Lopez claim in California

2024(See People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.) At the first step of the Lopez analysis, the court, applying the standard set forth in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , decides whether “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied, because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant

2024(See People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.) At the first step of the Lopez analysis, the court, applying the standard set forth in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , decides whether “to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court relied, because the amended statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the defendant

2023(See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840 .) However, we need not belabor the point because, as now discussed, even if these factors are excluded from step two of the Lopez analysis, there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a lower sentence on counts 7 through 9.

2023(See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840 .) However, we need not belabor the point because, as now discussed, even if these factors are excluded from step two of the Lopez analysis, there is no reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a lower sentence on counts 7 through 9.

2023This denial was correct if “the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that [Lopez] is ineligible for relief.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) 6 Lopez contends that the record does not do so, as “section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires assisting the act of killing itself, rather than just the underlying felony, because it uses the phrase ‘assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.’ (Italics added.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) The majority rejects Lopez’s claim on the view that the actus reus required by section 189(e)(2) is identical

2023This denial was correct if “the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that [Lopez] is ineligible for relief.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) 6 Lopez contends that the record does not do so, as “section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires assisting the act of killing itself, rather than just the underlying felony, because it uses the phrase ‘assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.’ (Italics added.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) The majority rejects Lopez’s claim on the view that the actus reus required by section 189(e)(2) is identical

2026A. Legal Standard Section 1170, subdivision (b), generally provides that a sentence may not exceed the middle term, except when it finds aggravating circumstances justify a higher sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Both section 1170, subdivision (b), and the Sixth Amendment require that these aggravating factors be stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 281 ; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 759 (Lynch) [“An upper term sentence may be imposed ‘only’ when circumstances

2026A. Legal Standard Section 1170, subdivision (b), generally provides that a sentence may not exceed the middle term, except when it finds aggravating circumstances justify a higher sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Both section 1170, subdivision (b), and the Sixth Amendment require that these aggravating factors be stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 281 ; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 , 759 (Lynch) [“An upper term sentence may be imposed ‘only’ when circumstances

2022In her petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, Lopez argued for the first time that there was no DSA legally in effect between Dr. Ledesma and Freesemann because the DSA was “revoked by operation of law” due to “incapacity of the principal.” In her petition for review before this court, Lopez argued for the first time that the DSA between Dr. Koire and Hughes had also been revoked. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293.) As a matter of p

2022In her petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeal, Lopez argued for the first time that there was no DSA legally in effect between Dr. Ledesma and Freesemann because the DSA was “revoked by operation of law” due to “incapacity of the principal.” In her petition for review before this court, Lopez argued for the first time that the DSA between Dr. Koire and Hughes had also been revoked. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293.) As a matter of p

2021(Ibid.) The Lopez court wrote that, as between the substantial evidence standard and the George T. mixed standard, “We do not 21 find it necessary to determine which standard applies in the present case because we would affirm under either one.” (Lopez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 447 .) Lopez noted that “if independent review is appropriate, it is applicable only to issues that could implicate the First Amendment, such as the content of the appellant’s communications; sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding on intent is determined according to the usual substantial evidence

2021On August 18, 2015 we affirmed the judgment, rejecting Lopez’s claim that his conviction was not supported by substantial evidence.2 (People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436 , review den.

2020(In re Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 77, fn. 18 ; Moore, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 171 .) Thus, we are limited to Aldaco’s preliminary hearing testimony that he “start[ed] drilling the frame rail through the plastic” (italics added), though he also referred to the covering material during the preliminary hearing as “sheet metal.” In either event, we agree with the Attorney General that “the most reasonable interpretation of [this] testimony is that [Aldaco] drilled through where the drain hole would have been, into material . . . that comprised the hidden compartment.” We will analyze Lopez

2016Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused, [citation]; his lack of education, [citation]; or his low intelligence, [citation]; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, [citation]; the length of detention, [citation]; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, [citation]; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, [citation].” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226 .) 24 Contrary to Lopez’s claim, the video demonstrates that the interview room was not uncomfortably small.

2013The Geier court held that the DNA report was not a testimonial statement under Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 , because it was a contemporaneous recordation of observable events rather than documentation of past events relating to criminal activity. ( Geier at pp. 605-606 .) As the Lopez court acknowledged, two years after Geier was decided, “the high court in Melendez-Diaz said that a laboratory report may be testimonial, and thus inadmissible even if it ‘ “contains near contemporaneous observations of [a scientific] test.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 581 .) 34 The Lopez cou

2013(Ibid.) 39 many business records will be admissible absent confrontation because they were created for the administration of an entity’s business affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact at trial. ( Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 321-324.) Furthermore, under the Lopez test, a statement is not testimonial unless its “primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution . . . .” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 582 .) However, if a business record embodies the essential components of a testimonial statement, it is subject to the requirements of the Co

1967Accordingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest injustice which the rejection of Lopez , at the virtual end of its natural life, would entail.” (People v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d 681, 691 .) “ [W]e continue to follow Escobedo in the few remaining cases which were pending on direct review when that decision was announced.” (Id. at p. 691, fn. 10.) Cases that were final before Escobedo , but which must now be reconsidered on appeal, do not arise under the “natural life” of Lopez .

1967Accordingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest injustice which the rejection of Lopez, at the virtual end of its natural life, would entail." (People v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d 681, 691 .) "[W]e continue to follow Escobedo in the few remaining cases which were pending on direct review when that decision was announced." (Id at p. 691, fn. 10.) Cases that were final before Escobedo, but which must now *1004 be reconsidered on appeal, do not arise under the "natural life" of Lopez.

2026(See People v. Miranda- Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 29 , quoting People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [“[t]he defendant must generally object ‘in a timely fashion—and on the same ground,’ and must ‘request[] that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety’ ”].) We nonetheless reach the merits of these claims because Lopez alternatively asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve these issues.

2026DISCUSSION I Applicable Principles of Law To discipline a permanent state employee, the “employer, in this case CDCR, must first determine whether there is cause for discipline and, if so, what discipline to impose.” (Rodgers v. State Personnel Bd. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1 , 10 (Rodgers).) “To comply with due process, the employer must give the employee notice of and reasons for the proposed disciplinary action and give the employee an opportunity to respond.” (Ibid., citing § 19574 & Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215 .) “Except in cases involving minor disciplinary matter

2026As a general matter, such a retrospective inquiry into appellate defense counsel’s strategic decisions is susceptible to “the distorting effects of hindsight.” (In re Valdez (2010) 49 Cal.4th 715, 729 .) Although sometimes a claim with merit is clear from existing authority, it is more frequently murky.

2026On remand, the 8 new trial judge is directed to exercise its discretion to determine the appropriate scope of discovery by weighing the factors identified in Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138 , 168, citing City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134 .

2026(Gyorgy, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 675.) The stop cannot be based on ““‘mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch.’”” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 757 .) Urrutiaguillen argued below that Lopez’s inquiry and search of the vehicle were a hunch unsupported by reasonable suspicion.

2025“The victim of the murder was not a peace officer . . . .” 2 In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 . 3 The prosecution filed a response and attached a copy of the amended complaint and Lopez’s plea form.

2025(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 .) After reviewing the entire record de novo, we dismiss the appeal as to the trial court’s denial of Lopez’s motion to stay the restitution fines and affirm the postjudgment order as to Lopez’s petition for resentencing.

2025(People v. Francis (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 873, 879 .) The trial court’s detailed analysis of Lopez’s claim shows it well understood the requirements of section 1385, subdivision (c).

2024Lopez’s claim also fails on the merits. “ ‘ “ ‘Under the federal Constitution, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct only if the conduct infects the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Misconduct that falls short of a federal due process violation may nevertheless violate state law if it ‘involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or 19 jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 909–910.) “Reversal of a judgment of conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct