illustration rule in Missouri

2010Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc., where a helicopter pilot alleged that he was terminated because he refused, against his employer’s wishes, to make three flights he believed to be in violation of FAA regulations. 869 S.W.2d at 175 .

2010Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc ., where a helicopter pilot alleged that he was terminated because he refused, against his employer's wishes, to make three flights he believed to be in violation of FAA regulations. 869 S.W.2d at 175 .

1958Smith v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 340 Mo. 389, 412 , 100 S.W.2d 909, 920-921 , contains an illustration of an instruction’s setting forth essential facts in a vague and general manner, not clearly, and assuming silicosis “to be a disease peculiar or incident to the kind of work plaintiff was doing” so as to infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial of the issues.

1958Smith v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 340 Mo. 389, 412 , 100 S.W.2d 909, 920-921 , contains an illustration of an instruction’s setting forth essential facts in a vague and general manner, not clearly, and assuming silicosis “to be a disease peculiar or incident to the kind of work plaintiff was doing” so as to infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial of the issues.

1958Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406 , 251 S.W.2d 635 , contains an illustration of an instruction’s so erroneously assuming a fact as to require the granting of a' new trial, but the instruction there is not comparable to this one and the compelling reasons there are not demonstrated or indicated here.

1958Willey v. Fyrogas Co., 363 Mo. 406 , 251 S.W.2d 635 , contains an illustration of an instruction’s so erroneously assuming a fact as to require the granting of a' new trial, but the instruction there is not comparable to this one and the compelling reasons there are not demonstrated or indicated here.

1917In Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. l. c. 129-30, it is said : “We do not regard Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan. 84 , as laying down the hard-and-fast rule that a court of equity should never compel the specific performance of a parol contract of this character, but rather as an illustration of the doctrine, recognized almost universally, that each case depends upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and the .^anting of denying of the remedy rests in judicial discretion.” The recent case of Malaney v. Cameron, 159 Pac.

1906The rule of law is, that defenses are inconsistent only when one fact contradicts another. [Cohn v. Lehman, 93 Mo. 574 ; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 Mo. 97 .] The best illustration of the rule is found in Nelson v. Broadhack, 44 Mo. 596 .

1906The rule of law is, that defenses are inconsistent only when one fact contradicts another. [Cohn v. Lehman, 93 Mo. 574 ; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 Mo. 97 .] The best illustration of the rule is found in Nelson v. Broadhack, 44 Mo. 596 .

1906The rule of law is, that defenses are inconsistent only when one fact contradicts another. [Cohn v. Lehman, 93 Mo. 574 ; Crowder v. Searcy, 103 Mo. 97 .] The best illustration of the rule is found in Nelson v. Broadhack, 44 Mo. 596 .

1904For purposes .of description she referred to an existing state of things, thus giving an illustration of the exception to the general rule, hereinbefore stated, that the language of the will is to be interpreted as having been used with reference to the time of the death of the testator, the exception being in the language of Ellsworth, J., in Gold v. Judson, 21 Conn. 616 , that ‘wherever a testator refers to an actually existing state of things, his language should he held as referring to the date of the will, and not to his death, as this is then a prospective event.

1891The case of Schmidt v. Adams, 18 Mo. App. 432 , which has been cited to us on behalf of the plaintiff, is perhaps as good an illustration of this principle as any.

1871This decision is an illustration of the rule laid down by Greenleaf, and was cited and approved by this court in Dickerson v. Chrisman, 28 Mo. 139 ; see also McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. 250 ; and Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423 : In the case now before the court, the declarant must have known the facts attested by him.