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10 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 2013–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Iowa v. Joseph D. Cerettigreen2 sentences2026Id. at 96 (recognizing attempted homicide as a homicide offense under the one-homicide rule); see also Termaat v. State, 867 N.W.2d 853, 854 (relying on precedent to determine that attempted murder “could not be defined as a ‘homicide offense’” under the one-homicide rule) (citation omitted). 2026Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at 95–96 (noting that multiple punishments would also violate rule 2.22(3)); Henry, 483 N.W.2d at 4 ; Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 4 Finney’s homicide offense, however, was second-degree murder instead of involuntary manslaughter. 8 at 383; see also Noble, 2018 WL 1433797 , at *2 (clarifying that the one- homicide rule limits punishment, not prosecution, for offenses arising from a single death when one offense is a homicide offense and the other is not). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Fixgreen2 sentences2026We have noted an important nuance to the one-homicide rule in two previous cases: while the rule protects defendants from excessive sentencing, it is “not technically rooted in either the constitutional double jeopardy clauses or the merger statute at Iowa Code section 701.9.” Fix, 830 N.W.2d at 748 ; see also Noble v. Iowa Dist. 2021See State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2015) (stating the one-homicide rule “prohibits ‘a trial court from entering judgments and imposing sentences for multiple homicide offenses if the defendant was convicted for killing only one person’” (quoting State v. Fix, 830 N.W.2d 744, 745 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013))). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Wissinggreen2 sentences2013The one homicide rule merely states that “where the offenses arise from one homicide, we permit sentencing on only one of the two homicide offenses.” State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1972), where we cited secondary sources in supporting the rule that “two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide . . . is double punishment”). 2013The one homicide rule merely states that “where the offenses arise from one homicide, we permit sentencing on only one of the two homicide offenses.” State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 68, 68 (Iowa 1972), where we cited secondary sources in supporting the rule that “two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide ... is double punishment”). | 3 | 3 |
Philip Dean Termaat, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowagreen2 sentences2026Id. at 96 (recognizing attempted homicide as a homicide offense under the one-homicide rule); see also Termaat v. State, 867 N.W.2d 853, 854 (relying on precedent to determine that attempted murder “could not be defined as a ‘homicide offense’” under the one-homicide rule) (citation omitted). 2026Id. at 96 (recognizing attempted homicide as a homicide offense under the one-homicide rule); see also Termaat v. State, 867 N.W.2d 853, 854 (relying on precedent to determine that attempted murder “could not be defined as a ‘homicide offense’” under the one-homicide rule) (citation omitted). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Lathamgreen2 sentences2015Termaat v. State, 867 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015); accord People v. Latham, 631 N.E.2d 83, 85 (N.Y. 1994) (“Attempted murder—which fails to cause the death of a person—is . . . by definition a ‘nonhomicide’ 16 offense.”). 2015Termaat v. State, 867 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa Ct.App.2015); accord People v. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d 233 , 609 N.Y.S.2d 141 , 631 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1994) (“Attempted murder — which fails to cause the death of a person — is ... by definition a ‘nonhomicide’ offense.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gilroygreen2 sentences2013The one homicide rule merely states that “where the offenses arise from one homicide, we permit sentencing on only one of the two homicide offenses.” State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1972), where we cited secondary sources in supporting the rule that “two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide . . . is double punishment”). 2013See id. (“Although Wissing has not challenged on appeal the two convictions arising from only one homicide, we believe this issue should be addressed.”); Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d at 68 (“Although defendant has at no time, either in trial court or here, challenged the two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide we are satisfied this is double punishment which cannot be allowed to stand.”). | 2 | 2 |
Diaz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d at 383 ; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 449 (1912). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Finnelgreen1 sentence2026See State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41 , 43–44 (Iowa 1994) (holding double jeopardy bars multiple punishment for the same offense; no person may be convicted of a public offense that is a lesser- included offense of another crime of which the person is convicted); State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995) (noting where two convictions arise from one death, we permit sentencing on only one of the homicide offenses). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKettrickgreen1 sentence2023See Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at 96 (explaining the one-homicide rule “prohibits ‘a trial court from entering judgments and imposing sentences for multiple homicide offenses if the defendant was convicted for killing only one person’” (citation omitted)); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 58 (Iowa 1992) (finding defendant could not be convicted of separate offenses and receive multiple punishments for a single assaultive act); see also Iowa Code §§ 707 .6A(4) (criminalizing causing a serious injury by vehicle), 708.4(1) (criminalizing willful injury causing a serious injury). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Judith Renae Uttergreen1 sentence2018See State v. Utter , 803 N.W.2d 647 , 651 (Iowa 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Hepp v. Zinnelgreen2 sentences2013The one homicide rule merely states that “where the offenses arise from one homicide, we permit sentencing on only one of the two homicide offenses.” State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 68, 68 (Iowa 1972), where we cited secondary sources in supporting the rule that “two sentences imposed as the result of one homicide ... is double punishment”). 2013Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodygreen1 sentence2013Fix argues under State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2000), the parties may not rely on a plea agreement to uphold an illegal sentence, and the State is the party which “bears the consequences” of a faulty assumption that the bargained-for sentence was legal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Birkestrandgreen1 sentence2013The State relies on State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Iowa 1976), for the proposition that the protection against double punishment is a “waivable privilege.” The State urges recognizing such a waiver would prevent the defendant from “trifling with the courts by attempting to better [his plea] bargain through the appellate process.” In his reply brief, Fix contends even if Birkestrand stands for the proposition that the Gilroy rule can be waived, waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the prosecution bears the burden of affirmatively showing he intended to relin | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Henry
green
2 sentences2026Shifting gears, the State argues that Finney’s appeal is controlled by State v. Henry, 483 N.W.2d 2 , 4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (finding that victim’s death after Henry’s guilty plea to willful injury was a new fact, so the trial for murder did not place him twice in jeopardy), and State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377 , 382–83 (Iowa 2000) (citing Henry and finding successive prosecution for felony murder following death of child was not barred by earlier conviction for felony child endangerment). 2026Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at 95–96 (noting that multiple punishments would also violate rule 2.22(3)); Henry, 483 N.W.2d at 4 ; Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 4 Finney’s homicide offense, however, was second-degree murder instead of involuntary manslaughter. 8 at 383; see also Noble, 2018 WL 1433797 , at *2 (clarifying that the one- homicide rule limits punishment, not prosecution, for offenses arising from a single death when one offense is a homicide offense and the other is not). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Ruesga
green
1 sentence2026Shifting gears, the State argues that Finney’s appeal is controlled by State v. Henry, 483 N.W.2d 2 , 4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (finding that victim’s death after Henry’s guilty plea to willful injury was a new fact, so the trial for murder did not place him twice in jeopardy), and State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377 , 382–83 (Iowa 2000) (citing Henry and finding successive prosecution for felony murder following death of child was not barred by earlier conviction for felony child endangerment). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Iowa’s second application of the one-homicide rule came more than two decades later when the supreme court decided in Wissing that judgments and sentences for both vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter, while not constituting the same offense under the double jeopardy test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), could not be permitted under the Gilroy holding. 2013Iowa’s second application of the one-homicide rule came more than two decades later when the supreme court decided in Wissing that judgments and sentences for both vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter, while not constituting the same offense under the double jeopardy test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), could not be permitted under the Gilroy holding. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.