county has waived sovereign immunity in Georgia

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2014If the Ellers have stated a viable claim for inverse condemnation, or a claim for nuisance or trespass that rises to the level of a taking, then the County has waived sovereign immunity as to all these claims since “the Constitution provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance which amounts to an inverse condemnation.” Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 433 (1) ( 249 SE2d 235 ) (1978); see also Stanfield, supra, 280 Ga. at 786 (1) (trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of inverse condemnation claims); Orwig, supra, 261 Ga. at 138 (1).

2012Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1) ( 508 SE2d 159 ) (1998); Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744,753-754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994).

2012Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 65 (1) ( 508 SE2d 159 ) (1998); Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744,753-754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994).

2022Whether a county has waived sovereign immunity is a “threshold issue” and not a “mere defense to liability.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Glynn County v. Johnson, 311 Ga. App. 867, 869 (1) ( 717 SE2d 272 ) (2011).

2022Whether a county has waived sovereign immunity is a “threshold issue” and not a “mere defense to liability.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Glynn County v. Johnson, 311 Ga. App. 867, 869 (1) ( 717 SE2d 272 ) (2011).

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2020The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.12 But OCGA § 50-21-22 (5) specifically excludes counties from the definition of “state” for purposes of the Georgia Tort Claims Act.13 So, even though Ashby 11 Rutherford v. DeKalb Cty., 287 Ga. App. 366, 367-68 (1) ( 651 SE2d 771 ) (2007); see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“A county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function to the ext

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2020The codified purpose of the Recreational Property Act instrumentalities, and institutions, but does not include counties, municipalities, school districts, other units of local government, hospital authorities, or housing and other local authorities.” (emphasis supplied)). 14 Layer, 297 Ga. at 871 (1); accord Conway, 353 Ga. App. at 111 (1); see Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 754 (7) (holding that county official sued in official capacity was entitled to the benefit of the County’s sovereign immunity). 15 See, e.g., Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 748-49 (4) (explaining that “a county waives its governmental immunit

2019Instead, our law is clear that “[a] county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function only to the extent the county has waived sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Ratliff, supra, 326 Ga. App. at 309 (1).

2019Instead, our law is clear that “[a] county may be liable for a county employee’s negligence in performing an official function only to the extent the county has waived sovereign immunity.” (Citation omitted.) Ratliff, supra, 326 Ga. App. at 309 (1).

1998See Gilbert v. Richardson, supra at 752-754, 452 S.E.2d 476 ; Lowe v. Jones County, 231 Ga.App. 372 , 499 S.E.2d 348 (1998); Seay v. Cleveland, 228 Ga.App. 836 , 493 S.E.2d 30 (1997); Brown v. Jackson, 221 Ga.App. 200, 201 (2), 470 S.E.2d 786 (1996).

1998See Gilbert v. Richardson, supra at 752-754, 452 S.E.2d 476 ; Lowe v. Jones County, 231 Ga.App. 372 , 499 S.E.2d 348 (1998); Seay v. Cleveland, 228 Ga.App. 836 , 493 S.E.2d 30 (1997); Brown v. Jackson, 221 Ga.App. 200, 201 (2), 470 S.E.2d 786 (1996).

1994See James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 ( 418 A2d 1173, 1182-1184 ) (1980); Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 1 ( 453 NE2d 421, 423 ) (1983); Adams v. Peoples, 18 Ohio St. 3d 140 ( 480 NE2d 428, 430 ) (1985); Muntan v. City of Monongahela, 45 Pa. Commw. 23 ( 406 A2d 811, 813-814 ) (1979); Maynard v. City of Madison, 101 Wis. 2d 273 ( 304 NW2d 163, 169 ) (1981).

1994See James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 ( 418 A2d 1173, 1182-1184 ) (1980); Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 1 ( 453 NE2d 421, 423 ) (1983); Adams v. Peoples, 18 Ohio St. 3d 140 ( 480 NE2d 428, 430 ) (1985); Muntan v. City of Monongahela, 45 Pa. Commw. 23 ( 406 A2d 811, 813-814 ) (1979); Maynard v. City of Madison, 101 Wis. 2d 273 ( 304 NW2d 163, 169 ) (1981).