walk-and-turn test in Hawaii

2020Ferrer held that psychomotor FSTs are nonscientific in nature and that, therefore, an arresting officer may be permitted to testify as to a driver’s performance on such tests and to give a lay opinion based on observations whether the driver was intoxicated when arrested. 95 Hawaiʻi at 427, 23 P.3d at 762 .

2016Ferrer, 95 Hawaii at 426-27 , 23 P.3d at 761-62 (brackets and ellipsis points in original).

2026During the one-leg stand test, Officer Ah Nee observed that Franco's "raised foot was swaying," that Franco raised his arms once, and that he "count[ed] a couple of numbers twice." On this record, we conclude that there is substantial evidence that Franco's operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against casualty. (2) Franco contends that "[t]he district court plainly erred in failing to strike Officer Ah Nee's testimony that impermissibly stated a legal conclusion." (

2026During the one-leg stand test, Officer Ah Nee observed that Franco's "raised foot was swaying," that Franco raised his arms once, and that he "count[ed] a couple of numbers twice." On this record, we conclude that there is substantial evidence that Franco's operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against casualty. (2) Franco contends that "[t]he district court plainly erred in failing to strike Officer Ah Nee's testimony that impermissibly stated a legal conclusion." (

2025Moreover, "[i]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is the province of the trier of fact." State v. Pomroy, 132 Hawai#i 85, 95, 319 P.3d 1093, 1103 (2014).

2023They testified that: Okawa was stopped for driving at an excessive rate of speed; Okawa fumbled with his driver's license, registration and insurance card when providing them to Officer Aberilla; Officer Aberilla could smell a strong odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle; Okawa had a "blank stare[] and red and watery eyes"; during the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus portion of the standardized field sobriety test, Officer Borges observed that Okawa had "difficulty entering into the initial position to do the test[,]" "stood in a different direction on two different 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'

2023They testified that: Okawa was stopped for driving at an excessive rate of speed; Okawa fumbled with his driver's license, registration and insurance card when providing them to Officer Aberilla; Officer Aberilla could smell a strong odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle; Okawa had a "blank stare[] and red and watery eyes"; during the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus portion of the standardized field sobriety test, Officer Borges observed that Okawa had "difficulty entering into the initial position to do the test[,]" "stood in a different direction on two different 5 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'

2021When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 576-77 , 827 P.2d 648, 651 (1992), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Pedro's OVUII conviction. 3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment, entered on March 29, 2019, in the District Court of the Third Circuit, Kona Division, is affirmed.

2021When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 576-77 , 827 P.2d 648, 651 (1992), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Pedro's OVUII conviction. 3 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment, entered on March 29, 2019, in the District Court of the Third Circuit, Kona Division, is affirmed.

2020Under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1), (a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or assumes actual physical control of a vehicle: (1) While under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair the person’s normal mental 26 Uchima indicates in a footnote of his Application that the United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, noted that the officer’s request in that case to count aloud during two tests of the FST were “exceptions” to the Court’s rule concerning “carefully scripted instructions.” (Citing 496 U.S.

2020See id.

2007In Park v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 271, 279 , 859 P.2d 917, 921 (1993), the ICA held that "the statement that `[t]he Intoxilyzer used ha[s] been in proper working order when the test was conducted' presupposes that the supervisor tested the machine and that it was working properly, thus fulfilling the requirement of HRS § 286-257(a)(2)(C)" (now HRS § 291E-36(a)(2)(C)).

2007In Park v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 271, 279 , 859 P.2d 917, 921 (1993), the ICA held that "the statement that `[t]he Intoxilyzer used ha[s] been in proper working order when the test was conducted' presupposes that the supervisor tested the machine and that it was working properly, thus fulfilling the requirement of HRS § 286-257(a)(2)(C)" (now HRS § 291E-36(a)(2)(C)).

1999State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d at 686 (footnotes omitted).