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9 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Gantgreen2 sentences2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con 2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con | 2 | 2 |
Brinn v. Brinngreen2 sentences1989Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 285 , 137 S.E. 503, 505 (1927). 1989Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 285 , 137 S.E. 503, 505 (1927). | 2 | 2 |
Redman v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025Thus, even if we deem this a request to invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule -11- 5A:18, we decline to do so since the record contains adequate evidence to support the circuit court’s ruling and Long fails to affirmatively assert or demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice occurred requiring reversal of the termination orders.9 “[A]pplication of the ends of justice exception ‘requires a determination not only that there was error . . . but also that application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice.’” Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 46 (2009) (quoting Charles | 1 | 1 |
Angela Maye Holt v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2025Thus, even if we deem this a request to invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule -11- 5A:18, we decline to do so since the record contains adequate evidence to support the circuit court’s ruling and Long fails to affirmatively assert or demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice occurred requiring reversal of the termination orders.9 “[A]pplication of the ends of justice exception ‘requires a determination not only that there was error . . . but also that application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice.’” Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 46 (2009) (quoting Charles | 1 | 1 |
Charles v. Com.green1 sentence2025Thus, even if we deem this a request to invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule -11- 5A:18, we decline to do so since the record contains adequate evidence to support the circuit court’s ruling and Long fails to affirmatively assert or demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice occurred requiring reversal of the termination orders.9 “[A]pplication of the ends of justice exception ‘requires a determination not only that there was error . . . but also that application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice.’” Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 46 (2009) (quoting Charles | 1 | 1 |
Lacey v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025Thus, even if we deem this a request to invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule -11- 5A:18, we decline to do so since the record contains adequate evidence to support the circuit court’s ruling and Long fails to affirmatively assert or demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice occurred requiring reversal of the termination orders.9 “[A]pplication of the ends of justice exception ‘requires a determination not only that there was error . . . but also that application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice.’” Lacey v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 32, 46 (2009) (quoting Charles | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2018While mere presence in a high crime area does not establish a reason to detain a suspect, “it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 , 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 782, 791-92 , 595 S.E.2d 30, 35 (2004) (finding defendant’s behavior and “very nervous” appearance in area known for drug activity, and officer’s concern when appellant refused to remove hand from his pocket, justified frisk). 2018While mere presence in a high crime area does not establish a reason to detain a suspect, “it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 , 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 782, 791-92 , 595 S.E.2d 30, 35 (2004) (finding defendant’s behavior and “very nervous” appearance in area known for drug activity, and officer’s concern when appellant refused to remove hand from his pocket, justified frisk). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jaime Eleazar Bustos-Torres, United States of America v. Armando Magallan-Alfarogreen2 sentences2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con 2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Com.green2 sentences2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con 2018See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692 , 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403 , 407 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]” (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). 2 We note that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety con | 1 | 1 |
Whitaker v. Com.green2 sentences2018While mere presence in a high crime area does not establish a reason to detain a suspect, “it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 , 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 782, 791-92 , 595 S.E.2d 30, 35 (2004) (finding defendant’s behavior and “very nervous” appearance in area known for drug activity, and officer’s concern when appellant refused to remove hand from his pocket, justified frisk). 2018While mere presence in a high crime area does not establish a reason to detain a suspect, “it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.” Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 , 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010); see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 782, 791-92 , 595 S.E.2d 30, 35 (2004) (finding defendant’s behavior and “very nervous” appearance in area known for drug activity, and officer’s concern when appellant refused to remove hand from his pocket, justified frisk). | 1 | 1 |
Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Uniongreen1 sentence2016Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (where the Court of Appeals and trial court properly applied then-existing law regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, declining to consider a challenge to an inventory search of a vehicle under new United States Supreme Court precedent). | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen2 sentences2015“Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 2015“Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2015Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) (noting that its holding did not affect the Long exception for a vehicle search conducted out of concern for officer safety).2 Relevant facts “in this analysis include characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer trained and experienced in the detection of a crime.” McCain, 275 Va. at 554 , 659 S.E.2d at 517 . 2015Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) (noting that its holding did not affect the Long exception for a vehicle search conducted out of concern for officer safety).2 Relevant facts “in this analysis include characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer trained and experienced in the detection of a crime.” McCain, 275 Va. at 554 , 659 S.E.2d at 517 . | 1 | 1 |
McCain v. Com.green2 sentences2015Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) (noting that its holding did not affect the Long exception for a vehicle search conducted out of concern for officer safety).2 Relevant facts “in this analysis include characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer trained and experienced in the detection of a crime.” McCain, 275 Va. at 554 , 659 S.E.2d at 517 . 2015Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) (noting that its holding did not affect the Long exception for a vehicle search conducted out of concern for officer safety).2 Relevant facts “in this analysis include characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct of the suspect individual, the character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique perspective of a police officer trained and experienced in the detection of a crime.” McCain, 275 Va. at 554 , 659 S.E.2d at 517 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michigan v. Long
green
2 sentences2021Instead, police may conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle based on the assumption that when the stop concludes, the individual presumably “will be permitted to reenter his automobile” and “will then have access to any weapons inside.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 ; see 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6(e), at 944 (characterizing the Long test as “expansive”). 2021Instead, police may conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle based on the assumption that when the stop concludes, the individual presumably “will be permitted to reenter his automobile” and “will then have access to any weapons inside.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 ; see 4 LaFave, supra, § 9.6(e), at 944 (characterizing the Long test as “expansive”). | 2 | 2015–2021 |
McGhee v. Com.
green
2 sentences2016As explained through 4 Consistent with the long held principle of “judicial restraint,” appellate courts decide cases on the “best and narrowest ground available.” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4, 701 S.E.2d 58 , 61 n.4 (2010) (quoting Air Courier Conf. v. Am. 2016As explained through 4 Consistent with the long held principle of “judicial restraint,” appellate courts decide cases on the “best and narrowest ground available.” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620 , 626 n.4, 701 S.E.2d 58 , 61 n.4 (2010) (quoting Air Courier Conf. v. Am. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Long v. Old Point Bank
green
2 sentences2012The first step in the Long test is to examine the occasion of the communication and “determine if the statement was made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding.” Long, 41 Va. Cir. at 414 . 2012The first step in the Long test is to examine the occasion of the communication and “determine if the statement was made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding.” Long, 41 Va. Cir. at 414 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Morris v. Morris
green
1 sentence2003She argues Code § 20-107.3(K) grants the trial court "continuing authority . . . to make any additional orders necessary to effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to [Code § 20-107.3]." Courts in Virginia "operate under the long held principle that a court of chancery need not fully exercise its power at one time but may adapt its relief to the circumstances of a particular case." Morris, 3 Va. App. at 306 , 349 S.E.2d at 663 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.