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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greene v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The State cites as authority for this charge the case of Greene v. State, 214 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 448 SE2d 758 ) (1994), where the issue was “whether Greene was in control of a moving vehicle at any time while intoxicated.” In that case, a police officer observed Green, who admitted he was intoxicated, passed out in the driver’s seat of the truck and slumped over the steering wheel. 1997The State cites as authority for this charge the case of Greene v. State, 214 Ga. App. 664, 665 ( 448 SE2d 758 ) (1994), where the issue was “whether Greene was in control of a moving vehicle at any time while intoxicated.” In that case, a police officer observed Green, who admitted he was intoxicated, passed out in the driver’s seat of the truck and slumped over the steering wheel. | 1 | 1 |
Weathers v. Cowangreen2 sentences1987The trial court instructed the jury, "[i]f you find that [appellant] has appeared as a witness for himself and has given self contradictory, vague, or equivocal testimony, then that testimony is to be construed *447 most strongly against him; and if the most unfavorable version of his testimony shows that the verdict should be against him, then you must find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant." In Weathers v. Cowan, 176 Ga. App. 19, 20 (2) ( 335 SE2d 392 ) (1985), the following charge was given as to all parties in that case: "`Testimony of a party who offers himself or 1987The trial court instructed the jury, "[i]f you find that [appellant] has appeared as a witness for himself and has given self contradictory, vague, or equivocal testimony, then that testimony is to be construed *447 most strongly against him; and if the most unfavorable version of his testimony shows that the verdict should be against him, then you must find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant." In Weathers v. Cowan, 176 Ga. App. 19, 20 (2) ( 335 SE2d 392 ) (1985), the following charge was given as to all parties in that case: "`Testimony of a party who offers himself or | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Zantgreen2 sentences1986See State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269 (1) ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1) (1976); Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 380 (3) ( 290 SE2d 442 ) (1982). 1986See State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269 (1) ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1) (1976); Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 380 (3) ( 290 SE2d 442 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Culberson v. Culbersongreen1 sentence1986See State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269 (1) ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1) (1976); Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 380 (3) ( 290 SE2d 442 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen1 sentence1986See State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269 (1) ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1) (1976); Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 380 (3) ( 290 SE2d 442 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Bartow County Bank v. Bartow County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen2 sentences1983In an earlier analysis of our bank share tax statute, we explained that, “... the [bank share] tax is upon the bank’s shareholders rather than the bank itself, although the value of those shares is based upon the capital (net worth) of the bank.” Bartow County Bank v. Board of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 704 ( 285 SE2d 920 ) (1982). 1983In an earlier analysis of our bank share tax statute, we explained that, “... the [bank share] tax is upon the bank’s shareholders rather than the bank itself, although the value of those shares is based upon the capital (net worth) of the bank.” Bartow County Bank v. Board of Tax Assessors, 248 Ga. 703, 704 ( 285 SE2d 920 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Castlegreen2 sentences1962The charge as a whole sufficiently instructed the jury as to the essential law of the case, and while “some of the detached fragments of the charge, if treated alone, may be subject to slight criticism, when considered in the light of the charge as a whole and the facts of the case, none of them disclose reversible error.” Smith v. Castle, 102 Ga. App. 737, 742 ( 117 SE2d 623 ). 1962The charge as a whole sufficiently instructed the jury as to the essential law of the case, and while “some of the detached fragments of the charge, if treated alone, may be subject to slight criticism, when considered in the light of the charge as a whole and the facts of the case, none of them disclose reversible error.” Smith v. Castle, 102 Ga. App. 737, 742 ( 117 SE2d 623 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brodes v. State
green
1 sentence2006In Brodes , the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that under the circumstances of that case the “level of *372 certainty” portion of the charge was harmful error, in light of the “lack of correlation between a witness’s certainty in his or her identification of someone as the perpetrator of a crime and the accuracy of that identification.” Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gober v. State
green
2 sentences1991However, not only did the judge recognize his slip of the tongue immediately and attempt to correct it in the same sentence in which it occurred, but he then completely restated the sentence using the word “authorizes” and omitting the word “justifies.” The “palpable” slip of the tongue could not have “misled or confused the jury.” Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652 (3) ( 278 SE2d 386 ) (1981). 1991However, not only did the judge recognize his slip of the tongue immediately and attempt to correct it in the same sentence in which it occurred, but he then completely restated the sentence using the word “authorizes” and omitting the word “justifies.” The “palpable” slip of the tongue could not have “misled or confused the jury.” Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652 (3) ( 278 SE2d 386 ) (1981). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Mathis v. Watson
green
2 sentences1990The charge in this case is substantially identical to the charge given in Mathis v. Watson, 259 Ga. 13 ( 376 SE2d 660 ) (1989), where the Supreme Court held that the giving of such a charge was harmful error because it related to the issue of liability and did not deal solely with the issue of damages. 1990The charge in this case is substantially identical to the charge given in Mathis v. Watson, 259 Ga. 13 ( 376 SE2d 660 ) (1989), where the Supreme Court held that the giving of such a charge was harmful error because it related to the issue of liability and did not deal solely with the issue of damages. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Minter v. Leary
green
2 sentences1990Although we held in Minter v. Leary, 181 Ga. App. 801 (1) ( 354 SE2d 185 ) (1987) that a charge on magnified damages constituted harmless error where the jury exonerated the defendant, it appears from the opinion that the charge was confined to the issue of damages. 1990Although we held in Minter v. Leary, 181 Ga. App. 801 (1) ( 354 SE2d 185 ) (1987) that a charge on magnified damages constituted harmless error where the jury exonerated the defendant, it appears from the opinion that the charge was confined to the issue of damages. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences1984Since appellant’s requested charge was a correct statement of the law and was adjusted to the evidence, we are constrained to hold that the trial court’s failure to give the charge was harmful error demanding reversal of the conviction.” Jones v. State, 160 Ga. App. 209 (2) ( 286 SE2d 764 ). 1984Since appellant’s requested charge was a correct statement of the law and was adjusted to the evidence, we are constrained to hold that the trial court’s failure to give the charge was harmful error demanding reversal of the conviction.” Jones v. State, 160 Ga. App. 209 (2) ( 286 SE2d 764 ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence1941In support of these contentions she cites Smith v. State, 109 Ga. 479 (3), 484 (35 S. E. *548 59), and Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Bryans, 35 Ga. App. 713 (134 S E. 787). | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Barnes v. Holcomb
green
1 sentence1941In support of these contentions she cites Smith v. State, 109 Ga. 479 (3), 484 (35 S. E. *548 59), and Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Bryans, 35 Ga. App. 713 (134 S E. 787). | 1 | 1941–1941 |