607-610 ( 385 SE2d 285 ) (1989). 1992Although Chandler itself is silent on this issue, the Supreme Court in Chandler based its new rule on Justice Weltner's concurrence in Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 607-610 ( 385 SE2d 285 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chandler v. State
green
2 sentences2010Spencer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial Chandler hearing, see Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991), and failing to ascertain on the record whether he wanted to testify in his own defense. 2010Spencer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial Chandler hearing, see Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 ( 405 SE2d 669 ) (1991), and failing to ascertain on the record whether he wanted to testify in his own defense. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Leeks v. State
green
2 sentences1997See Malone *232 v. State, 225 Ga. App. 315 ( 484 SE2d 6 ) (1997) (reversing a conviction where reasons given for strikes were race-neutral); O’Neal v. State, supra (jurors’ employment status, marital status, and hostile attitudes are race-neutral reasons for strikes); Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227 ( 483 SE2d 691 ) (1997) (potential business relationship between prospective jurors a race-neutral reason to strike). 2 In O’Neal v. State, supra, we noted that the trial court had likely combined steps two and three of the Chandler analysis and disapproved such combination. 1997See Malone *232 v. State, 225 Ga. App. 315 ( 484 SE2d 6 ) (1997) (reversing a conviction where reasons given for strikes were race-neutral); O’Neal v. State, supra (jurors’ employment status, marital status, and hostile attitudes are race-neutral reasons for strikes); Leeks v. State, 226 Ga. App. 227 ( 483 SE2d 691 ) (1997) (potential business relationship between prospective jurors a race-neutral reason to strike). 2 In O’Neal v. State, supra, we noted that the trial court had likely combined steps two and three of the Chandler analysis and disapproved such combination. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.