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10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ellison v. Kane County Sheriff's Office Merit Commissiongreen2 sentences2019Id. at 256 (citing Ellison v. Kane County Sheriff’s Office Merit Commission, 108 Ill. 1999Ellison, 108 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
AEH Construction, Inc. v. Department of Laborgreen1 sentence2023However, “[e]ven clear indications that the administrative agency will rule adversely are not sufficient to bypass or terminate the administrative process.” AEH Construction, Inc. v. State Department of Labor, 318 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission
green
2 sentences2001Dock Club, 83 Ill. 1982The fact that there are clear indications that the administrative agency will rule adversely is generally insufficient to abort the administrative process. ( 83 Ill. | 4 | 1982–2001 |
Goodwin v. McHenry County Sheriff's Office Merit Commission
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 256 (citing Ellison v. Kane County Sheriff’s Office Merit Commission, 108 Ill. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Robert Hameetman, Cross-Appellee v. The City of Chicago, Cross-Appellants
green
1 sentence1992Moreover, we are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s statement that the reason for requiring an administrative agency or its hearing officer to state the reasons for its determination “is a back-up safeguard, designed to make sure, so far as it is possible to do so, that the hearing which due process requires is a meaningful one, as it would not be if the decision maker based his decision on materials outside of the record that was compiled at the hearing, other than such extra-record materials as the agency could properly take official notice of. [Citations.]” (Hameetman v. Cit | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Burke v. Board of Review
green
1 sentence1991(Burke, 132 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences1979Jur. 2d Administrative Law §185, at 989 (1962).) In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Department of Revenue (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 564, 566 , the administrative agency held a hearing on stipulated facts and rendered a ruling on the application of law to those facts. 1979The supreme court, however, did not state that a hearing should not have been held, but rather noted that “[s]ince the facts are not in dispute their legal effect becomes a matter of law reviewable by this court.” Caterpillar, 29 Ill. 2d 564, 566 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.