10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1852–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.green2 sentences2017Indeed, when we spoke in Sustainable Coast about the principle that the Constitution itself may waive sovereign immunity in some cases, we identified the Takings Clause as an illustration of that principle. 20 See 294 Ga. at 600 (2). 2017Indeed, when we spoke in Sustainable Coast about the principle that the Constitution itself may waive sovereign immunity in some cases, we 36 identified the Takings Clause as an illustration of that principle.20 See 294 Ga. at 600 (2). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wyatt v. Singley
green
2 sentences1961And see Wyatt v. Singley, 103 Ga. App. 182 ( 118 SE2d 841 ) for an illustration of this principle in a factual situation similar to the one presented by this record. 1961And see Wyatt v. Singley, 103 Ga. App. 182 ( 118 SE2d 841 ) for an illustration of this principle in a factual situation similar to the one presented by this record. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Rust & Johnson v. Woolbright
green
1 sentence1943As an illustration of an exception permitting an intervention, see Rust v. Woolbright, 54 Ga. 310 , where “A sold land to B, taking his notes for the purchase-money, and giving a bond for the titles. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Cawthon v. State
green
2 sentences1940When we read the record in this case, and the charge of the court limiting the effect of such testimony, we fail to see how a better illustration of the exception to'the general rule that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible (Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413 , 69 S. E. 310 ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 (4, 5), 46 S. E. 897 ), could be shown than it was under the evidence here presented. 1940When we read the record in this case, and the charge of the court limiting the effect of such testimony, we fail to see how a better illustration of the exception to'the general rule that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible (Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413 , 69 S. E. 310 ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 (4, 5), 46 S. E. 897 ), could be shown than it was under the evidence here presented. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Lee v. State
green
1 sentence1940When we read the record in this case, and the charge of the court limiting the effect of such testimony, we fail to see how a better illustration of the exception to'the general rule that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible (Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413 , 69 S. E. 310 ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 (4, 5), 46 S. E. 897 ), could be shown than it was under the evidence here presented. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Swain v. State
green
1 sentence1940When we read the record in this case, and the charge of the court limiting the effect of such testimony, we fail to see how a better illustration of the exception to'the general rule that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible (Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413 , 69 S. E. 310 ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 (4, 5), 46 S. E. 897 ), could be shown than it was under the evidence here presented. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Houston v. Davidson
neutral
1 sentence1938We do regard, however, the decision in Houston v. Davidson, 45 Ga. 574 , as controlling. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Harris v. Southern Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1909Co., 129 Ga. 388 ( 58 S. E. 873 ), where a plaintiff was denied recovery for an injury occasioned by being struck by an engine, because, with a knowledge of the impending danger, he stepped on the track of the railroad company and attempted to cross immediately in front of the moving engine, although it appeared that the agents of the railroad company may have been negligent. 1909Co., 129 Ga. 388 ( 58 S. E. 873 ), where a plaintiff was denied recovery for an injury occasioned by being struck by an engine, because, with a knowledge of the impending danger, he stepped on the track of the railroad company and attempted to cross immediately in front of the moving engine, although it appeared that the agents of the railroad company may have been negligent. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Davis v. Hollingsworth
green
1 sentence1902The English rule as to personalty in such cases has been followed in Georgia as to realty also, and we have an illustration of this principle in the case of Davis v. Hollingsworth, 113 Ga. 210 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Mitchell v. Mitchell
neutral
1 sentence1902Yet, even in such cases, the Vice-Chancellor in Lyon v. Mitchell, supra (p. 481), said that the extent of the estate given under the first devise is to be governed by the words in the limitation over, “where they bear upon, and unite with, and tend to affect the construction of the prior words, and which in many cases may enable us to come to a conclusion respecting it.” He also said (pp. 472-3) that a devise to A. and his issue as tenants in common would be another mode of showing a legal intention on the part of the testator not to create an estate tail; but we think this would apply to esta | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Oothout v. Thompson
neutral
1 sentence1854Thompson, ( 20 John. 277 .) That was an action for deceit, growing out of the purchase of a negro woman slave, in N. York. | 1 | 1854–1854 |
Palmer v. Stephens
green
1 sentence1852Stephens, 1 Denio, 471 ; and there also, the reason upon which it is based is clearly expressed by Beardsley, J. | 1 | 1852–1852 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.