Long motion in Georgia

2013See Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-843 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (required evidence test applicable in determining whether jury charge on lesser included offense required).

2013See Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-843 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (required evidence test applicable in determining whether jury charge on lesser included offense required).

2025While trial courts should of course use caution when adopting proposed orders by parties in full, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 572 (II) ( 105 SCt 1504 , 84 LE2d 518) (1985) (noting “the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have already been informed that the judge has decided in their favor” and cautioning courts concerning the “verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to

2025While trial courts should of course use caution when adopting proposed orders by parties in full, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 572 (II) ( 105 SCt 1504 , 84 LE2d 518) (1985) (noting “the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have already been informed that the judge has decided in their favor” and cautioning courts concerning the “verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to

2025While trial courts should of course use caution when adopting proposed orders by parties in full, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 572 (II) ( 105 SCt 1504 , 84 LE2d 518) (1985) (noting “the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have already been informed that the judge has decided in their favor” and cautioning courts concerning the “verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to

2025While trial courts should of course use caution when adopting proposed orders by parties in full, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 572 (II) ( 105 SCt 1504 , 84 LE2d 518) (1985) (noting “the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have already been informed that the judge has decided in their favor” and cautioning courts concerning the “verbatim adoption of findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties, particularly when those findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to

2024Even so, given the rather cursory nature of the trial court’s ruling on Long’s motion to dismiss, we are unable to discern if it considered the implications of ruling on a 6 Bowers v. The Ophthalmology Grp., 733 F3d 647, 654 (III) (6th Cir. 2013); see also Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F3d 83, 90 (II) (D.C.

2024Cir. 2015) (holding that although “a district court enjoys broad discretion in managing its docket and determining the order in which a case should proceed,” that “discretion is limited, however, in circumstances such as these” because “a conflict of interest could affect the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding, or the perception of fairness and impartiality,” and, as a result, “a plausible claim of conflict must be resolved before allegedly conflicted counsel or the court takes further action in the case.”); accord Tymiak v. Comm’r Social Security, 844 FedAppx 537, 546 (IV) (B) (3rd C

2024Even so, given the rather cursory nature of the trial court’s ruling on Long’s motion to dismiss, we are unable to discern if it considered the implications of ruling on a 6 Bowers v. The Ophthalmology Grp., 733 F3d 647, 654 (III) (6th Cir. 2013); see also Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F3d 83, 90 (II) (D.C.

2024Cir. 2015) (holding that although “a district court enjoys broad discretion in managing its docket and determining the order in which a case should proceed,” that “discretion is limited, however, in circumstances such as these” because “a conflict of interest could affect the fairness and impartiality of the proceeding, or the perception of fairness and impartiality,” and, as a result, “a plausible claim of conflict must be resolved before allegedly conflicted counsel or the court takes further action in the case.”); accord Tymiak v. Comm’r Social Security, 844 FedAppx 537, 546 (IV) (B) (3rd C

2020Partners, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 397, 402 (5) ( 721 SE2d 617 ) (2011); see Mordica v. State, 319 Ga. App. 149, 154-55 (2) (736 24 without a ruling by the trial court on a particular issue, there is “nothing for this Court to review upon appeal.”49 Here, as evidenced supra, Long’s motion for summary judgment as to alternative carcinogens was based solely on preventing the appellants from pursuing an apportionment defense, and the appellants acknowledge that the trial court’s sole basis for granting summary judgment was their failure to meet the causation requirement of the apportionment statute.

2020Partners, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 397, 402 (5) ( 721 SE2d 617 ) (2011); see Mordica v. State, 319 Ga. App. 149, 154-55 (2) (736 24 without a ruling by the trial court on a particular issue, there is “nothing for this Court to review upon appeal.”49 Here, as evidenced supra, Long’s motion for summary judgment as to alternative carcinogens was based solely on preventing the appellants from pursuing an apportionment defense, and the appellants acknowledge that the trial court’s sole basis for granting summary judgment was their failure to meet the causation requirement of the apportionment statute.

2020Simply put, the court’s order involved the grant of summary judgment on an apportionment defense, not any evidentiary rulings unrelated to apportionment, which makes sense if, as the appellants contend, discovery is not over SE2d 153) (2012) (explaining that it is well settled that “this [C]ourt may not address issues on appeal which were not addressed by the trial court, because this [C]ourt is a court for the correction of errors and it does not consider matters which were not raised and ruled on by the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)); Morman-Johnson v. Hathaway, 312 Ga. App. 300, 301 (

2020Partners, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 397, 402 (5) ( 721 SE2d 617 ) (2011); see Mordica v. State, 319 Ga. App. 149, 154-55 (2) (736 24 without a ruling by the trial court on a particular issue, there is “nothing for this Court to review upon appeal.”49 Here, as evidenced supra, Long’s motion for summary judgment as to alternative carcinogens was based solely on preventing the appellants from pursuing an apportionment defense, and the appellants acknowledge that the trial court’s sole basis for granting summary judgment was their failure to meet the causation requirement of the apportionment statute.

2020Simply put, the court’s order involved the grant of summary judgment on an apportionment defense, not any evidentiary rulings unrelated to apportionment, which makes sense if, as the appellants contend, discovery is not over SE2d 153) (2012) (explaining that it is well settled that “this [C]ourt may not address issues on appeal which were not addressed by the trial court, because this [C]ourt is a court for the correction of errors and it does not consider matters which were not raised and ruled on by the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)); Morman-Johnson v. Hathaway, 312 Ga. App. 300, 301 (

2020Simply put, the court’s order involved the grant of summary judgment on an apportionment defense, not any evidentiary rulings unrelated to apportionment, which makes sense if, as the appellants contend, discovery is not over SE2d 153) (2012) (explaining that it is well settled that “this [C]ourt may not address issues on appeal which were not addressed by the trial court, because this [C]ourt is a court for the correction of errors and it does not consider matters which were not raised and ruled on by the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)); Morman-Johnson v. Hathaway, 312 Ga. App. 300, 301 (

2020Simply put, the court’s order involved the grant of summary judgment on an apportionment defense, not any evidentiary rulings unrelated to apportionment, which makes sense if, as the appellants contend, discovery is not over SE2d 153) (2012) (explaining that it is well settled that “this [C]ourt may not address issues on appeal which were not addressed by the trial court, because this [C]ourt is a court for the correction of errors and it does not consider matters which were not raised and ruled on by the trial court.” (punctuation omitted)); Morman-Johnson v. Hathaway, 312 Ga. App. 300, 301 (

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2014It is well established under Georgia law that [f]or either the victim’s general reputation for violence or specific acts of violence by the victim to be admissible, the defendant must, among other procedural and substantive burdens, make a prima facie showing that the victim was the aggressor, that the victim assaulted the defendant, and that the defendant responded with force only to defend himself or herself.11 And under the new Evidence Code, “[e]xcept as modified by statute, the common law as expounded by Georgia courts shall continue to be applied to the admission and exclusion of evidenc

2011Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. at 435 (10). 4.

2010Compare Gardner v. Gardner, 276 Ga. 189, 190 ( 576 SE2d 857 ) (2003) (“Because equity seeks always to do complete justice, third parties are properly joined in a divorce action so as to facilitate resolution of the spouses’ marital claims.”) (punctuation omitted). 22 In light of our disposition of this case, Long’s motion for stay or supersedeas of the trial court’s order is moot.

2010Compare Gardner v. Gardner, 276 Ga. 189, 190 ( 576 SE2d 857 ) (2003) (“Because equity seeks always to do complete justice, third parties are properly joined in a divorce action so as to facilitate resolution of the spouses’ marital claims.”) (punctuation omitted). 22 In light of our disposition of this case, Long’s motion for stay or supersedeas of the trial court’s order is moot.

2010Long’s motion to deny supplementation of the record is denied. 23 (Citation omitted.) Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 589 (3) ( 452 SE2d 159 ) (1994).

2010Long’s motion to deny supplementation of the record is denied. 23 (Citation omitted.) Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 589 (3) ( 452 SE2d 159 ) (1994).

1999Daniel v. State, 194 Ga. App. at 496 (2), supra. 3.